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Abstract
The increasing penetration of distributed power generation into the power distribu-
tion domain necessitates reliable and QoS-aware communication in order to safely man-
age the grid. The management of this complex cyber-physical system, called the Smart
Grid (SG), requires responsive, scalable and high-bandwidth communication, which is of-
ten beyond the capabilities of the classical closed communication networks of the power
grid. Consequently, the use of scalable public IP-based networks is increasingly being ad-
vocated. However, a direct consequence of the use of public networks is the exposure of
the SG to varied reliability/security risks. In particular, the current Internet infrastructure
does not support end-to-end (E2E) QoS-guaranteed communication. Furthermore, pub-
lic networks’ more open structure versus proprietary networks potentially exposes the
SG to cyberattacks such as Denial-of-Service (DoS) and Distributed DoS (DDoS) which
can compromise the high availability and responsiveness of the SG applications. Thus,
there is need for new lightweight mechanisms that can provide both E2E communication
guarantees along with strong DoS/DDoS attack protection.
To address this requirement, we first propose an overlay network based approach.
This approach provides a QoS guarantee across the network with a dedicated QoS rout-
ing mechanism taking into account three parameters: reliability, latency and bandwidth
for SG applications. To achieve the QoS guarantee, we also develop two additional mech-
anisms: (a) a multipath routing scheme that satisfies the critical applications’ high re-
liability requirements by employing E2E physically-disjoint paths, and (b) an altruistic
resource allocation scheme with the QoS routing mechanism targeting QoS-guaranteed
communication for applications having strict QoS requirements.
Second, we propose a novel DDoS defense mechanism which leverages: (1) a semi-
trusted P2P-based publish-subscribe (pub-sub) system providing a proactive counter-
measure for DoS/DDoS attacks and secure group communications by aid of a group key
management system, (2) a data diffusion mechanism that spreads the data packets over
all the servers versus a single server to provide a robust protection against volume-based
DDoS attacks that would affect some of the servers, and (3) a multi-homing-based fast
recovery mechanism for detecting and requesting the dropped packets, thus paving the
way for meeting the stringent latency requirements of SG applications.
Third, we develop a cloud-assisted DDoS attack resilient communication platform,
built on the proposed defense mechanism discussed above. To prevent transport or appli-
cation layer DDoS attacks, this platform implements a port hopping approach, switching
the open port of a server over a function of both time and a secret (shared between au-
thorized clients and server), thus efficiently dropping packets with invalid port number.
iv
By leveraging the rapid-elasticity characteristic of the cloud, we can instantiate replica
servers to take over the attacked servers without blocking the all traffic due to the data
diffusion mechanism. Moreover, we propose a shuffling-based containment mechanism
in order to quarantine malicious clients, which can mount a DDoS attack, exploiting the
shared secret in a remarkably short time. Accordingly, the effect of a DDoS attack based
on the compromised secret of the malicious clients is minimized.
Finally, to counter the transport and application layer DoS/DDoS attacks which are
launched by compromised SG devices, we propose a proactive and robust extension of
the Multipath-TCP (MPTCP) that mitigates such attacks by using a novel stream hopping
MPTCP mechanism, termed MPTCP-H. Unlike the port hopping mechanism, MPTCP-H
does not need a shared secret and time-sync between the clients. The proposed MPTCP-H
hides the open port numbers of the connection from an attacker by renewing (over time)
the subflows over new port numbers without perturbing the SG data traffic.
Our results demonstrate that both in the attack and attack-free scenarios, the proposed
mechanisms provide a significant availability degree. The results also indicate a reason-
able overhead in terms of additional latency and message for the proposed approaches.
vKurzfassung
Die zunehmende Verbreitung dezentraler Stromerzeugung in der Energieverteilungs-
domäne erfordert eine zuverlässige und QoS-fähige Kommunikation, um das Strom-
netz sicher zu managen. Die Verwaltung dieses komplexen Cyber-physikalischen Sys-
tems, genannt Smart Grid (SG), erfordert eine reaktionsfähige, skalierbare und hochband-
breitige Kommunikation, die oft jenseits der Fähigkeiten der klassischen geschlossenen
Kommunikationsnetze des Stromnetzes liegt. Der Einsatz skalierbarer öffentlicher IP-
basierter Netzwerke wird daher zunehmend befürwortet. Eine unmittelbare Konsequenz
der Nutzung öffentlicher Netze ist jedoch die Exposition des SG gegenüber vielfältigen
Zuverlässigkeits- und Sicherheitsrisiken. Insbesondere unterstützt die aktuelle Internet-
Infrastruktur keine Kommunikation mit Ende-zu-Ende (E2E) QoS-Garantien. Darüber
hinaus setzt die offene Struktur öffentlicher Netzwerke im Vergleich zu proprietären
Netzwerken das SG potenziell Cyberattacken wie Denial-of-Service (DoS) und verteilte
DoS (DDoS) aus, welche die hohe Verfügbarkeit und schnelle Reaktionsfähigkeit der
SG-Anwendungen beeinträchtigen können. Deswegen besteht ein Bedarf an neuen le-
ichtgewichtigen Mechanismen, die sowohl Ende-zu-Ende-Kommunikationsgarantien als
auch einen starken Schutz gegen DoS- und DDoS-Angriffe bieten.
Um diesen Anforderung gerecht zu werden, schlagen wir zunächst einen Overlay-Ne
tzwerk-Ansatz vor, der QoS-Garantien im gesamten Netzwerk mittels eines dedizierten
QoS-Routing-Mechanismus bereitstellt, wobei drei Parameter berücksichtigt werden: Zu-
verlässigkeit, Latenz und Bandbreite für SG-Anwendungen. Um die QoS-Garantie zu
erreichen, entwickeln wir außerdem zwei zusätzliche Mechanismen: (a) ein Multipath-
Routing-Schema, das die kritischen Anwendungen für ihre hohen Zuverlässigkeitsan-
forderungen durch Verwendung von physisch disjunkten Pfaden kompensiert und (b)
eine altruistisches Ressourcenzuweisung mit dem QoS Routing-Mechanismus, der auf
QoS-garantierte Kommunikation für Anwendungen mit strengen QoS-Anforderungen
abzielt.
Zweitens schlagen wir einen neuartigen DDoS-Abwehr-Mechanismus vor, unter Auss-
chöpfung von: (1) einem bedingt vertrauenswürdigen P2P-basierten Publish-Subscribe
(Pub-Sub) System, welches proaktive Gegenmaßnahmen für DoS/DDoS-Angriffe und
sichere Gruppen-Kommunikation durch ein gruppenbasiertes Schlüsselverwaltungssys-
tem beinhaltet, (2) einem Mechanismus zur Diffusion von Daten, der die Datenpakete
über alle Server im Vergleich zu einem einzigen Server verbreitet, um einen robusten
Schutz gegen volumenbasierte DDoS-Angriffe bereitzustellen, die einige der Server beein-
trächtigen würden, und (3) einem schnellen Multi-Homing-basierten Wiederherstellungs
Mechanismus zur Detektion und Wiederholung von verlorenen Paketen, womit der Weg
geebnet wird für die Erfüllung der strengen Latenzanforderungen von SG-Anwendungen.
Drittens entwickeln wir eine Cloud-unterstÃijtzte Kommunikationsplattform, DDoS-
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Angriffen widersteht und auf dem oben besprochenen Verteidigungsmechanismus auf-
baut. Um DDoS-Angriffe auf Transport- oder Anwendungsebene zu verhindern, ver-
wendet diese Plattform einen Port-Hopping-Ansatz. Dabei wird der offene Port des
Servers als Funktion der Zeit und eines zwischen autorisierten Clients und Server geteiltes
Geheimnis gewechselt und somit Pakete mit ungültiger Portnummer effizient gelöscht.
Danke der reaktionsschnellen Elastizität der Cloud und unseres Datendiffusionsmecha-
nismuses, können wir Replikatserver instanziieren, welche die Aufgaben der angegriffe-
nen Server übernehmen ohne den gesamten Verkehr zu blockieren. Darüber hinaus schla-
gen wir einen Shuffling-basierten Containment Mechanismus vor, um bösartige Clients
zu isolieren, die eine DDoS-Attacke unter Ausnutzung des gemeinsamen Geheimnisses
in einer besonders kurzen Zeit ausführen können. Dementsprechend wird die Auswirkung
eines DDoS-Angriffs, der auf dem kompromittierten Geheimnis der böswilligen Clients
basiert, minimiert.
Schließlich, um DoS- und DDoS-Angriffen auf Transport- und Anwendungsschicht
entgegenzuwirken, die von kompromittierten SG-Geräten gestartet werden, schlagen wir
eine proaktive und robuste Erweiterung von Multipath-TCP (MPTCP) vor, die solche
Angriffe mithilfe eines neuartigen Stream-Hopping-Mechanismus, MPTCP-H genannt,
entschärft. MPTCP-H benötigt kein gemeinsames Geheimnis und Zeitsynchronisation
zwischen den Clients im Gegensatz zu dem oben beschriebenen Port-Hopping-Mechanis
mus. Das vorgeschlagene MPTCP-H verbirgt die offenen Portnummern der Verbindung
vor einem Angreifer indem (im Laufe der Zeit) die Unterströme über neue Portnummern
erneuert werden, ohne den SG-Datenverkehr zu stören.
Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die vorgeschlagenen Mechanismen sowohl in Szenar-
ien mit Angriffen als auch in angriffsfreien Szenarien einen erheblichen Verfügbarkeits-
grad bieten.Die Ergebnisse zeigen auch einen angemessenen Zusatzaufwand hinsichtlich
zusätzlicher Latenzzeiten und Nachrichten für die vorgeschlagenen Ansätze an.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction and Problem Context
The traditional power grid is evolving into the Smart Grid (SG) to incorporate hetero-
geneous and geographically distributed energy sources for overall cost-effective power
generation and distribution. However, the penetration of distributed power generation
sources into the power distribution grid causes two-way electricity flows within the grid.
This requires active management of the distribution grids, which were typically designed
to support only one-way power distribution [WYB15].
In order to deal with such a complex system, utility companies employ management
systems such as wide area monitoring, protection and control (WAMPAC) and advanced
distribution automation (ADA) among others. WAMPAC and ADA (and other SG apps)
need to acquire and deliver large amounts of data with latency needs of 100ms-5sec and
availability/reliability needs of 99.00%-99.999% [WYB15; OK10]. To achieve this, the elec-
tric utility companies currently employ proprietary, simple centralized automation net-
works. However, these centralized networks invariably encounter scalability issues to
deal with the (a) increasingly large and ad hoc SG structure, and (b) large amount of data
traffic produced by the thousands of SG devices [Wei+10; Bud+10]. The SG requires a
flexible and scalable network that can provide low-latency, high-availability communi-
cation. While an ideal solution would be an IP-based dedicated network, the cost-based
implications result in the use of public networks, such as the Internet [YBG11].
An important caveat of inheriting the Internet’s reliability risks and security vulnera-
bilities is that they can be exploited by hackers causing security and safety risks for not
only the cyber-system but also for physical systems, e.g., electrical grids/appliances. To
address these risks, many current IT (Information Technology) security and reliability ap-
proaches cannot be easily deployed in the SG automation network, since the SG’s security
and reliability requirements differ from classical IT systems on a number of dimensions,
as follows: (1) IT security typically focuses on server-side protection versus client-side by
deploying, for example, a powerful firewall on the server-side, while in the SG both client
(SG generators, devices) and server-side require the same level of protection, (2) unlike
the best-effort delivery mechanism of the Internet, the SG data traffic requires explicit
assurance on timely delivery of information, and (3) most SG devices have constrained
computational capacity unlike the abundant capacity found with IT systems [Wei+10].
A number of approaches to provide secure and reliable communication service for SG
applications have been proposed [Kim+12; Nav+13; Hei+15; Cio+15; Bak+11]. However,
none of the existing methods focus on providing secure and reliable communication over
the public network for SG applications requiring high availability, especially in the case
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of intentional/unintentional failure of intermediary network devices, such as routers, or
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks on the SG devices.
1.1 Problem Statement
In this thesis, the focus is on designing a communication infrastructure that provides
a reliable and secure communication service for SG applications in the IP-based public
networks such as the Internet1. When utilizing the Internet infrastructure for SG applica-
tions, intentional or unintentional communication failures are the most serious concern
due to the Internet’s relatively open and less manageable structure, compared to propri-
etary networks. The loss of availability caused by intentional or unintentional commu-
nication failures can lead to safety risks in the power grid. The communication failures
can be 1) unintentional or intentional failures in the intermediary communication devices
such as routers, as detailed in the problem (P1), and/or 2) intentional failures of the SG
devices that are caused by DoS/DDoS attacks, i.e., volume-based DoS/DDoS attacks (P2),
transport/application-layer DoS/DDoS attacks (P3), and internal DoS/DDoS attacks ex-
ploiting the elevated privileges of the compromised nodes (P4). Within this context, we
focus on the following problems, discussed below, to provide an assured availability for
SG communication.
1.1.1 (P1) The Best-effort Delivery Service Provided by the Internet Vi-
olates the Strict QoS Requirements of the SG Applications.
While designing a communication platform for the SG using the Internet infrastructure,
the first challenge is to ensure the provision of the required quality-of-service (QoS)2 for
the SG applications, since the Internet does not innately provide the necessary QoS guar-
antees for particularly the safety-critical applications requiring both low latency and high
reliability. One reason for this deficiency is that the routing among Autonomous Sys-
tems (ASes) on the Internet3 depends on commercial considerations, resulting from con-
tracts among these ASes/ISPs. The contracts promote low cost links rather than low
latency/high quality links. In addition, the BGP convergence time (i.e., the time needed
for all routers to have a consistent view of the network after a failure) might take several
minutes or sometimes up to 20 or 30 minutes. This can cause delays or even loss of SG
data traffic, which can pose safety risks for the power grid [Wan+13].
Recently, some techniques [And+01; Sub+04; LK12] have been proposed to provide
QoS-aware communication over the public network. The suggested approaches aim to
improve the availability level of the communication system in a best-effort manner. These
approaches, however, do not address the delivery guarantee for each message taking
1In this thesis, public networks refer to the Internet infrastructure. Therefore, they are interchangeably
used throughout this thesis.
2In this thesis, we consider two factors for QoS, i.e., latency and availability, unless otherwise stated.
Moreover, availability and reliability of SG communication network are interchangeable [OK10].
3BGP:Border Gateway Protocol is typically used for routing among Autonomous Systems
(ASes)/Internet Service Providers(ISPs)
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into account each application’s availability requirement, particularly in cases where long-
duration underlay failures occur. Therefore, providing a high availability, particularly
for safety-critical SG applications even in the case of intentional/unintentional failures of
intermediary communication devices is a serious problem that has not been addressed.
1.1.2 (P2) Volume-based DDoS Attacks on a Large Amount of SG De-
vices, Launched by Adversaries Controlling a Large Botnet.
While decreasing the cost of operation, employing public networks naturally makes the
power grids vulnerable to cyber attacks. An adversary, whose aim is to render critical de-
vices inaccessible, can mount a DDoS attack against either intermediary network devices
or the SG devices directly. The former is covered by problem (P1). However, the latter,
particularly volume-based DDoS attacks on the SG devices in the Internet, also represents
a major threat to the SG applications, considering SG applications’ stringent availability
and latency requirements [AP15]. IT-based cyber security solutions, e.g., firewalls and
intrusion detection systems (IDS), are known to be effective in securing the IT infrastruc-
ture. However, the resource constraints (computational, memory and bandwidth) of SG
devices often preclude the direct applicability of such IT solutions [Wei+10].
Moreover, as availability constitutes a safety property for SG applications (especially
for control functions), deploying proactive defense mechanisms becomes indispensable
for SG communication. Proactive defense mechanisms are introduced as countermea-
sures, e.g., [Sta+05; Jia+14] constantly move/hide the attack surface of the system to boost
the cost of an successful attack for the attacker. However, since these proactive defense
mechanisms are mainly designed to mitigate DDoS attacks in typical web applications re-
quiring low availability, they are not suitable for safety critical SG applications requiring
high availability and responsiveness [SK05].
1.1.3 (P3) Application and Transport Layer DoS/DDoS Attacks.
Transport and application layer DoS/DDoS attacks, such as DNS and HTTP flooding
attacks, exploit network protocol or application vulnerabilities of the target in order to
deplete the target’s resources [ZJT13; Mor+11]. Whereas in this problem (P3) the attack-
ers need to discover the vulnerabilities in the transport and application layers to launch
such attacks, in the problem (P2) the adversaries require a large enough Botnet to mount
volume-based DoS/DDoS attacks. An attacker that manages a large Botnet and discov-
ers the vulnerabilities can bring down many more target devices, which can cause catas-
trophic damage on the power grid [AP15].
To address the application and transport layer attacks, SG communication networks
need to have lightweight security mechanisms for preventive/proactive defenses to such
DoS/DDoS attacks due to the constrained resources of the SG devices. The featured ap-
proaches to address such attacks are port hopping based DoS/DDoS defense mechanisms
[LT04; FPT12], which periodically switch an open port of a service in a pseudorandom
manner and confuse potential intruders. The port hopping mechanism facilitates both the
detection and filtering of unauthenticated packets with a lower cost and does not require
changes in the existing systems and protocols [LWC14]. However, these mechanisms, as
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in all capability-based defense mechanisms, use a key shared among each communicat-
ing party for determination of the current open port, posing a high security risk for the
SG communication.
1.1.4 (P4) DoS/DDoS Attacks Launched by Compromised SG Devices
Against the Other SG Devices.
The deployment of SG devices in a wide geographical area renders it difficult to protect
them from being physically compromised [AP17]. The attackers can use the compromised
SG devices inside a wide area network (WAN) to launch DoS/DDoS attacks on critical SG
devices [Mor+11; AP17]. The attacker exploits the elevated privileges of the compromised
device(s) that are common with target devices in WAN, such as secret keys or specific
protocol/application knowledge that enable the attacker to bring down the target at low
cost [AP15; Mor+11]. Since SG applications heavily depend on the availability of the
communication network, such an attack originating from internal-devices and targeting
some critical SG devices in WAN should be proactively mitigated.
1.2 Research Questions
Given the problems associated with using the public network for SG applications, we
have formulated the following four research questions that guide the research presented
in this thesis:
1.2.1 (R1) How to Maintain QoS of the SG Applications Between Each
Node in the case of Failure or Degradation of Intermediary Net-
work Devices in the Internet?
This research question (R1) targets problem (P1). As mentioned in problem (P1) (Sec-
tion 1.1.1), in instances of intentional/unintentional failure/degradation of intermediary
network devices in the Internet, the SG applications experience unacceptable loss of the
availability. However, the high path redundancy of the Internet infrastructure can be used
to bypass the failed or degraded paths and to meet the QoS requirements of the SG appli-
cations. This research question (R1) is addressed by a substantial technical contribution
(C1).
1.2.2 (R2) How to Mitigate Volume-based DoS/DDoS Attacks over the
Public Network Considering the Constrained Resource of SG De-
vices?
Research question (R1) focuses on QoS-assurance only when the failures or degradations
occur in the intermediary network devices. This leaves open the question as to how to
defend the SG devices against DoS/DDoS attacks that also perturb the QoS requirements.
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Using the public networks increases concerns about the effect of volume-based DDoS at-
tacks that congest the link to the target by sending a high volume of traffic. To counter
such an attack before it saturates the access link of the target, proactive light-weight de-
fense mechanisms are needed for the constrained SG devices. We address the research
question (R2), which targets problem (P2), by the technical contribution (C2).
1.2.3 (R3) How to Counter the Application and Transport Layer DoS/DDoS
Attacks on the Constrained SG Devices?
The other DoS/DDoS related threats to the SG communication are application and trans-
port layer DoS/DDoS attacks where low-rate forged data packets are sent to saturate the
target’s resources by exploiting the vulnerabilities of the target system. These attacks also
can render critical SG devices inaccessible which causes instability in the power grid or
power blackout. To address this issue, a defense mechanism that is light-weight and com-
patible with the current devices is needed. The research question (R3), which targets the
problem (P3), is addressed by the third contribution (C3).
1.2.4 (R4) How to Protect SG Devices from DoS/DDoS Attack by Com-
promised SG Devices?
As the compromised devices act similar to the normal devices and have elevated privi-
leges, such "internal" DoS/DDoS attacks also pose a high threat to significantly damage
the SG communication network and the control system of power network. Therefore,
to protect SG devices from the internal DoS/DDoS attacks, a defense mechanism that
requires fewer common "secrets" between SG devices for protection is needed. The con-
tribution (C4) addresses this research question (R4) targeting problem (P4).
1.2.5 Summary
To provide the required QoS of SG applications in the Internet in the case of intentional/
unintentional failures of intermediary communication devices (R1), we propose an ov
erlay-based network architecture (C1). To counter the volume-based DDoS attacks in
question (R2), we develop a pub-sub4-based DoS/DDoS defense mechanism, as a second
contribution (C2). In addition, to address the application and transport DoS and DDoS
attacks in question (R3), we develop a cloud-assisted DoS/DDoS defense mechanism,
built on (C2), as the third contribution (C3). Moreover, to counter DoS/DDoS attacks
launched by compromised SG devices (R3) against the other SG devices by exploiting
common secrets, we develop a Multipath-TCP extension as the forth contribution (C4),
which is used instead of UDP, employed in all the previous techniques, (C1), (C2), and
(C3).
4Publish-Subscribe
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1.3 Scientific Contributions
We address the questions (R1), (R2), (R3) and (R4) by the following substantial contribu-
tions. First, the contributions of this thesis are detailed (Sections 1.3.1/1.3.2/1.3.3/1.3.4),
and then the problems and the contributions addressing those problems are reviewed
(Section 1.3.5).
1.3.1 (C1) Robust QoS-aware Communication in the Smart Grid
To provide the required latency and reliability of SG applications in the Internet infras-
tructure, we propose a novel overlay network architecture, termed HetGrid. HetGrid
provides reliable and QoS-aware communication on heterogeneous5 networks by over-
coming the degraded paths that are detected by monitoring of the underlay network.
HetGrid selects and employs the "strongest"6 overlay nodes to manage inter-AS commu-
nication rather than placing dedicated servers into each domain. This mechanism only
needs local underlay knowledge to enable reliable communication across the network.
To provide reliable and QoS-aware communication, HetGrid also employs the following
mechanisms in a self-adaptive manner: (1) Source Routing-based QoS Routing (SRQR)
finds the "best" path considering bandwidth, latency, and reliability requirements of the
applications. It also uses altruistic flow allocation (AFA) to reserve the "best" path for
high critical applications. (2) To obtain fault-tolerant communications for high priority
applications, CMR employs adequate paths for multipath routing depending on the reli-
ability requirement of the application. The details of HetGrid approach [DGS14; DGS15]
are presented in Chapter 4.
The simulation result demonstrates that even for BGP router failures or heavy Internet
congestion, HetGrid provides practical QoS-satisfaction rates by employing the above
mechanisms in an adaptive manner. In addition, HetGrid provides a significantly higher
QoS-satisfaction rate for each application compared to direct TCP connections between
pairs. Thus, HetGrid demonstrates both the feasibility of using a heterogeneous network
for SG applications and an architecture to provide a robust QoS-aware communication.
1.3.2 (C2) A Secure and Reliable Communication Platform for the Smart
Grid.
To counter the volume-based attacks on SG devices in public networks, which is not ad-
dressed by HetGrid (C1), we introduce in Chapter 5, a pub-sub-based proactive DDoS
attack defense mechanism as well as its lightweight security mechanism [DS17b], called
SeReCP. By taking into account the constrained SG devices resources and the security re-
quirements of SG applications, SeReCP uses geographically dispersed pub-sub brokers
to proactively counter DDoS attacks that cannot be handled by the constrained SG de-
vices. Targeted or blindly sweeping DDoS attacks against the pub-sub brokers can easily
5In this work, heterogeneous networks refer to the combination of public (i.e., the Internet) and private
networks. In addition, without loss of generality we interchangeably use public network, the Internet and
heterogeneous network.
6In terms of computational power, memory, bandwidth, and multihoming feature
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render some of the critical devices inaccessible and pose safety risks. To address this
issue, SeReCP also employs a data diffusion approach which enables spreading of the
consecutive data packets across the pub-sub brokers by using a token-based stateless au-
thentication mechanism.
In addition, we develop a multihoming-based fast ”recovery” mechanism for SeReCP
to meet the stringent availability and latency requirements of SG applications in the case
of several pub-sub brokers being simultaneously attacked. This mechanism allows each
publisher to transmit every two consecutive data packets to two different network in-
terfaces7 of each pub-sub broker during the diffusion of the publication data over all
brokers. If one of the network interfaces of any broker is under attack, that broker can
request a missing packet after a short waiting time using the remaining functional net-
work interface8. This allows for fast packet ”recovery” compared to classical ACK-based
mechanisms such as TCP’s cumulative ACK. On the other hand, to protect end-to-end
(E2E) confidentiality and integrity of the data, we propose a group key management sys-
tem. This system provides role-based access rights for both publisher and subscriber in
addition to protection from replay attacks.
To assess the effectiveness of our approach against DDoS attacks in the Internet in-
frastructure, we employed the NorNet Testbed [Dre15] that contains multihomed nodes
spread over all of Norway. The results show that SeReCP introduces an acceptably low
latency overhead of 40 ms for the SG applications tolerating maximum 200ms [OK10].
We compare our system with the reference work of Angelos et al. [SK05], which also
employs data diffusing mechanisms for real-time applications. [SK05] shows stable per-
formance for up to 5% of pub-sub brokers being attacked. Once over 5% of the brokers
have been attacked, the TCP connection stalls due to the large amount of dropped pack-
ets. In contrast, SeReCP shows stable performance up to 30% of pub-sub nodes being
compromised. Overall, these results evidence that SeReCP provides the required security
for SG applications during volume-based attacks in the public networks.
1.3.3 (C3) Securing the Cloud-Assisted Smart Grid
To provide protection from application and transport layer DoS/DDoS attacks for SG
communication on SeReCP (C2), we develop a new cloud-assisted defense mechanism
[DS17a], built upon SeReCP. To this end, we first propose a hybrid hierarchical cloud-
extension concept (HHCEC), which is a SG-relevant cloud-assisted architecture. HHCEC
provides ultra-high responsiveness and security with its (a) hybrid and geographically
dispersed structure, and (b) specialized broker-based publish-subscribe communication
system. Second, we propose a novel approach termed Port Hopping Spread Spectrum
(PHSS), which acts as a strong defense against transport and application layer DoS/DDoS
attacks, as well as the volume-based DoS/DDoS attacks, against the broker servers. PHSS
7For simplicity, we explain the idea using a broker with two network interfaces card (NIC). However,
SeReCP transmits the consecutive data depending on the number of NICs of each broker
8In this work we consider an Akamai-sized pub-sub broker network (∼2500) [SK05]. Each broker in
this network has multiple IP addresses/NICs connected to different carriers (multihomed). Whereas the
IP addresses of brokers are publicly known, information about the relationships between IP-addresses and
their corresponding brokers is confidential. In such a network, it is very unlikely that all NICs of any one
broker will be simultaneously compromised by an attacker.
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is equipped with two distinctive features: (1) port hopping, changing the open port of the
broker server as a function of the time and a secret shared between the broker server and
the publishers9, and (2) packet spreading, diffusing consecutive data packets over a number
of broker servers in the cloud versus a single broker server. This data spreading approach
enables PHSS to instantiate replica broker servers to take over the attacked broker servers
without blocking all traffic by taking advantage of the cloud’s rapid-elasticity.
Lastly, to minimize the impact of a probable compromising the secret, we introduce
(1) a token-based authentication method that allows for a light-weight periodic transmission
of the secret to each client (publisher), and (2) a shuffling-based containment mechanism that
quarantines malicious clients, without rendering the broker server inaccessible. To do
this, the containment mechanism repositions/shuffles the clients over the ports of the
broker server with a negligible overhead.
To assess the efficiency of the proposed approach, we construct a proof-of-concept
prototype using EC2-micro instances [Ama16] and the PlanetLab (http://planet-lab.org)
test-bed. We evaluate PHSS’s effectiveness in providing network availability by using
the shuffling-based containment mechanism against DDoS attacks that use the compromised
secret. We also compare our approach with the public key-based re-keying method used
by the existing port hopping mechanisms [LT04]. Our results show that by containing the
impact of the DDoS attack in a notably shorter time period, PHSS provides a high network
availability of over 98% during the attack versus the typical 60% availability achieved by
the public key-based re-keying method. Furthermore, the experimental results show that
our proposed mechanism causes neither significant throughput degradation (i.e. <0.01%
throughput degradation) nor additional latency. We detail the contribution (C3) in Chap-
ter 6.
1.3.4 (C4) Towards DDoS Attack Resilient Wide Area Monitoring Sys-
tems.
To counter DoS/DDoS attacks on the SG devices, which are launched by compromised
other SG devices, we extend upon the Multipath-TCP (MPTCP) approach for SG appli-
cations using long-lived connection such as the phasor measurement applications. The
basic MPTCP provides long-duration communication connections [Paa+14] and provides
reactive mitigation against attacks with its diverse multi-path functionality. However, in
order to achieve proactive and robust protection of the transport and application layer
DoS/DDoS attacks as in PHSS, we introduce a novel stream hopping mechanism, termed
MPTCP-H, that is directly integrated into MPTCP. MPTCP-H does not need a shared se-
cret and time-sync between the clients unlike the port hopping mechanism of PHSS (C3),
thus avoiding the secret key disclosure employed by the compromised SG devices. The
proposed hopping mechanism hides open port numbers by refreshing sub-flows over
time with new port numbers, without causing data traffic interruptions. This approach
of hiding port numbers is shown to provide high coverage against transport and applica-
tion layer DoS/DDoS attacks. The results from MPTCP-H demonstrate that the proposed
9The terms client/publisher and server/broker are used interchangeably in the rest of the thesis. In
addition, while every SG device/application server can be a publisher and/or a subscriber, the brokers are
dedicated servers for their respective roles.
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approach indeed secures the system with minimal additional latency and message over-
head. The details regarding MPTCP-H mechanism [DS17c] are introduced in Chapter
7.
1.3.5 Overview
In this thesis the main problem of focus is the loss of availability of SG systems using the
public network in the case of unintentional and intentional communication failures. We
consider two different types of failures 1) unintentional or intentional failures in the inter-
mediary communication devices such as routers, and/or 2) intentional failures of the SG
devices that are caused by DoS/DDoS attacks. For the second type of failure we consider
three different types of DoS/DDoS attacks that can compromise the SG communications,
i.e., volume-based DoS/DDoS attacks, transport/application-layer DoS/DDoS attacks,
and internal DoS/DDoS attacks exploiting the elevated privileges of the compromised
nodes.
To address the first failure type, we introduce HetGrid (C1), providing QoS assur-
ance for SG applications over the public network. To mitigate the second type of failure
(DoS/DDoS attacks) we propose three mechanisms i.e., SeReCP (C2), (PHSS + HHCEC)
(C3) and MPTCP-H (C4), to target all three aforementioned types of attack.
The mechanisms proposed in this thesis are integrated with each other to provide
high availability assurance for the SG against communication failures. For example,
HHCEC + PHSS (C3) is developed by enhancing SeReCP (C2) to address the applica-
tion and transport layer DoS/DDoS attacks in addition to the volume-based attacks by
redesigning the system of SeReCP (C2) using cloud assistance. In our integrated system,
it can be shown that using HHCEC + PHSS (C3) versus SeReCP (C2) provides better
protection against the DoS/DDoS attacks. However, to address the authorization issues
between the publishers and brokers/subscribers, we also employ the scheme of SeReCP,
which utilizes a token-based authentication scheme between publishers and brokers to
provide a "stateless" connection and a strong replay attack protection. In addition, for
E2E integrity, we also deploy the cryptography-based group key management system of
SeReCP (C2), which enables the application of role-based access rights for both publish-
ers and subscribers as well as the protection from replay attacks. Furthermore, HetGrid
(C1) is employed, which enables the SG communication system to benefit from the path
redundancy in the Internet by using an overlay network in order to assure the transmis-
sion of messages with ultra-high availability and ultra-low latency between the publisher
and the brokers of SeReCP (C2) or HHCEC (C3).
Finally, (C4) replaces UDP in the other proposed mechanisms, to mitigate the secret
key discloser-based internal DoS/DDoS attacks which are caused by a vulnerability in
the port hopping mechanism of PHSS (C3).
Overall, by building a system using the proposed mechanisms in this thesis, we de-
rive a communication platform that provides secure and reliable communication for SG
applications over a public network.
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1.5 Thesis Structure
To begin, the state of the art, with respect to the work presented in the thesis, is discussed
(Chapter 2). We further detail a secure and reliable platform system model along with our
attack model (Chapter 3). As contribution (C1), in Chapter 4 we introduce a novel overlay
network, providing reliable communication for the SG in the Internet. Chapter 5 presents
a secure and reliable platform for the SG, which corresponds to our second technical
contribution (C2). Subsequently, in Chapter 6, we introduce a defense mechanism for the
cloud-assisted SG, as contribution (C3). In Chapter 7, we propose a DDoS attack resilient
transport protocol for WAMS, as contribution (C4). Finally, the summary and conclusion
of the thesis is presented in Chapter 8.
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Related Work
In this chapter we discuss the state of the art approaches related to the work in this thesis
by categorizing them into the following relevant groups:
• Approaches providing QoS-aware communication (Section 2.1)
• Proactive DoS/DDoS defense approaches (Section 2.2)
• Cloud computing approaches for SG (Section 2.3)
2.1 QoS-aware Communication
The existing approaches providing QoS-aware communication for the SG span two dis-
tinct subjects fields: (i) Reliable and QoS-aware communication systems specific for SG
(Section 2.1.1), and (ii) Systems providing reliable and QoS-aware communication for web
applications (Section 2.1.2).
2.1.1 Resilient and QoS-aware communication systems for smart grid
There are limited works proposing new QoS techniques specific for SG applications
[Riz+14; Kho+13; Ali+13], which utilize various features of different networking tech-
nologies, such as Multi-protocol Label Switching (MPLS) and VLAN. However, the pro-
posed techniques can be functional in the case where the SG utilizes a proprietary net-
work that is constituted from those networking technologies.
Recently, many middleware/overlay-based approaches simplifying application de-
velopment on a variety of platforms, operating systems, networking technologies have
been proposed to provide reliable SG operation on the heterogeneous networks and sys-
tems. We discuss the most prominent ones below.
The INTEGRIS [Nav+13] project proposes a novel information and communication
technologies (ICT) infrastructure based on mixing heterogeneous OSI layer 2 technologies
(PLC, wireless, etc.) integrated through a middleware. It suggests the use of a QoS broker
device to enhance the QoS in SG by employing a centralized QoS management. Since
they offer a QoS management mechanism for a dedicated heterogeneous network, this
proposal can be implemented for only utility owned communication networks.
The GridStat [Bak+11] project proposes a middleware framework which manages net-
work resources to timely and reliably deliver the messages acquired anywhere on the net-
work and transmitted to multiple other points. In addition, GridStat utilizes a pub-sub
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network of message routers controlled by a hierarchical QoS management plane to sat-
isfy the NASPInet QoS requirements. However, GridStat assumes that it receives certain
QoS guarantees from the underlay network and the underlay network topology is fully
known. GridStat also uses static routing to avoid the overhead of dynamic link-state-
based routing. This proposal cannot obtain end-to-end (E2E) guaranteed delivery in the
use of public carriers since it is not designed to use the best-effort Internet infrastructure
and rather it requires dedicated networks.
The SmartC2Net [Cio+15] project aims to develop, implement and validate robust so-
lutions that facilitate Smart Grid operation on top of heterogeneous off-the-shelf commu-
nication infrastructures with diverse properties. The functions of the proposed new mid-
dleware include: (1) adaptive network and grid monitoring, (2) control methodologies for
communication network configurations and QoS settings, and (3) models of the extended
information and procedures for adaptive information management. SUNSEED [Ste+14]
proposes an evolutionary approach to usage of the existing communication networks
from both energy and telecom operators by improving their robustness/reliability. The
project proposes an exposed application programming interfaces (API) based on open
standards (W3C) to enable third-party creation of new businesses associated with energy
and communication sectors (e.g., virtual power plant operators). Although these two
projects do not propose any mechanisms that assure the required QoS provisioning of
critical SG applications, they introduce promising network monitoring and interoperabil-
ity mechanisms for the SG utilizing public networks.
Albano, et al. [Alb+15] review varied categories of communication middleware focus-
ing on message oriented middleware (MOM). They particularly address data distribu-
tion services (DDS) targeting distributed real-time systems (for smart grid applications)
with complex distributed applications, where prioritization requirements have to be as-
sured. Furthermore, Prodejev, et al. [Pre+14] devise a working architecture that relies
on the ETSI M2M components (upgraded by CoAP and Websockets), and is mapped to
the Smart Grid. The authors analyze whether the heterogeneous solution is able to meet
the communication requirements of the diverse Smart Grid applications. Due to the lack
of underlay topology-awareness of these approaches, the critical application’s reliability
and latency requirements cannot be met by these approaches alone.
SeDAX [Kim+12] proposes a data-centric communication method on a secure overlay
network on top of the existing TCP/IP network. This method provides good routing
performance and self-configurable group communication. However, it is inapplicable for
real-time applications, e.g, ADA, and distributed generation, since it does not guarantee
E2E latency.
Deconinck, et al. [Dec+10] propose a dependable infrastructure for autonomous de-
centralized microgrid control. It enables power devices to interact over a self-organized
and semantic peer to peer overlay network on top of the existing TCP/IP network, called
Agora. Since this work concentrates on non-time-critical applications (secondary and
tertiary voltage control), it cannot cope with the strict timeliness requirements of SG ap-
plications.
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2.1.2 Systems Providing Reliable and QoS-aware Communication for
Web Applications
Although there have been advances in the QoS provisioning in network-level approaches,
models such as DiffServ [Bla+98], IntServ [Wro97] and MPLS [RVC00] are still far from
deployment across the Internet due to the changing requirements in the networking in-
frastructure or the configuration differences among the domains. Although MPLS/VPN
[EBB08] is introduced as a QoS-guaranteed communication protocol, its QoS-guarantee
does not guarantee inter-AS connections, only within AS connections.
As the Internet is increasingly used for mission critical applications, connection relia-
bility and latency are becoming significant challenges. To address these challenges, ser-
vice overlay networks managed by third party providers are advocated. The providers
target to offer QoS-guaranteed service for multiple applications and clients on the Inter-
net, as proposed in RON [And+01], OverQoS [Sub+04], and NGSON [LK12]. RON and
NGSON are well-defined, recognized service overlay network approaches. They provide
reliable and timely communication on wide area networks for distributed applications.
However, they do not offer timely delivery guarantee per message for safety-mission
critical applications, e.g., the islanding protection in SG. In addition, no adaptive QoS
and reliability mechanisms depending on application criticality are introduced in those
proposals. For safety critical applications, even short-lived failures of the Internet infras-
tructure can pose a significant risk of damage on the grid. As a potential solution to these
problems, Han et al. [HWJ08] propose a topology-aware overlay framework to maximize
path independence for better availability and performance of E2E communication in the
Internet. They do not introduce any traffic prioritization or resource allocation mecha-
nisms in their work. Yang et al. [Yan+09] propose a message-oriented middleware with
QoS awareness which provides QoS assurance depending on the requirements of each
application. Their proposed middleware [Yan+09] , however, has the following short-
comings with regards to the stringent QoS requirements of SG applications: 1) a lack of
fault tolerance due to the assumption of no failure in the local brokers, and 2) no assured
resource allocation for the traffic of the critical application, although a simple delay-based
QoS mechanism is in place.
Other than [DGS15; DGS14], all of the above works lack at least one of the following
criteria: (i) high fault tolerance, (ii) scalability, (iii) adaptive QoS management, or (iv)
support for the heterogeneous network, as depicted in Table 2.1.
2.2 DoS/DDoS Resilient Communication
The existing techniques providing DoS/DDoS resilient communication fall in two main
categories: (i) Secure and reliable communication for the SG (Section 2.2.1), and (ii) Proac-
tive DDoS defense for web applications (Section 2.2.2).
2.2.1 Secure and Reliable Communication for the SG
Some existing IDSes developed for SG [Zha+11; BS11] aim to detect DoS/DDoS attacks
and then subsequently investigate them. These approaches introduce promising features
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TABLE 2.1: Existing Works Comparison regarding QoS Requirements of SG
Applications
Requirements/
Existing
Works
GridStad Integris MPLS-
VPN
ATM RON NGSON HetGrid
[DGS14;
DGS15]
High Fault Tol-
erance
Y N Y N P P Y
Scalability Y P Y N N Y Y
Adaptive
QoS/Reliability
management
N N P N P N Y
Heterogeneous
Network
P N N Y Y Y Y
Symbols N: No, Y: Yes, P: Partially
to incorporate with the technique [DS17c] proposed in this thesis that is focused on mit-
igating the internal-attacks mounted by the compromised devices. Karthikeyan et al.
[Kar14] employ three methods, i.e., Marking Scheme, TTL Value analysis and MAC value
analysis, to detect and isolate DDoS attacks in routers of the SG network. While the afore-
mentioned approaches requires a proprietary network for their deployment, there are also
some approaches that do not need (or only need to some extent) a dedicated network, as
follows.
GridStat [Bak+11] proposes a pub-sub network of message routers controlled by a hi-
erarchical management plane to meet the NASPInet’s QoS and security requirements. In
addition to its lack of QoS assurance on the public network, GridStat does not provide a
DoS/DDoS resilience particularly for internal attacks exploiting the elevated privileges,
which poses a security risk for the particularly critical SG application. SeDAX [Kim+12]
proposes a data-centric communication method on a secure overlay network. This ap-
proach involves trusted authentication servers allowing parties to periodically obtain
topic-based group keys to assure E2E confidentiality and integrity. While SeDAX pro-
vides secure and efficient communication for SG applications allowing latency-tolerance
and relatively low availability, it does not support SG applications requiring low latency
and high availability due to its message passing technique and lack of a mechanism pro-
viding DoS/DDoS attack resilience. SmartC2Net [Cio+15] aims to develop resilient solu-
tions that facilitate SG operations on top of heterogeneous off-the-shelf communication
infrastructures. C-DAX [Hei+15] employs a pub-sub paradigm to decouple communi-
cation parties in space, time, and synchronization. C-DAX enables topic access control,
end-to-end integrity and end-to-end confidentiality of data, and authentication of nodes.
Despite their lack of countermeasures for DoS/DDoS attacks, SmartC2Net and C-DAX
offer promising features which can be incorporated with our work to provide secure and
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reliable communication.
2.2.2 Proactive DDoS Attack Defense
For security of IT infrastructures, traditional security solutions, e.g, firewalls, intrusion
detection systems (IDS), or Virtual Private Networks (VPN), are both widespread and ef-
fective. However, since the SG devices typically have constrained computational, band-
width, and memory resources, the direct use of these traditional security mechanisms
is often not possible [DS17b; ZJT13]. Hence, for providing the required security for SG
communication systems, security solutions that proactively counter the attacks should be
implemented. Within this context, we develop our approaches based on the following
proactive techniques.
Overlay networks can offer an Internet-wide network of nodes to create a first-level
firewall that proactively counters DDoS attacks. In this scenario, the requests first need to
pass through the nodes of Overlay Network before getting to the target server. [Sta+05;
Jia+14; KMR02; NSS10] are overlay-based proactive DDoS attack defense mechanisms
which aim at hiding or moving the position of the application sites to prevent DDoS at-
tacks based on available information about their locations. Secure Overlay Services (SOS)
[KMR02] architecture consists of a three-layer hierarchy of overlay nodes to control ac-
cess to the protected target server. The goal is to ensure that any client can find a path
to the target server under DDoS attacks; maintaining a small probability of compromis-
ing all available paths between clients and the target server. Although SOS can protect
against blind DDoS attacks, it is ineffective against sophisticated and targeted DDoS at-
tacks on a given overlay network. Such attacks can disturb latency-sensitive applications
communicating over the attacked overlay node until the connection is established over
a non-attacked overlay node. SIEVE [FP12] offers a lightweight distributed filtering pro-
tocol that intends to expand the filtering and receiving capacity of the protected target.
In this architecture, the server needs to provide some kind of secret to the client that can
help it to pass through the filter. Since SIEVE isolates the protected server in IP level by
deploying it in a private network in order to protect the server from direct flooding at-
tacks, it is not deployable in a network that contains large amount critical nodes/servers
spread over a large-scale geographical area.
An overlay-based target hiding technique aiming at addressing the shortcomings of
the technique in [KMR02] is proposed in [SK05], where the authors propose to spread
the duplicated data packets across the overlay nodes between the client and the target.
This ensures robust protection against targeted DDoS attacks that bring down some of
the overlay nodes at the expense of latency and packet overheads.
Further examples of moving/hiding target defense are port and address hopping tech-
niques. Lee et al. [LT04] present a random port hopping (RPH) technique where the
server uses time-varying UDP/TCP port number as well as a shared secret among the
server and clients. Fu et al. [FPT12] state that the RPH in [LT04] undergoes time differ-
ences due to the local clock drift. In order to address the time-synchronization issue in
[LT04], Fu et al. [FPT12] propose two algorithms, BiGWheel and HoPerAA, which enable
the RPH for multiple servers and clients in the presence of clock-drift. In this approach,
the secret is used by the clients without a restricted time duration, which poses the risk
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of compromising the secret. With a compromised secret, the communication will be in-
terrupted for a certain amount of time duration because of the direct attack against the
ports.
The time synchronization issue is also addressed by [BHK07a] through an acknowl-
edgment based port hoping strategy. In cases where the acknowledgment packet is lost in
the network, this arrangement can force the two sides to communicate on a common port
for a longer time period. This enables the attacker to obtain the port number to start a di-
rected attack and disrupt communication. Moreover, this approach may not be a practical
scheme for communication when there are multiple users.
A shuffling-based moving target defense mechanism is proposed by [Jia+14] to reduce
the level of large-scale DDoS attacks with the help of cloud computing properties. By re-
placing attacked servers with newly instantiated replica servers and optimally shuffling
client-to-server assignments, their solution can gradually isolate DDoS attacks on net-
work and computation resources, and restore quality of service for benign-but-affected
clients. This method is actually a reactive method and not convenient for applications
requiring high availability.
Based on the above discussion of the related work, the techniques [DS17b; DS17a;
DS17c] proposed in this thesis are developed by addressing the existing works’ short-
comings concerning the SG security threats and requirements associated with our net-
work model, as shown in table 2.2.
2.3 Cloud Computing for th SG
Multiple features of cloud computing, such as on-demand service, flexibility, pay-for-
use and instant network access, are continuously attracting the attention of researchers
working on the system development for potential future power grids [BMR15].
GridCloud [BI14] was proposed in order to design a prototype and present a well-
defined software platform with the aim of meeting the requirements of the future power
grid in the cloud. GridCloud develops a cloud architectural model for monitoring, man-
aging and controlling the power systems, which is achieved by integrating some of the
technologies such as GridStat, Isis 2, TCP-R and GridSim [BI14].
A contemporary approach for power system frequency monitoring system (FNET)
[Zha+10] is proposed as a wide-area monitoring system. The main architecture of FNET
includes a broadly deployed network of frequency disturbance recorders (FDR) which
returns phasor readings to either a local central point or a remote data center with Ether-
net. Handling the data of the FNET application with diverse configuration requirements
(number of CPU, memory, etc.) by using in-house infrastructures is not a cost-effective
solution for the power grid. Rather, leveraging the cloud computation for the FNET ap-
plications would be the most feasible solution [BI14].
[Mah+13] proposed a framework, Grid-Cloud, which enables PMU-based state esti-
mation applications on a cloud infrastructure. To identify the limitations of the current
standard cloud infrastructures, the authors carry out a real-world implementation using
the Red-Cloud and PlanetLab infrastructures [Mah+13]. Based on the results, the authors
infer that a best effort state estimation can be fulfilled when using the in-time data. Oth-
erwise, the outdated data can be used for historical analysis.
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TABLE 2.2: Existing Works Comparison regarding Security Requirements of
SG Applications
Requirements/
Existing
Works
GridStad SeDAX C-
DAX
SOS Cloud-
based
e.g.,
Akamai
[NSS10]
Angelos
at al.
[SK05]
SeReCP
[DS17b]
PHSS
[DS17a]
Scalability Y Y N N N N Y Y
Key Manage-
ment
N N Y N N Y Y Y
DDoS Defense
(volume-
based)
N N N Y Y Y Y Y
DDoS Defense
(transport and
application
layer)
N N N P P N N Y
Targeted or
sophisticate
DoS/DDoS
attacks
N N N N N N Y Y
Symbols N: No, Y: Yes, P: Partially
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[Bae+15] introduced a smart-frame, which consists of three hierarchical levels, i.e., top,
regional and end user, for the SG applications based on cloud computing. This framework
is designed to provide scalable, flexible and secure information management for those
applications. In addition, to address information security issues, a security solution based
on identity-based encryption and signature, and identity-based proxy re-encryption are
proposed.
The aforementioned existing work provides the basic inspiration behind the SG-relevant
cloud-assisted architecture, HHCEC, proposed in this thesis (cf. Chapter 6, [DS17a]).
HHCEC, however, is a dispersed and hybrid design architecture focused on providing
secure and high responsiveness for the SG applications.
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Chapter 3
System & Threat Model
In this section, we introduce the basic system and threat models that are common across
the proposed approaches in this thesis. The differences and details are discussed in the
corresponding chapters.
3.1 System Model
Similar to contemporary SG models, we consider SG communication nodes (e.g., intelli-
gent electrical devices (IED), substations and control centers) to span a large geographical
area and connect to the wide area network (WAN) of the utility. The WAN is built using
both public (ISPes) and private networks taking into account availability requirements
of the applications and their relative cost-effectiveness. Hence, the SG communication
network comprises many Autonomous Systems (AS) and domains. In addition, some SG
communication nodes such as transmission/distribution substations and control centers
are multihomed, i.e., multiple ISP connections, and have direct fiber optic links between
them. As a result, the SG communication network is considered to be a heterogeneous
network.
In this section, we present the underlay and overlay models that are foundational to
the development of HetGrid (C1), which provides a base for the other contributions in
this thesis, i.e., (C2), (C3), and (C4). The system models of the other contributions are also
gradually introduced throughout this section.
3.1.1 Underlay Model
We model the underlay topology, which corresponds to the SG communication network,
as a directed graph Gu = (Vu, Eu) where Vu and Eu are the set of vertices and edges. The
vertices refer to ASes, or private domains, and the edges represent the peerings between
them. Although there are many internal routers inside an AS and a private domain, we
consider them as underlay nodes to simplify the route calculation between pairs.
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FIGURE 3.1: Basic HetGrid Architecture
3.1.2 Overlay Model
To pave the way to obtaining E2E physically-disjoint paths, containing no common un-
derlay router and overlay node, and providing QoS-aware routing in a lightweight man-
ner, the bootstrap node1 clusters the communication nodes depending on their autonomous
system (AS) and domains and selects the nodes with the highest computational capacity
from each cluster as a supernode (SN) (a master SN and d− 1 redundant SN, cf. Chapter
4). This results in a two layer overlay for HetGrid as illustrated in Fig. 3.1.
We define a primary layer overlay as a directed graph Gp = (Vp, Ep). Vertices refer to
all overlay nodes (including SNs and normal nodes (NNs), which are SG communication
nodes (e.g., IEDs)). Edge set Ep represents virtual links between NNs and their SNs (each
NN is connected to only SNs in the same cluster).
A secondary layer is defined as a directed graph Gs = (Vs, Es). Vertices in Vs only
consist of SNs that participate in both layers, i.e., SN is a gateway, and therefore, Vs ⊂ Vp.
In addition, if a physical link (the peering) eu ∈ Eu exists between two ASes or the private
domains, there exists a secondary layer edge es ∈ Es.
To support end-to-end (E2E) QoS-guaranteed communication in a heterogeneous net-
work that includes the Internet, HetGrid is equipped with a dedicated QoS routing mech-
anism. This mechanism provides QoS guarantees across the network, taking into account
three parameters: reliability, latency and bandwidth for SG applications. To achieve
this, we develop two elements, namely (a) a multipath routing mechanism compen-
sating the critical applications for their high reliability requirements by employing E2E
physically-disjoint paths, and (b) an altruistic resource allocation with the QoS routing
1A node in the overlay network that provides initial configuration information to newly joining nodes
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mechanism targeting QoS-guaranteed communication for applications having strict QoS
requirements. The details of HetGrid are presented in Chapter 4.
3.1.3 Model Assumptions
In this work, the link state between two overlay nodes (u, v) is denoted by bandwidth
Buv, latency Luv, and reliability (simply loss rate) Ruv. We assume that each primary layer
node p regularly derives its available computation capacity, Cp, and link state information
between itself and its SNs and transmits them to its SNs. On the other hand, each sec-
ondary layer node u obtainsCu and its adjacent links’ available link state information, and
disseminates them to all Vs (SNs). We consider that the bootstrap node broadcasts the up-
dated membership list over the secondary layer, only upon change of membership of the
clusters. We expect that the overlay network has a low churn rate given the operational
characteristics of the SG communication nodes. Moreover, when a NN sends a packet
to its SN in order to deliver the packet to its destination over QoS-satisfied path(s), the
SN employs a Bloom Filter model to find the SN to which the destination node belongs
(inspired by [Zha+02]).
3.1.4 Pub-Sub Model
To counter volume-based DoS/DDoS attacks against SG devices, we propose a pub-sub-
based defense mechanism, called SeReCP. We employ a broker (P2P)-based pub-sub sys-
tem, as pub-sub systems inherently provide scalability and proactive DDoS attack de-
fense, particularly for constrained devices. The broker (P2P)-based pub-sub system of
SeReCP selects the ”strongest” nodes (in terms of computation capacity, multihoming
feature and trust-level), as brokers. These brokers are clustered depending on their au-
tonomous system (AS) and geographical proximity, as illustrated in Fig. 3.2. By doing so,
we aim at overlapping the brokers from SeReCP and SNs of HetGrid. SeReCP is devised
for a messaging paradigm where, upon reception of a publication from a publisher, the
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FIGURE 3.3: Hybrid Hierarchical Cloud Concept (HHCEC)
broker transmits the data to brokers responsible for delivering the data to the correspond-
ing subscribers. Moreover, to provide QoS assurance between the brokers or between the
brokers and publishers/subscribers of SeReCP, we utilize the HetGrid, which provides a
scalable QoS-aware routing.
The main role of SeReCP in combating DDoS attacks is to distinguish between autho-
rized and unauthorized traffic in the brokers and then to either enable the traffic to access
to the destination (subscriber) or to drop/filter it, respectively. Thus, the system pro-
vides the functionality of a firewall scattered over the wide area network to prevent any
congested link to the target(s). We detail the defense mechanism of SeReCP in Chapter 5.
3.1.5 Cloud-assisted Pub-Sub Model
To manage millions of SG devices and to handle large amounts of data in a reliable, scal-
able, and cost-effective way, the SG utilities increasingly extend their communication-
based management system to the (herein advocated) cloud computing platforms to en-
able reliable and on-demand access to varied computing resources [BI14]. Therefore, we
propose a hybrid hierarchical cloud-extension concept (HHCEC), which is a SG-relevant
cloud-assisted architecture. HHCEC provides ultra-high responsiveness and security
with its (a) hybrid and geographically dispersed structure, and (b) specialized broker-
based publish-subscribe communication system. Providing the specific SG requirements
is the driver behind proposing a 3-layer HHCEC cloud-assisted architecture, as depicted
in Fig. 3.3. The first layer is composed of Broker Bundles, which are dispersed based on the
grid topology throughout the utility territory. The second layer is an in-house private cloud
infrastructure comprised of application servers that process data requiring high availabil-
ity and/or confidentiality. The third layer consists of public cloud infrastructure(s). This
layer communicates and shares corresponding data with third parties.
In HHCEC, a system administrator, that considers the geographical distance and the
latency between the brokers on the cloud and publishers, assigns each publisher to a
broker bundle. Furthermore, the system administrator monitors/maintains the latency
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between the broker bundles and the publishers/subscribers to re-assign the publish-
ers/subscribers to a new broker bundle in cases where intolerable latency is detected.
In order to transmit the messages between the brokers and the publishers/subscribers
while preserving the ultra-high availability and ultra-low latency requirements, the over-
lay of HetGrid is employed as in SeReCP. This enables the SG communication system to
benefit from the path redundancy in the Internet, i.e., by using the overlay network in
addition to providing QoS-aware routing.
In addition, we propose a novel approach termed Port Hopping Spread Spectrum
(PHSS), which acts as a strong defense against transport and application layer DDoS at-
tacks, as well as high-volume DoS/DDoS attacks, against the broker servers of HHCEC.
The details of HHCEC and PHSS are introduced in Chapter 6.
3.1.6 The Transport Protocol for SG Applications Requiring Long Du-
ration Communication
The effectiveness of such cyber-control systems is determined by achieving real-time, ac-
curate state information as obtained from an efficient and reliable communication schema.
In practice, this state assessment is achieved using Wide Area Monitoring Systems
(WAMS) that use Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs, and also known as Synchrophasors)
for data acquisition to monitor real-time power transmission and to detect grid instabili-
ties [Mar+14]. Furthermore, in addition to high reliability, WAMS require long-duration
connections for phasor measurement traffic. Since the Multipath-TCP (MPTCP) allows
long-duration connections as well as path redundancy for resilient communication, we
propose use of MPTCP particularly for SG applications requiring long-duration connec-
tions (such as the phasor measurement applications of WAMS).
Furthermore, to counter internal-attacks mounted using elevated privilege against
the WAMS devices, we develop a proactive and robust extension of the Multipath-TCP
(MPTCP) transportation protocol, termed as MPTCP-H, that mitigates such attacks by
using a novel stream hopping mechanism. The proposed stream hopping mechanism pe-
riodically renews the subflows over new port numbers to hide the open port numbers of
the connection from an attacker. The connections and the structure of MPTCP is depicted
in Fig. 3.4. The details of the proposed extension, MPTCP-H, are presented in Chapter 7.
3.2 Threat Model
We introduce threat models which are common for the contributions (C2), (C3), and (C4).
The differences in threat models/attack types are presented in Chapter 5-6-7, respectively.
3.2.1 Security Goals
Our security objective is to guarantee delivery of the publisher data to the corresponding
subscribers within the time window specified in the application requirements. To achieve
this, DoS/DDoS attacks must be proactively prevented or at least mitigated to meet the
high availability requirements of the critical devices. Moreover, any lossy or outdated
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data needs to be detected by the brokers and subscribers. The origin of the data should
be identifiable within the group communication paradigm. Also, data requiring confi-
dentiality can be decrypted by the corresponding subscriber but neither by the broker
nor by intruders.
3.2.2 Attack/Threat Model
An adversary whose aim is to render critical devices (publishers) inaccessible can mount
a DDoS attack against subscribers passing through broker(s) or direct broker(s) that main-
tain the communication between the publishers and the corresponding subscribers. The
attacks can be mounted for a short time, which forces the peers to reset their communi-
cation and authentication, introducing an unacceptable loss of availability for the critical
applications. For critical applications, replay and repudiation attacks can pose a high risk
e.g., receiving an outdated measurements can result in a wrong decision for field devices.
An adversary can obtain an elevated privilege by compromising secrets to resend/delay
some of the data.
We consider a strong threat model where (1) An adversary can have access rights to
some underlay routers to eavesdrop, capture, drop, resend, or alter the data traffic to
carry out a replay or DDoS attack against brokers. By exploiting elevated privileges, a
large amount of zombies can launch an attack on brokers to deny the service. (2) The
secrets of some publishers, subscribers and brokers can be compromised by the intruders
to attack brokers and subscribers (if the attacker gains a right to pass the authentication
of the brokers).
3.2.3 Assumptions
As in contemporary attack models, we assume that (a) publishers obtain only the IP ad-
dresses of the broker servers and (b) valid certificates are issued by a Certification Author-
ity to all brokers/publishers/subscribers and to Authorization Servers in a secure way.
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Since we focus on the broker defense against DDoS attacks, the protection of the Autho-
rization Server is beyond the scope of the paper. It is worth mentioning that the patho-
logical case of attackers that can fully saturate the Internet backbone links in HHCEC is
also beyond the scope of this approach.
3.2.4 Security Vulnerabilities of SG Systems
To highlight security vulnerabilities of SG devices regarding the threats above, we outline
a study conducted on a testbed using real SG devices. Morris et al. [Mor+11] conducted
tests to evaluate the vulnerability of PMUs and PDCs in the context of attacks originat-
ing from inside a WAN by building a testbed consisting of PMUs, PDCs, a router and
a Network Analyzer [Mor+11]. They launched TCP flooding (SYN and FIN) and UDP
garbage flooding attacks on the devices for both specific and random ports. The test
results showed that all devices under flooding attacks are eventually overwhelmed and
start denying service when the traffic volume increases beyond the data processing ability
of the device. Based on these results, in order to mitigate these issues the authors suggest
that utilities to monitor the volume of the network traffic should be enabled in order to
detect and/or limit transmission of the traffic to the devices. Moreover, the fuzzing tests
conducted in [Mor+11] show that even individual packets can result in device failures
i.e., resetting the devices. These test results indicate that DoS/DDoS attacks can be a se-
rious threat to the safety and reliability of the power network. Such DoS/DDoS attacks
can lead to partial loss of availability, and thus can lead to wrong state estimation of the
power network or delay in removing power system failures [Mor+11]. For these reasons,
a proactive defense mechanism needs to be employed to mitigate the DoS/DDoS attacks
for SG communication.
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Chapter 4
Reliable Communication over Public
Networks
To support the communication requirements of the SG, utilities typically prefer dedicated,
private E2E communication networks. However, this may not always be accomplished
due to cost and technical restrictions. Therefore, the SG communication network could
become a heterogeneous network consisting of multiple private networks and Internet
service providers (ISPs). Furthermore, the scale of SG communication networks might
span a territory (e.g., a state or metropolitan area) with millions of nodes. While some SG
communication nodes (e.g., substations) have high computation capacity and multihom-
ing with high outgoing bandwidths, other nodes (e.g., smart meters, sensors and circuit
breakers) may only have basic functionalities [Gun+13; Bud+10; KK13].
Irrespective of the type of SG schema, the common element across them is the need
for reliable, timely and responsive communication to facilitate effective sensing and con-
trol. Most of these applications have stringent latency (in the range of 100 ms to 5 s) and
reliability (99.00%-99.9999%) requirements [US 10; WYB15]. Unfortunately, the present
Internet infrastructure does not innately provide the necessary QoS guarantees for such
safety-critical applications, which essentially require both low latency and high reliabil-
ity. One reason for this deficiency is that the routing, utilizing BGP:Border Gateway Pro-
tocol, among ASes of the Internet, depends on commercial considerations resulting from
contracts among these ASes. These contracts promote low cost links rather than low
latency links, although there are better paths that BGP can accommodate in the Inter-
net infrastructure. In addition, the BGP convergence time might take several minutes
or even sometimes up to 20 or 30 minutes. This can cause delays or even loss of traffic
[Wan+13; RGZ06]. Furthermore, in such heterogeneous networks, E2E QoS cannot be
guaranteed by employing the current underlying QoS approach (e.g., DiffServ [Bla+98],
IntServ [Nav+13], MPLS [RVC00]), due to administration configuration differences in
each domain [Bud+10].
To meet the QoS requirements for SG applications, multiple approaches have been
proposed such as INTEGRIS [Nav+13], GridStat [Bak+11], and CRUTIAL [DBC09]. While
INTEGRIS and GridStat mainly focus on dedicated private networks, CRUTIAL targets
reliable communication between control centers and substations (but not all SG devices)
by employing multihoming techniques. In addition to these approaches, overlay net-
works have emerged as an effective way to improve the performance of real-time Internet
applications [And+01; LM04; Sub+04; Vul+12; LK12]. The overlay routing solutions use
overlay nodes to bypass performance degradation on Internet paths without requiring
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changes in the underlying network layer. They can provide timely and relatively reliable
Internet services. Nevertheless, these solutions do not target (1) delivery guarantee for
each message (high reliability) even in case of permanent underlay failures, in addition
to (2) application-adaptive and criticality aware resource allocation.
Building on this background, in this chapter, we propose HetGrid as an overlay based
communication infrastructure that provides the following capabilities and contributions:
1. High reliability in the heterogeneous networks: HetGrid strives to build physically-
disjoint multipaths, and meets the strict QoS requirements of SG applications via a light-
weight low-overhead communication architecture. To achieve high reliability, it employs
Source Routing-based QoS Routing (SRQR) and Compensative Multi-Routing (CMR)
mechanisms.
2. Application-adaptive and criticality aware resource allocation: SG applications not only
need flow-based (periodic) data acquisition, they also need a periodic data accusation
(e.g., alert messages) with diverse QoS requirements. This necessitates a smart resource
allocation on the overlay network. Thus, HetGrid employs Altruistic Flow Allocation
(AFA) in order to reserve/allocate the ”best” paths (in terms of QoS metrics) for high
priority (critical) applications in a distributed manner.
Overall, HetGrid’s overlay network obtains QoS-satisfied paths for each SG applica-
tion by using SRQR and AFA on the heterogeneous networks. In addition, CMR strives to
maintain the communication at the required latency and reliability level. Our evaluation
focuses on QoS-satisfaction of each application with the diverse reliability, latency and
bandwidth requirements.
Since TCP provides a reliable connection between end hosts, the current IP-based in-
dustrial critical applications typically rely on TCP connections. This is a pragmatic so-
lution and a widely used approach in industrial systems if the TCP overhead is small
compared to the application payload size. Unfortunately, the SG applications message
payloads are usually less than 1000 bytes [KK13]. Consequently, the TCP’s additional
overhead (e.g., larger header, session establishment messages etc.) entails an unaccept-
ably large protocol overhead that is not viable for SG applications. Hence, HetGrid advo-
cates and employs a lower-overhead UDP connection between peers.
We evaluate HetGrid by comparing the direct TCP Vegas1 [BOP94] connection (be-
tween the end hosts) based on the applications’ QoS-satisfaction rate. The evaluation is
performed in four perturbation scenarios: 1. dynamic link state changes in the underlay
network, 2. failure in the underlay routers, 3. heavy congestion in the underlay routers,
and 4. bursty traffic on the overlay network. We note that in existing works, although
there are many direct TCP connection and overlay based QoS enhancement comparisons
[And+01; Sub+04; Vul+12], they focus on performance improvement in terms of latency
and loss rate but not on delivery guarantee in time for each message (high reliability) in
case of large-scale failures.
1In this chapter, TCP is used to refer to TCP Vegas.
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4.1 QoS Requirements and Challenges for SG Applications
over the Heterogeneous Network
As highlighted in the previous section, E2E ownership of the network for the SG may not
always be possible because of cost considerations, spectrum availability etc. While het-
erogeneous networks are proposed as potential solutions, detailing the challenges that SG
applications will encounter is very much an open issue. Before introducing our proposal,
the major communication requirements and challenges for SG applications communicat-
ing over the heterogeneous networks are discussed in the rest of this section.
4.1.1 E2E Latency Guarantee
Many types of information delivery between power devices are only meaningful if they
arrive within a predefined time frame (i.e., deadline). Delayed information is of limited
value, and in the worst case, damage might occur in the grid. For example, the islanding
protection actions must be made within a time window of 150-300 ms [Kan+09]. As public
networks such as the Internet typically provide best-effort services, time-sensitive appli-
cations running on such a network potentially result in damage to the grid. In cases where
the public network is used for SG communication, the communication system should be
supported by additional measures e.g., increasing the number of end hosts with multi-
homing feature [KK13].
4.1.2 Reliability
From [OK10], SG reliability is defined as the degree to which a communication system
must remain operational. The operability of SG devices relies on the communication
infrastructure in order to maintain the stability of the grid in their respective domains.
Hence, the communication infrastructure must be fault-tolerant, especially for safety crit-
ical applications, to protect the grid and ensure efficient operation. In particular, the In-
ternet’s communication reliability is affected by a number of possible failures. For exam-
ple, BGP failure and congestion introduce high reliability risks due to BGP’s convergence
time and its policy based routing approach [Wan+13]. To cope with this, a self-organizing
overlay network, supported by multi-homing for critical end points, is a potential alterna-
tive to satisfy the communication requirements on the heterogeneous networks [RGZ06;
KK13].
Furthermore, in cellular networks the failure of core network resources potentially
leads to disconnection of many power devices, which poses safety risks in the grid. To
mitigate this, ad-hoc connections with physically-near devices, which connect to differ-
ent ISPs, can be provided in order to obtain fault tolerant communication for the critical
applications [KK13].
4.1.3 Scalability
Due to the continual growth of the SGs, an a priori estimation of the network scale is dif-
ficult to ascertain. In addition, the workload of SG applications can increase rapidly
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depending on conditions such as the weather or the electricity price [KK13]. As the
workload of the network increases, meeting latency and reliability requirements of safety
critical applications becomes more challenging. Hence, the communication network for
the SG applications should be scalable and adaptive to the changing network dynamics
[KK13].
4.1.4 End-to-End QoS Guarantee
SG applications have diverse QoS requirements. Moreover, some of SG applications may
need different priorities for their messages under different conditions depending on the
function of that data. For example, periodic metering measurement traffic typically has
a lower priority, whereas these metering measurements may necessitate higher priority
when they are required in active demand response applications [Bud+10]. Moreover,
after a power outage, if a large number of meters must be registered in a short time,
the meter registration traffic may be considered higher priority and critical. Hence the
need is of a QoS mechanism that discovers the resources across the network and allocates
them in a distributed manner depending on the applications’ real-time QoS requirements.
Moreover, it should not be centralized in order to avoid a single point failure [KK13].
4.2 System Model
As SG communication nodes span a large geographical area and connect to WAN of the
SG via diverse ISPs and private links, the SG communication network contains many
Autonomous Systems (AS) and domains. In addition, some the utility owned powerful
nodes are multihomed by connecting to multiple ISPes or other nodes via direct links
such as transmission/distribution substations and control centers. As a result, the SG
communication network is considered as a heterogeneous network. The underlay and
overlay models are presented in Chapter 3.1.1-3.1.2, as they provides a base for the all
contributions in this thesis. We now present the data types and application models that
underlie the development of HetGrid.
4.2.1 Data Type and Delivery Model of SG Applications
There are three types of data traffic in SG applications: (D1) Sensing traffic, (D2) Control
traffic and (D3) Coordination traffic. All data traffic types can be periodic or aperiodic,
and their sizes are typically less then 1 Kb [YBG11].
We classify data delivery requirements of SG applications into four different modes:
(M1) guarantee, (M2) no-guarantee, (M3) in-time, and (M4) best-effort time. To illustrate,
while a protection application requires delivery in M1 and M3, a video surveillance ap-
plication can be based on M2 and M3. In all modes, the packets are formed by employing
the UDP protocol. In order to address UDP’s reliability shortcomings and guarantee data
delivery, we make use of the adaptable Ack mechanism (AAM) in M1. To obtain timely
data delivery in M3, a source routing-based QoS routing (SRQR) mechanism is employed
considering latency constraints. Furthermore, for an application that needs both M1 and
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FIGURE 4.1: Basic HetGrid Architecture
M3, in addition to SRQR, the data is routed over multiple redundant paths to exploit
physical path diversity using a compensative multipath routing (CMR) mechanism.
We use a priority scale ranging from high to low priority (high, medium, and low
priority). We assume that safety or mission critical applications with low latency and
high reliability requirements are allocated as a high priority.
4.2.2 Application Model
We consider diverse SG applications to comprehensively evaluate our proposal. Hence,
we employ the following application characterizations, according to the above data traffic
types: we firstly categorize the SG applications into two classes, sensing As, and control-
ling Ac applications. While As transmits its data in a periodic manner (flow), Ac delivers
data aperiodically (occasional). Furthermore, these applications are assigned to different
classes based on their priorities, i.e., Ashigh, Asmedium, and Aslow and Achigh, Acmedium, and
Aclow.
4.2.3 Assumptions
We assume that each application has a unique ID. For each application ID, priority and
QoS requirements information exists in all overlay nodes. The application ID is a part of
the packet payload and written by the sending power application.
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4.3 Construction of a Supernode-based Two-layer Overlay
Network
The objectives of the HetGrid’s overlay network design are twofold: (1) To mitigate the
overhead of the QoS routing that probes the underlying network to find paths satisfying
the QoS requirements, and (2) To obtain physically disjoint redundant paths for the mul-
tipath routing mechanism, which provides fault-tolerant communication for the critical
applications.
4.3.1 Clustering of Nodes and SN Selection
The bootstrap node clusters nodes depending on their AS, and then selects SNs from each
cluster depending on their resources (i.e., computation capacity, outgoing bandwidth,
and multihoming), as illustrated in Fig. 4.1. The purpose of this clustering is to mitigate
the overhead of the overlay-based link state routing and to improve routing scalability
and performance on the overlay network. This results in a two layer overlay design. The
secondary layer only consists of the SNs that are interconnected with each other. The
primary layer, on the other hand, consists of all NNs and SNs in their respective clusters.
The primary layer clusters are structured using a star topology, whereas secondary layer
links are constructed according to the physical links that connect ASes or the private
networks.
In order to cluster nodes according to their AS, we can use the approach from Ren et
al. [RGZ06]. Their procedure is as follows: BGP updates can be regularly accessed by the
bootstrap node. By using these updates, IP prefixes of ASes and the AS-AS connection
relationships can be obtained. AS-based clusters are then constructed by the bootstrap
node, matching the IP-prefixes of ASes with node IPs.
The bootstrap node defines a master SN (mSN) and d − 1 redundant SNs (rSN) from
the selected SNs for each cluster. Together, the mSN and the rSNs provide at least d re-
dundant disjoint paths for each pair in the overlay network. In case of mSN failures, the
rSNs can take over the mSN tasks. This is possible as rSN regularly checks the mSN by
using heartbeats, in addition to periodically synchronizing the required data with mSN.
By an overseeing rSN, the transition is accomplished by disseminating a leadership mes-
sage, "I’m the new-mSN" to all overlay nodes of its cluster. This takes less than 10s in our
implementation.
While the selection criterion for mSN is that it is the ”strongest” node in the cluster, the
criteria for d−1 rSNs is the provision of the ”highest” path diversity (in terms of underlay
routers) between each pair within the cluster, in addition to a sufficiently high computa-
tion capacity. Selecting the overlay nodes in a cluster providing physically-disjoint paths
between each pair, however, is a difficult task. To cope with this, each peer (including
SNs and NNs) runs the traceroute tool towards the others within its cluster to obtain
the underlay routers pattern between them. They relay the traceroute data to the mSN,
which then heuristically chooses d− 1 rSN that statistically provide "the least" correlated
paths (in terms of underlay routers patterns) between each pair in their cluster (cf. Han
[HWJ08]). Since the underlay topology changes only infrequently (monthly or at a longer
interval), this traceroute operation adds only limited additional overhead [HWJ08].
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FIGURE 4.2: The architecture of software on a SN and NN, respectively
4.3.2 Obtaining Disjoint Redundant Paths
In order to obtain a fault-tolerant communication system for the critical applications, Het-
Grid aims to determine E2E physically-disjoint redundant paths between each pair (of
NNs) by using the constructed overlay network.
The connection between a pair can be intra-AS or inter-AS. Thus, the determination of
redundant disjoint paths on the network requires different approaches for each scenario.
For intra-AS connections, HetGrid enables NNs to transmit their data through mSN and
d − 1 rSN, providing the ”highest” path diversity, to any other NN as explained above.
Thus, the NN can send its data, replicated d times, over their respective SNs (1 mSN and
d − 1 rSN) to any other NN in the same AS in order to obtain reliable and timely data
delivery guarantees.
In case of inter-AS connections, mSN calculates multiple disjoint paths towards each
destination of a given application. This is unlike intra-AS connections which provide ad-
equate path diversity by simply sending the replicated data over their respective SNs.
Since the secondary layer is based on physical connectivity of the underlying network,
mSN can readily define inter-AS disjoint redundant paths towards any other SN by omit-
ting the path(s) which have the same overlay nodes (SNs) with already selected path(s).
However, some ASes have single upstream (i.e., single BGP router to connect to another
AS). This disturbs the E2E path disjointness. To cope with this, mSN takes advantage of
multihoming features of its cluster’s d SNs to obtain disjoint upstreams for each redun-
dant path (we assume that SNs have multiple network connections, e.g., different carrier
connections in a substation, a meter concentrator etc.). Furthermore, the mSN organizes
the d SNs to provide different upstream networks when multiple disjoint paths towards
a destination of an application are defined. Thus, HetGrid ensures an E2E physically-
disjoint path for the critical applications in the Internet infrastructure.
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4.4 The Software Architecture of HetGrid
Fig. 4.2 depicts the conceptual software architecture (stack) for the SN (left side) and the
NN (right side). We first detail the NN operations.
The Entrance component serves as a gateway for exchanging data between power ap-
plications and the NN stack. After receiving a packet from a power application, the En-
trance component determines the priority of the packet by using the application ID. If
the packet is of high priority, the Entrance relays it to the Multi Router (#1 in Fig. 4.2),
otherwise it is relayed to the Sender (#2). Multi Router replicates the packet d times and
then hands the packets over to the Sender (#3) to be delivered to d SNs (the details be-
low). Sender relays medium and low priority packets depending on their destination
domain. Packets that are destined to extra-AS are sent to mSN and packets that are des-
tined to intra-AS are directly transmitted to the destination NN2. In addition, the Local
Topology Supervisor, which maintains local network discovery, gives information about
the addresses where packets are destined (#4).
Let us assume that a packet destined to an extra-AS is received by a mSN’s Passage
component which is functioning as a gateway for exchanging packets between ingress
SNs and NNs. As described above, intra-AS deliveries are fulfilled either directly (medium
or low priority) or over d SNs (high priority).
The Passage component first determines the QoS requirements for the packet using the
application ID tag. Subsequently, the Passage component consults the Topology Supervisor,
which is responsible for network discovery and maintenance, about the destination NN’s
mSN (#1). Then, the QoS Router is queried to find a suitable routing path between itself
and the mSN, which has to satisfy the QoS requirements (#2).
If the packet is of high priority, it is first processed by the Multi Router before being
delivered to the Forwarder. If not, the packet is handed over to the Forwarder (#3) after
tagging it with the route information. If it is of high priority, implying d − 1 rSN also re-
ceived the replicated packet, Multi Router in the mSN identifies SNs (among d SN) which
should relay the replicated packet (cf. Section 4.5.4) and their routes over the secondary
layer. This information is then transmitted to the defined rSNs and, finally, the defined
SN’s Multi Router emits the packet, tagged with the respective route information, to the
Forwarder. The Forwarder’s task is to send the packet to the next address in the packet
header irrespective of its priority.
Once the QoS routing path(s) are determined for the destinations of a given applica-
tion in the ingress mSN, that information can be stored and reused if the application needs
a periodic data flow towards the destinations. Hence, packets with already known appli-
cation IDs can be directly handed over to the Forwarder. However, in case of significant
network state changes, the Topology Supervisor causes a reset of the stored information to
allow the system to adapt to the new network state. In addition, all aperiodic packets are
simply relayed to d SNs to route over their the ”best” path towards the destination, which
is reserved (cf. Section 4.5.3).
2As Internet service providers (ISP) can assure re-convergence time in the range of a few seconds by
employing MPLS within AS, we do not need to use any overlay routing inside the cluster. However, for
high priority applications, HetGrid still sends the messages over d SN’s that provide disjoint paths over a
given AS’ routers.
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4.5 Routing
The fundamental differences of SG applications from current Internet-based applications
are their stringent QoS requirements and needs pertaining to the timely delivery guaran-
tee for each message (e.g., islanding protection messages). However, the current Internet
infrastructure mainly provides a best-effort delivery. Hence, any communication system
that is proposed for the SG should: 1) provide QoS-satisfied paths for each application
and 2) be fault-tolerant to support the timely delivery guarantee for each message of the
critical applications by employing multipath routing and smartly allocating the resources.
To address these requirements, the following mechanisms are employed on the secondary
layer overlay network in an application-adaptive manner: HetGrid provides the QoS-
satisfied paths for each application by employing a Source Routing-based QoS Routing
(SRQR). Furthermore, to obtain timely delivery guarantee for each message of the critical
applications, HetGrid takes advantage of Compensative Multi-Routing (CMR) in addi-
tion to the Altruistic Flow Allocation (AFA) mechanism. We introduce these mechanisms
and detail how they cooperate in a self-adaptive way.
4.5.1 Source Routing-based QoS Routing (SRQR)
Essentially, SRQR takes advantage of the shortest path algorithm to make routing deci-
sions on the secondary layer, considering QoS metrics, i.e., reliability, latency and band-
width. Moreover, SRQR employs source routing in order to facilitate multihop routing by
speeding up the transmitting path at overlay nodes. It also helps bind a packet flow to a
selected path (barring significant link state changes sensed by the heartbeat mechanism),
making performance more predictable, and providing support for multipath routing in
HetGrid. When the strict QoS requirements of SG applications are considered, using the
source routing to obtain predictable network performance can be an efficient method.
The paths are constructed using the shortest path algorithm with hop normalized path
weights for bandwidth, reliability, and latency to result in Equation 4.1 as:
PathWeight = αb
n∑
i=0
(
Bi,i+1
Bi,i+1 −RB )/n ∗
∗ αr −
∑n
i=0 logRi,i+1∑n
i=0 logRi,i+1 − logRR
∗ αl RL
RL −
∑n
i=0 Li,i+1
(4.1)
In the Equation 4.1, n is the number of hops in the path. While Bi,i+1, Ri,i+1 and
Li,i+1 are residual bandwidth, current reliability, and latency of the link, respectively. RB,
RR and RL denote required bandwidth, reliability and latency, respectively. The alpha
coefficients enable tuning of the influence that the individual components have on the
overall path weight.
This formula combines the influence of the multiplicative (reliability), concave (band-
width) and additive (latency) metrics in a proportional manner to calculate the path
weights while assuring that only paths which satisfy all metrics are selected. It ensures
the best available path in terms of the metrics. The derivation of this formula is presented
in Appendix A [DGS14].
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FIGURE 4.3: Basic illustration of AFA
The main goal of SRQR is to bypass performance degradation on the Internet path by
having multihop routing on the overlay network. However, a drawback of this approach
is that it entails additional hops leading to performance degradation in the overlay net-
work. To circumvent this, we employ the following approach: After the start of the flow
over the path (which is allocated by mSN), each overlay node on the path probes the des-
tination to decide whether direct communication meets the QoS requirements. If it does,
then the overlay node skips the rest of overlay nodes on the path and sends directly to
the destination. When a significant link state change is reported, the overlay node probes
the direct link whether it still satisfies the flow’s requirements, skipping the rest of path.
This approach provides a significant improvement in performance for SRQR.
4.5.2 Resource Monitoring
To obtain QoS-satisfied communications by using SRQR, available resources of the links
(i.e., link bandwidth, reliability, and latency) need to be monitored. Thus, HetGrid em-
ploys pinging and direct bandwidth measurement methods in each mSN to obtain its ad-
jacent links’ states, as in Li et al. [LM04]. Each mSN disseminates the gathered link state
information to the other mSNs when significant changes occur on the links. However,
these measurements might be noisy, and this leads to oscillation or the wrong selection
in the path allocation. To avoid this, HetGrid applies a 5% hysteresis bonus to the "last
good" measurements for the three metrics, thus providing a reasonable trade-off between
responsiveness to the link state change and the oscillations.
4.5.3 Altruistic Flow Allocation (AFA)
SG applications have both periodic (flow) and aperiodic data traffic. Assuring availability
of the resources for critical/high priority data traffic in such a network is a difficult task.
Existing works try to cope with resource allocation by building different virtual networks
for QoS requirement classes on top of an overlay network and smartly allocate the re-
sources, as done with policy routing in [And+01]. However, these methods base on static
resource allocation for the applications that need static QoS requirements and introduce
best-effort performance but not predictable. For SG applications with changeable and
strict QoS requirements [US 10], these are not efficient approaches.
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AFA introduces an implicit allocation mechanism for quick adaptation to the dynamic
background traffic of the overlay network. The implicit allocation fundamentally relies
on binding a flow to a specific path by utilizing source routing. To make this happen,
the other nodes in the overlay network also refrain from using the resources on that path
by following the restrictions from resource monitoring mechanism. Moreover, to assure
availability of the resources for critical/high priority data traffic, AFA selects a path from
k paths3 depending on the application’s priority, as illustrated in Fig. 4.3. Thus, the
low priority applications sacrifice the ”best” resources (but their requirements are still
satisfied with the path allocated to them) in an exponential manner, for the sake of the
critical applications in a distributed manner. Our AFA approach implicitly provides a
resource reservation for aperiodic and critical messages. For a pair belonging to an appli-
cation, a corresponding path (indicated by z) is chosen by the ingress mSN between the
first/shortest path and kth path by using the following equation:
λ = k(
eρ − 1
e− 1 ) (4.2)
z ← bλe
z is the integer value where be indicates rounding λ to the nearest integer and ρ rep-
resents priorities in the range [0-1], e.g., 0, 0.5, and 1 represent low, medium and high
priority respectively.
Following the equation, the zth path is identified by the ingress mSN for the flow allo-
cation. If k equals to 0, the equation 4.2 cannot find a path and multiple paths are required
to compensate for the reliability requirement of the application. To do this, HetGrid em-
ploys the following multi-routing CMR mechanism.
4.5.4 Compensative Multi Routing (CMR)
In case that SRQR fails to find any path that satisfies the QoS requirements (k = 0), the
CMR mechanism, which is running on mSNs, tries to find multiple paths whose total reli-
ability (packet loss rate) satisfies the application. Once CMR has found the paths, it relays
redundant replicated data over them. In aiming to cope with permanent failures, CMR
also strives to discover disjoint paths rather than transmitting multiple packets over a sin-
gle path that has the highest reliability degree. To do this, mSN running CMR organizes
the d SN in its cluster for the assignment of disjoint redundant paths, thus achieving E2E
disjointness. However, the open question is how to determine the number of SNs (among
d SNs) whose paths provide the required reliability degree. To address it, we propose the
following approach:
PRDi =
N∏
j
RLj (4.3)
3k paths are found by using the k shortest path algorithm and equation 1. We do not put a limit on k to
pave the way for obtaining more disjoint paths. In our implementation, k is observed between 5-20
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RR ≤ 1−
M∏
i
(1− PRi) (4.4)
where PRDi is the reliability degree of path i towards the destination D, and RLj is
the reliability degree of the link on the path (containing N links). While equation (3)
calculates path reliability, equation 4.4 computes total reliability of M parallel paths and
compares the total reliability with the required reliability degree. CMR employs an it-
erative algorithm for finding the number of parallel paths (M ), which compensate for
the required reliability degree RR. Moreover, while selecting the parallel paths, this algo-
rithm tries to eliminate the path whose similarity (in terms of SNs) on the already selected
path(s) are higher than a threshold value, heuristically defined.
4.5.5 Adaptable Ack Mechanism (AAM)
For an application that needs feedback or delivery guarantee, HetGrid introduces AAM.
It supports an adaptable acknowledgment mechanism by allowing applications to adjust
the delay of sending acknowledgment depending on their latency requirements. Thus,
several ACK responses may be combined together into a single response (by combining
the number of network updates), therefore reducing protocol overhead. Since many SG
applications have small payloads (e.g., 100-200 bytes) [KK13], it is clear that AAM obtains
efficient data transmission by minimizing the Ack traffic. We build AAM inspired by
TCP’s delayed acknowledgment technique.
4.5.6 Putting It All Together
The SRQR protocol strives to find the QoS-satisfied path for each application according
to their QoS requirements (e.g., bandwidth, latency, reliability). Additionally, the proto-
col seeks to balance traffic over the secondary layer of the overlay network. However,
as SRQR employs the shortest path algorithm that tends to use a considerable amount
of resources, this can lead to a lack of resources for the critical application. AFA pro-
vides a solution by reserving the ”best” resources for high priority applications. If SRQR
cannot find a path that satisfies the application’s reliability requirements, CMR can com-
pensate by employing multipath (adequate number) routing for the affected applications.
Finally, AAM guarantees data delivery and reductions in the protocol overhead in the
network. This will be done by employing an adaptive mechanism which configures the
delay of Ack messages depending on time-sensitivity of applications. HetGrid provides
QoS-satisfied and fault tolerant communication without producing expensive overhead,
as it is able to employ these mechanisms depending on the application requirements.
4.6 Evaluation
HetGrid is implemented by using the OverSim [BHK07b] and the INET framework that
run on OMNeT++ [Pon93]. This simulation setup paves the way for our perturbation
scenarios. The main purpose of our simulation-based evaluation is to assess HetGrid
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TABLE 4.1: Performance evaluation parameters
App. Msg.
size
Para. Prio.(p) RR RL Deli.
Mode
Ash 32 B 1 event/15s high (1) high
(99.90%)
low (<150ms) M1, M3
Asm 32 B 1 event/15s medium
(0.5)
medium
(99%)
medium
(>150ms, <2s)
M3
Asl 32 B 1 event/15s low (0.1) low
(97%)
high (>2s) M2, M4
Ach 32 B 1 event/120s high (1) high
(99.90%)
low (<150ms) M1, M3
Acm 32 B 1 event/120s medium
(0.5)
medium
(99%)
medium
(>150ms ,<2s)
M3
Acl 32 B 1 event/120s low (0.1) low
(97%)
high (>2s) M2, M4
against direct TCP connection according to (1) QoS satisfaction of each application, and
(2) fault-tolerance in the system, e.g., the effect of failures on the critical applications. We
deploy TCP Vegas from among TCP flavors in our implementation since it can address
the heterogeneous networks better than the other flavors [Alb+15] and obtains between
40 and 70% better throughput, with 1/5th to 1/2 the losses compared to the TCP Reno
[Pre+14].
We first present underlay topology and background traffic model, followed by overlay
network, traffic demands and metrics.
4.6.1 Underlay Network Topology
We randomly produce a hierarchical topology using BRITE [Med+01] in order to con-
struct an Internet-like underlay topology. The topology includes 20 nodes (we consider
that each node denotes an AS’s BGP router) for the AS level and 10 nodes (i.e, interior
gateway protocol (IGP) routers) under each BGP router with an edge density changing
from 2 to 5. For inter-AS and intra-AS networks, two bandwidth configurations are used:
all links are either OC3 (i.e., 51.84 Mbps) or OC48 (i.e., 155.52 Mbps). The propagation
delay of each link is randomly chosen between 0-10 ms subject to a uniform distribution.
4.6.2 Background Traffic
A dynamic background traffic load across the network is generated during simulation in
order to assess HetGrid’s success in the case of dynamic latency and bandwidth in the
underlay network. To produce this background traffic, we deploy 200 servers (each one
connects to a given edge router) that relays a packet (1-100kb) per second to a random
server.
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4.6.3 Overlay Network and Traffic Demands
In the simulation, |Vo|=1000, including (|mSN|=20 and |NN|=980) and these overlay nodes
are randomly deployed to 20 ASes. The AS-based clusters have two rSN (d− 1 = 2, total
|rSN| = 40) and their computation capacities are adequate and larger than the other NNs.
The outgoing bandwidths of SNs and NNs are 10 Mbps and 1 Mbps, respectively.
According to data traffic requirements of SG applications [YBG11], six application
models are employed, as shown in Table 4.1. Each overlay node randomly runs one of the
six applications and chooses a destination node to relay the application’s messages. In the
simulation, each node measures its adjacent links’ latency, bandwidth and loss rate every
5 seconds and if there is more than 5% change [And+01], e.g., a significant alternation of
the three metrics or an outage in the network, it broadcasts the measured values of the
link(s).
4.6.4 Metrics
HetGrid is assessed based on the QoS-satisfaction of each application and the fault-to
lerance in the system. QoS-satisfaction of a given application is computed based on its
data delivery monitoring results, i.e., latency and loss rate. A dropped or timed out mes-
sage is specified as an unsuccessful message delivery. To quantify the satisfaction of a
communication, QoS-satisfaction rate (QSR) is formalized as:
QSR = 1− DroppedOrT imedoutMessages
SentMessages
(4.5)
4.6.5 Simulation Methodology
Our evaluation is carried out in four different scenarios. The first three scenarios aim
to realize the most common Internet perturbations in order to assess HetGrid’s QoS-
satisfaction performance on the Internet. The final one’s aim is to investigate the scal-
ability of HetGrid if the overlay traffic sharply increases. Lastly, we compare the network
overhead of the both approaches to highlight the caveats in each approach.
Dynamic Link State: To realize the dynamic behavior of the Internet, we periodically
(every 10 sec.) and randomly switch bit error rate (BER) of links from the range of (1e-10,
1e-7) to (1e-10, 1e-3) as well as the background traffic produced by the servers. In this
scenario, we aim to evaluate whether HetGrid provides an adequate QoS-satisfaction
level for SG applications on a best-effort network like the Internet (considered as the
Internet provides unstable performance).
2% Underlay Router Failure: As mentioned in Section 4.2, BGP router failures and
their re-convergence time are severe problem for the applications which have stringent
QoS requirements. To investigate the effectiveness of HetGrid on these failure types, 2%
of the underlay routers fail around 10 min (like typical BGP re-convergence time [5]).
These router failures repeat every 10 min in randomly selected routers during the sim-
ulations. 2% of the routers are fixed as 1 BGP and 1 IGP router in our simulation. This
scenario helps assess HetGrid’s failure recovery mechanism, as well as the fault tolerance
efficiency of CMR for critical applications, in case resource failures occur in the Internet.
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FIGURE 4.4: Dynamic link state scenario: Sensing applications
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FIGURE 4.5: Dynamic link state scenario: Control applications
Heavy Congestion Scenario: When the majority of Internet users are concurrently
online, traffic congestion leads to long lag time for the users. To recreate this perturbation,
the delivery rate of the background traffic is increased by sending a packet every 100 ms
instead of every 1 s, by 40% of the servers (random selection). Employing this scenario,
we assess the ”best” path selection efficiency of SRQR.
Bursty Traffic on the Overlay Network: To assess the scalability of HetGrid in case of
bursty traffic on the overlay network, we increase delivery rate of the sensing applications
in three step, i.e., 1 msg. /15 sec, 1 msg. /10 sec, and 1 msg. /5 sec (SG applications’ traffic
volume can change depending on certain conditions [Kan+09]). The main aim of this
scenario is to investigate whether AFA smartly allocates resources for critical applications
even in bursty overlay traffic.
4.6.6 Simulation Results and Discussion
In our simulations, we consider that while the sensing applications require periodic data
delivery, e.g., periodic voltage measurements, the control applications need aperiodic
data delivery, e.g., command messages. However, while these applications share the
overlay network, AFA allocates resources for the sensing applications only, not for the
control applications. Hence, we compare HetGrid (HGN) directly with the TCP connec-
tion differing in both the control and the sensing applications to assess their performance
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FIGURE 4.6: 2% Underlay Router Failure: Sensing applications
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FIGURE 4.7: 2% Underlay Router Failure: Control applications
for both traffic types. Simulation results are first investigated for each specific scenario
and then discussed holistically.
Dynamic Link State
Fig. 4.4 depicts QSR of HGN and direct TCP connections for the sensing applications with
three different priorities, i.e., high, medium, and low priority. Remarkably, it shows that
HGN provides higher QSR in each priority level in comparison to direct TCP connections
between pairs, due to SRQR. In addition, although the high priority applications have
stringent QoS requirements, HGN provides significant QSRs for higher priority applica-
tions in contrast to direct TCP connections, owing to AFA’s priority-based flow allocation
mechanism. On the other hand, Fig. 4.5 shows that HGN presents a performance near
sensing applications for control applications due to AFA’s selection of the "best" resource
reservation for aperiodic messages (considered as high priority). However, TCP also pro-
vides a performance close to that of the sensing applications (middle/low priority), but
not with a consistent behavior. TCP’s inconsistency is due to its lack of adaptability to the
link state change in the inter-AS connections.
2% Underlay Router Failure
Fig. 4.6 shows QSR of HGN and direct TCP connections for the sensing applications
when 2% of the underlay routers fail. In the Fig. 4.6, whereas HGN provides QSR with
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slight degradation for each priority, TCP connections present a remarkable QSR degra-
dation in comparison to their dynamic link state scenario results. Owing to HGN’s fast
recovery system, the sensing applications using HGN experience slight degradation in
comparison to TCP connections. In particular, the high priority applications experience
lower degradation than the others in HGN thanks to CMR’s sufficient multipath routing
mechanism. Moreover, Fig. 4.7 depicts HGN nearly maintaining its QSR performance
also for aperiodic application.
Heavy Congestion Scenario
The effects of heavy congestion on the QoS-satisfaction of the sensing applications are
shown in Fig. 4.8. HGN provides significant QSRs for high and medium priority mes-
sages in comparison to TCP connections. However, both HGN and TCP presents almost
the same QSR performance for the low priority since AFA allocates the limited resources
for higher priority applications in such a heavy congested network. In addition, Fig. 4.9
depicts that HGN provides a similar performance to the sensing applications for the con-
trol applications even under heavy congestion.
Bursty Traffic on the Overlay Network
Fig. 4.10 shows the efficiency of HGN while increasing the work load on the overlay
network. We can observe that HGN saves QSR of high priority applications compared
with medium and low priority applications. This provides relatively an adequate QSR
for the high priority/critical applications if the bursty traffic is occasionally experienced
by the overlay network.
Network Overhead Comparison
Fig. 4.11 shows the network overhead comparison of the both approaches in different
failure scenarios: D.L.S., 2% F. and H.C. denote Dynamic Link State, 2% Underlay Router
Failure, and Heavy Congestion scenarios, respectively. As seen in Fig. 11, TCP Vegas
produces more overhead than HGN in D.L.S. scenario, despite HGN’s additional source
routing overhead. This is because TCP Vegas employs fast retransmission for each appli-
cations, whereas AAM of HGN uses an adaptive acknowledge mechanism in addition to
UDP transport protocol. Moreover, as TCP’s a higher header size (20 bytes), this yields
additional protocol overhead for SG applications requiring a small size packet delivery
(e.g., 100-200 bytes)[YBG11], TCP is not convenient transport protocol. On the other hand,
as shown in Fig.4.11, when the failure/congestion area expands in the network, HGN
network’s overhead can surpass TCP’s, since it must disseminate more link state infor-
mation. However, the infrequent occurrence of long failures or heavy congestions in the
Internet offer a pragmatic basis for the additional overhead for HGN.
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FIGURE 4.8: Heavy Congestion Scenario: Sensing applications
Discussion
In our evaluation, we assessed QSR performances of HGN and direct TCP connection in
common Internet perturbations as well as in overlay bursty traffic. We separately eval-
uate their QSR performances for periodic and aperiodic traffic by producing the sensing
and the control SG applications, respectively. The results show that HGN presents a sig-
nificant QSR for SG applications on the Internet-like network in scalable manner thanks
to its clustering mechanism. In particular, its QSR for high priority applications shows
that employing HGN enables the usage of the heterogeneous network for SG applica-
tions. The maintained QSR for high priority applications, in even the underlay failures
or heavy congestions, is also a notable feature of SG applications. Furthermore, although
HGN saves the resources for the sake of high priority applications by sacrificing the QoS
of medium and low priority applications, HGN’s QSR performances for medium and low
priority applications still outperform TCP connection. HGN also shows that if bursty traf-
fic happens on the overlay traffic, it does not allow significant QSR degradation for high
priority applications. In the simulation experiments, since HetGrid has a reactive link
state dissemination mechanism and a low overhead transport mechanism (UDP + AAM),
we do not observe a remarkable overhead rise in comparison to TCP Vegas. Finally, de-
spite a significant decline in the number of the unsatisfied, high priority messages in the
use of HetGrid, the unsatisfied messages could cause severe problems in the grid. This
can be handled by investing for more multihoming and direct fiber optic links between
SNs.
4.7 Conclusion
We have shown in this chapter that HetGrid provides reliable and QoS-aware commu-
nication on heterogeneous network, considering the SG applications’ requirements. Het-
Grid selects and employs overlay nodes with the most resources to manage inter-AS com-
munication rather than place dedicated servers into each domain. Also, it requires only
local underlay knowledge to obtain reliable communication across the network. To pro-
vide reliable and QoS-aware communication, HetGrid uses the following mechanisms in
a self-adaptive manner: (1) SRQR discovers the ”best” paths meeting bandwidth, latency,
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FIGURE 4.9: Heavy Congestion Scenario: Control applications
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FIGURE 4.10: Bursty Traffic on the overlay network: Sensing applications
FIGURE 4.11: Overhead comparison in different failure scenarios: D.L.S., 2%
F. and H.C. denote Dynamic Link State, 2% Underlay Router Failure and
Heavy Congestion scenarios respectively.
and reliability requirements of the applications. To reserve the ”best” path for high criti-
cal applications, SRQR also takes advantage of altruistic flow allocation (AFA), and (2) To
provide fault tolerant communications for the high priority applications, CMR uses ade-
quate paths for multipath routing to meet the reliability requirement of the applications.
The simulation results show that HetGrid provides a significantly higher QoS-satisf
action rate for each application compared with direct TCP connection between pairs. In
addition, even for BGP router failures or heavy Internet congestions, HetGrid provides
practical QoS-satisfaction rates by employing the above mechanisms in an adaptive man-
ner. Thus, HetGrid shows both the feasibility of using a heterogeneous network for SG
applications and also the architecture to achieve the robust QoS-aware communication.
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Chapter 5
A Secure and Reliable Communication
Platform
To monitor and control the power grid, the utilities currently employ proprietary and
closed automation networks. However, these networks invariably encounter scalability
issues to deal with the (a) increasingly large and ad hoc SG structure, and (b) large data
traffic produced by the thousands of SG devices. As a result, the grid requires a flexible
and scalable network that can provide low-latency, high-availability, secure and reliable
communication. While an ideal solution would be a dedicated network, the financial re-
ality results in the use of IP-based public networks such as the Internet [Bud+10; RGZ06;
KK13]. The caveat is the inheriting of the Internet’s reliability risks and security vulnera-
bilities, that can be exploited by hackers causing security and safety risks for not only the
cyber-system but also for physical-systems, e.g., electrical grid/appliances [WL13].
Hence, SG communication networks need to have lightweight security mechanisms
for preventive/proactive defenses to DDoS attacks in the SG’s distributed and composite
communication-control cyber-physical environment. As pub-sub approaches inherently
provide a proactive DDoS attack protection, a number of approaches based on them have
been proposed for the SG. GridStat [Bak+11] employs a pub-sub system and long-term se-
curity key pads to provide secure and scalable communication between the parties. How-
ever, long-term security keys can potentially introduce severe security vulnerabilities,
e.g., compromised keys can be distributed to a large number of zombies to access/attack
the network. SeDAX [Kim+12] also introduces a pub-sub system which contains trusted
authentication servers allowing the parties to periodically obtain topic-based group keys.
This assures E2E confidentiality and integrity. However, SeDAX does not introduce any
authentication mechanism between the publisher and pub-sub brokers and this paves the
way for DDoS attacks against both the brokers and subscribers. Moreover, none of the
existing approaches [Bak+11; Kim+12; SK05; Hei+15; KMR02; FP12] focus on address-
ing the high availability requirements of the SG devices/data traffic in case of a targeted
or blindly sweeping DDoS attack against pub-sub brokers to sustain communication be-
tween the critical SG entities.
SeReCP introduces a novel pub-sub-based proactive DDoS attack defense mechanism
as well as a lightweight security mechanism. In SeReCP, taking into account the require-
ments for SG data traffic, device resources and security, we propose a pub-sub system
proactively countering DDoS attacks that cannot be handled by the constrained SG de-
vices. However, to render inaccessible some of the critical devices, targeted or blindly
sweeping DDoS attacks against pub-sub brokers can be launched, which poses safety
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risks for the grid. To cope with this issue, we employ a data diffusion approach which
makes possible spreading the data packets across the pub-sub brokers thanks to its token-
based stateless authentication mechanism. Moreover, to address the stringent availabil-
ity and latency requirements of SG applications in the case of a DoS/DDoS attack, we
propose a multihoming-based fast "recovery" mechanism. We transmit every two con-
secutive data packets to two different network interfaces of each pub-sub broker during
spreading data packet across the brokers. If one of the network interface of any brokers is
under attack, the broker(s) request the missing packet after a relatively short waiting time
using the remaining functional network interface. This provides a fast packet "recovery"
compared to classical ACK-based mechanisms such as TCP’s cumulative ACK. Moreover,
to protect end-to-end (E2E) confidentiality and integrity of the data, we introduce a group
key management system which provides role-based access rights for both publisher and
subscriber, in addition to protection from replay attacks.
We assess our approach evaluating: (1) network availability for SG applications over
targeted or blindly sweeping DDoS attacks on the pub-sub brokers. For the SG, avail-
ability is not only successful data delivery but also a delivery meeting the application’s
latency requirements (2) overhead in terms of resource usage and additional transmission
delay produced by the proposed security mechanism. The results show that SeReCP in-
troduces an acceptably low latency overhead of 40 ms for the SG applications requiring
latency less than 200ms [OK10]. We compare our approach with the reference work of
Angelos et al. [SK05], which also utilizes data diffusing mechanisms for real-time appli-
cations. The approach in[SK05] demonstrates stable performance for up to 5% of pub-sub
brokers being attacked. Over 5% failure of brokers causes the TCP connection to break. In
contrast, SeReCP shows stable performance for up to 30% of pub-sub nodes being com-
promised. This demonstrates SeRECP’s highly promising capability to effectively build
safety critical SG applications utilizing public networks. To summarize, our contributions
in this chapter are:
• We define the security requirements and threats for the SG. Based on this, we pro-
pose a novel pub-sub approach which provides secure/reliable communication in
case of DDoS attacks and for link/node failures.
• Considering the high availability requirements of the SG traffic, we propose a mu
ltihoming-based fast "recovery" mechanism in addition to the data diffusion ap-
proach, which provides minimum drop/ack/re-transmission over attacks on the
intermediate pub-sub brokers.
• Considering the constraints of SG devices and their group communication require-
ments, we introduce a novel group key management mechanism, which provides
replay and repudiation attack protection in addition to confidentiality and integrity
assurance.
• The evaluation of SeReCP is performed on a real test-bed NorNet [Dre15], provid-
ing multihomed nodes distributed all over Norway. The evaluation validates the
effectiveness of SeReCP in terms of availability under attack and for its low over-
head.
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5.1 SG Network and Security Requirements
Traditionally, power grid communication systems have been physically isolated from
public networks. This has been changing due to the cost effectiveness of utilizing public
networks and the technical features offered by them in terms of bandwidth, latency, sta-
bility and availability. While decreasing the cost of operation, employing public networks
naturally makes the power grids vulnerable to cyber attacks. We survey some differences
of SG communication security requirements from classical IT systems (e.g., Internet, Web)
and introduce the features of our approach that address the corresponding requirements.
5.1.1 SG security requirements
In SG communication networks, the security objective is to defend the data from unau-
thorized acts with the prioritized concerns (driven by safety implications) being: 1) data
availability, 2) data integrity, and 3) data confidentiality.
For availability requirements, SG applications require timely and reliable access to
information. Lossy or delayed information can result in an inaccurate system state esti-
mation. Correspondingly, incorrect control decisions can occur, resulting in damage to
the grid. For integrity, the unauthorized modification of information can result in wrong
decisions on power management. For confidentiality, to protect personal and proprietary
information, unauthorized information access and disclosure need to be prevented. For
system reliability, confidentiality might not be critical, yet for systems involving interac-
tions with customers, such as demand response and advanced metering infrastructure
(AMI) applications, it is important [Wei+10].
A unicast delivery of a time-critical command by a constrained SG device to multiple
entities inevitably results in large delays/congestion in the network and the potential
for damage to power equipment. The more efficient approach is multicast, to deliver a
time-critical message to all related entities belonging to the same group [KK13]. Hence,
authentication/confidentiality schemes for SG security must be able to efficiently support
multicast communication (Requirement 1).
5.1.2 Differences from typical IT security
IT-based cyber security solutions, e.g, firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS), and
Virtual Private Networks (VPN), are known to be effective in securing the IT infrastruc-
ture. However, the resource constraints (computational, memory and bandwidth) of SG
devices often preclude the direct applicability of such IT solutions [Wei+10].
In a typical IT system, the application servers are often more secure than the edge/
client nodes. In SG networks, the edges require the same level of security as the control
center servers, as the edge devices (such as relays, circuit breakers,...) can cause harm to
human life, damage equipment or power lines. Furthermore, SG communication nodes
offer limited functionality given their resource constraints. Hence, directly employing so-
phisticated IT-based DDoS defense/authentication mechanisms has limited applicability
to the SG, resulting in the need for lightweight and proactive DDoS protection mechanism
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to be employed (Requirement 2) [Wei+10]. We advocate broker-based pub-sub systems to
provide for proactive DDoS mechanisms, as well as multicast communication.
In the case of failures in IT networks, a simple solution might be to reboot using a
node or an application. However, in many SG control applications, this is not admissible
from a control stability viewpoint. Moreover, the DDoS attacks leading to violation of
the timing requirements or loss of control messages data can result in imbalance of the
grid due to the improper control. Therefore, SG communication networks are required
to avoid single-point failures regarding physical network infrastructure, routing protocol
and security mechanisms (Requirement 3) [Wei+10]. To cope with this, we introduce a data
diffusion approach enabling delivery of the scattered data packets over multipath. This
ensures minimum packet drop in the case of pub-sub broker failures. In addition, we
propose multihoming based fast "recovery" mechanism in order to resend the dropped
packets in the fastest way. To address authentication, the use of high-overhead public
key based authentication is of limited usability in the resource-constrained SG devices
(Requirement 4). Therefore, we propose a token-base mechanism providing a stateless
light-weight authentication between brokers and publishers, in addition to an efficient
group key management system for E2E security.
5.2 Goals, Models and Assumptions
5.2.1 Security Goals
Our security goal is to ensure delivery of the publishers’ data to the corresponding sub-
scribers within the deadline1 stipulated in the application requirements. To achieve this
goal, DDoS attacks must be proactively prevented or at least mitigated to meet the high
availability requirements of the critical devices.
Moreover, any lossy or outdated data needs to be detected by the brokers and sub-
scribers. The origin of data should be identifiable within the group communication paradi
gm. Also data requiring confidentiality can be decrypted by the corresponding subscriber
but neither by the broker nor by intruders.
5.2.2 Reference Pub-Sub Model
We consider that the utility employs a combined network (i.e., public and private), taking
into account the applications’ availability requirements and cost-effectiveness. To deal
with the complexity of this heterogeneous network, we take advantage of the SeReCP
middleware, which provides a scalable QoS-aware pub-sub system. This P2P-based pub-
sub system selects the "strongest" nodes as brokers. These brokers are clustered depend-
ing on their autonomous system (AS) and geographical proximity in order to obtain the
network state information in a scalable probing overhead (Fig. 5.1). SeReCP is devised
for a messaging paradigm where, upon reception of a publication from a publisher, the
broker transmits the data, taking into account the QoS requirement of the application
1Maximum acceptable latency in the message delivery
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and the network state information, to the brokers responsible for delivery the data to the
corresponding subscribers.
SeReCP combats DDoS attacks by distinguish between authorized and unauthorized
traffic and then to either allowing the traffic to reach its destination or to drop/filter it,
respectively. Thus, SeReCP acts as a firewall scattered over the wide area network to
prevent any congested links to the target(s). SeReCP leverages some existing approaches
to provide this. For example, to provide a QoS-aware robust overlay network, pub-sub
platform for smart grid, and an overlay-based DDoS attack defense mechanism, we take
advantage of [DGS15], [Bak+11], and[SK05], respectively. However, considering the SG
security threats associated with the network model, we introduce a new advanced attack
model and a mechanism, SeReCP, which counters these attacks in addition to covering
scalability and QoS issues.
5.2.3 Perturbation/Attack Model
An adversary, whose aim is to render critical devices (publishers) inaccessible, can mount
a DDoS attack against either subscribers through broker(s) or directly broker(s) that main-
tain the communication between those publishers and the corresponding subscribers.
The attacks can be mounted for a short time, which force the peers to reset their com-
munication as well as authentication. This introduces an unacceptable loss of availability
for the critical applications.
On the other hand, for applications requiring high availability and low latency, the
accidental failure of broker(s) providing connections between a publisher and its sub-
scribers might pose safety-risks as, until a new connection is established over new bro-
ker(s), some of the critical node might be inaccessible.
For critical applications, replay and repudiation attacks can pose a high risk e.g., re-
ceiving an outdated measurement can result in a wrong decision for field devices. An ad-
versary can obtain an elevated privilege by compromising some secrets to resend/delay
some of the data.
We consider a strong threat model where: (1) An adversary can have access rights to
some underlay routers to eavesdrop, capture, drop, resend, and alter the data traffic to
mount a replay or DDoS attack against brokers. Exploiting the obtained elevated privi-
lege, a large amount of zombies can launch an attack brokers to deny the service. (2) The
secrets of some publishers, subscribers and brokers can be compromised by the intruders
to attack brokers and subscribers (if attacker gains a right to pass authentication of the
brokers).
5.2.4 Assumptions
We assume that all publishers/subscribers/brokers cannot be fully compromised, and
only the secrets held by the minority of them can be compromised.
We consider that publishers know only the access brokers IP addresses and not each
others.
We assume that all nodes have valid certificates issued by a Certification Authority
and that each node’s certification is delivered to Authorization Servers in a secure way.
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FIGURE 5.1: After obtaining the ticket from AdServ by using the secure chan-
nel, the publisher diffuses the data packets over N access brokers. Access
brokers check the authenticator and hand them over secret broker(s) to check
the validity of the ticket and distribute to the subscribers.
For devices that do not possess enough resources for asymmetric-key cryptography, we
employ physical unclonable functions (PUF), combining symmetric-key and ID-based
key cryptosystems [Sef+14]. This assumption is reasonable [Bak+11] considering the SG’s
relatively static communication node structure.
5.3 Developing the SeReCP Mechanisms
SeReCP’s main goal is to provide: (a) a proactive DDoS attack protection by differentiat-
ing authorized/unauthorized traffic at the resource-rich broker nodes than being handled
at the constrained subscriber nodes, and (b) a secure and reliable communication. SeReCP
is designed for a messaging paradigm, providing E2E timely delivery guarantee using a
lightweight pub-sub paradigm extending on [Bak+11] instead of data storage/querying
[Kim+12] or complex event processing.
The main components of SeReCP are as follows (Fig.5.1):
Publishers: The devices that produce the data, which are required for the subscribers.
This data can be a measurement for some applications or a command for some actuators.
This data is signed and (if necessary) encrypted by the publisher.
Subscriber: The entity that needs the data to decide or to actuate depending on the
application context.
Administration servers (AdServ): We consider these servers as trusted and robust for
the DDoS attacks. They have three roles in the system: (1) Bootstrap node (2) Autho-
rization server (3) Pub-sub system administrator. AdServ maintains all certifications of
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the nodes. When the nodes apply to AdServ to access the network, they obtain the secu-
rity keys and other information regarding their respective role in the network by using a
secure channel (public key or PUF).
Brokers: There are three type of brokers: (1) Access Brokers (AB), receiving the pub-
lications from publishers and validating their authenticators. (2) Secret brokers, trans-
mitting the publications to the corresponding subscribers after verifying their tickets’ au-
thenticity, and (3) Master brokers, responsible for probing to the other clusters/master
brokers and maintaining the network state.
After clustering all nodes according to their respective Autonomous System (AS) and
geographical proximity (Fig. 5.1), AdServ dynamically chooses the "strongest" nodes as
brokers for each cluster (versus employing dedicated brokers) in order to provide scala-
bility. AdServ assigns the roles as publisher/subscriber/broker to each node. Every node
in the network takes part as a publisher or/and subscriber or/and broker at the same
time. AdServ informs the corresponding brokers about the publishers’ advertisements2
and their corresponding subscribers. The access broker IP addresses/IDs are also deliv-
ered to publishers in the initialization process by AdServ (the changes in the broker list
are also delivered by AdServ, and we consider this to happen only infrequently).
SeReCP provides security in two steps: (1) From publishers to the brokers, and (2)
E2E (publishers to subscribers). We focus on the authentication between publishers and
access brokers in order to avoid the DDoS attacks.
5.3.1 Authentication/Communication Protocol between Publishers and
Access Brokers
When using the connection maintaining application or network layer state, the connec-
tion can be forced to reset by even short-time DDoS attack against access brokers. The
loss of availability can cause some disturbance for the critical SG applications. In the con-
struction of our authentication protocol between the publisher and brokers, we leverage
Angelos, et al. [SK05]’s approach, which alleviates the necessity of application state at
the brokers and provides high resilience against the DDoS attack. Taking advantage of
this "stateless" authentication, publishers diffuse the data packets over N access brokers.
In case of d percentage of N access brokers deny service due to the DDoS attacks (e.g.,
N = 100, d = 10), the dropped data can be checked/corrected in the subscribers by us-
ing forward error correction (FEC) or transmitting redundant replicated packets from the
publisher (an acknowledgement mechanism can also be used for applications requiring
relatively lower availability). However, [SK05] is based on a strong and potentially unre-
alistic assumption of fully trustworthy brokers. In [SK05], the authors also assume that
the shared key encrypting the ticket cannot be obtained by an adversary in any way. An
adversary who compromises the shared key can then mount a severe attack on the target
(e.g., subscribers). Our approach removes these significant constraints.
Key and Ticket Establishment: When a publisher applies to AdServ using the secure
channel in order to join the network, AdServ delivers three types of secrets to the pub-
lisher: (1) a secret key and an initial sequence number for each of their advertisements
2Advertisements are a type of publication and each of them has a group of subscribers. Each publisher
can publish one or multiple advertisements. We assume that these assignments are managed by AdServ.
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FIGURE 5.2: Ticket and packet structures
(the subscriber groups also obtain the corresponding secret key and sequence number),
(2) a session key, a 128 bit symmetric key, and (3) S (= number of the clusters) tickets valid
for the corresponding access brokers. These secrets can be regularly updated depending
on the criticality of the applications running on publishers3. Table 5.1 summarizes the
keys used in SeReCP.
Fig. 5.2(A) illustrates the ticket consisting of a session key, a publisher ID, a range of
publication ID numbers, a time-stamp, flags indicating ticket features, and a signature of
the ticket. While the tickets are signed using a shared keyKS (distributed to all secret bro-
kers by AdServ) to UMAC [Bla+99], they are encrypted using the corresponding access
broker’s key KA.
A packet sent to an access broker contains five parts, as shown in Fig. 5.2(B): (1)
the publication ID, which is a monotonically increasing number and encrypted using
the session key, (2) advertisement ID, (3) the corresponding ticket,(4) signature of the
whole packet, which is generated using the session key, and (5) an original packet, which
is encrypted and signed using a key (KO) that is generated using a secret key and the
sequence number of advertisement as inputs to a pseudo random function (PRF), more
details in the Section 5.3.2.
Communication Protocol between Publisher and Access Brokers: When a publisher
obtains the three secrets, it is ready to publish its data over access brokers. To transmit
each packet, an access broker is selected in a pseudo-random manner. The selection is
performed for each packet by using the last 4 digits of a random number as an index to
the list of access brokers. The random number is derived using the session key and the
publication ID as inputs to pseudo random generator (PRG). For each subsequent packet,
the publication ID regularly increases, thus diffusing the packets over access brokers in a
pseudo-random manner.
Once the access broker receives the packet from the publisher, it obtains the session
key by decrypting the ticket of receiving packet using its respective KA, and validates
the packet’s signature using the session key to UMAC. This provides a packet validation
3The tickets can be frequently updated by secret brokers with the same session key. However, the session
key can be updated by AdServ using the public key.
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with low computation and also protects from computational DDoS attacks. After the
validation, the packet’s publication ID (as decrypted using the session key) is checked to
be within the acceptable range defined in the ticket and that it is larger than the last seen
publication ID. The publisher ID and the last seen publication ID are only things stored
by access brokers. In addition, the access broker validates whether the packet is routed to
the correct access broker. To do this, it matches the respective access broker ID and the last
four digits of the random number (derived by using the session key and publication ID
along with PRG). These checks provide strong replay and repudiation attack protection
with minimum memory occupation in access brokers. Finally, the access broker hands
the packet containing the ticket in a decrypted form over to the corresponding secret
brokers4.
The ticket verification is delegated to the secret brokers to perform the authentication
in separate nodes. The validity of the ticket is checked by fulfilling a UMAC validation
using a shared key KS in secret broker(s). Moreover, the publication ID in the packet
and the last seen publication IDs5 are compared to determine whether there is an abnor-
mal difference, thus dropping the packets fabricated with a random publication ID by a
intruder compromising some of the access broker keys, KA and the shared key, KS .
Re-keying Procedure: Ticket usage is restricted by the range of publication ID num-
bers and the time-stamp, i.e., 500 packets and 1-2 hours, thus avoiding reuse of the ticket
by multiple zombies. Once a secret broker notices the ticket in the receiving packet is
about to expire in terms of either the time or the range of publication ID numbers, it pro-
duces a new ticket by enlarging the range of publication ID number and signing using
KS . Then, the secret broker sends a new ticket to S access broker (randomly selecting one
from each cluster). The access brokers issue new tickets to publishers after encrypting it
using its respective KA. However, in the re-keying process, the session keys of publishers
are not changed. This can only be fulfilled by AdServ and we consider this done using
the secure channel depending on the application criticality, e.g., hourly, daily.
Multihoming-based Fast "Recovery": SG applications have stringent latency require-
ments as delayed/lost messages could result in improper control operations. Taking these
requirements into account, we propose multihoming based fast "recovery" mechanism,
enhancing the approach of [SK05] by detecting/re-transmitting the dropped packets in a
timely manner. To achieve this, we redesign the data diffusion mechanism by enabling
publishers to forward every two consecutive data packets to two different network inter-
faces of a (pseudo) randomly selected pub-sub broker while spreading the data over the
all access brokers. The access broker sets a timer on receiving one of the messages to check
whether the other message arrives within the stipulated time period. If not, it requests the
dropped message using the remaining functional network interface. We consider that the
knowledge about which IP addresses belongs to the same access brokers is maintained by
only publishers but not by public. Our experiments show that this mechanism provides
high mitigation for delivery of the dropped packets without violating the defined maxi-
mum latency of the applications with high availability and latency requirement. This is
4AdServ constructs a hash table, mapping advertisement IDs with their corresponding secret broker ID,
and then issues this list to all access brokers
5While secret brokers maintain publisher ID and the last seen S publication IDs of each publisher, access
brokers save publisher ID and only the last seen publisher ID.
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TABLE 5.1: The keys used by SeReCP
Keys Usage
Session
Key
Signing/verifying the publication packets in publish-
ers and access brokers, respectively
KO Signing/verifying and encrypting/decrypting the
original packet in publisher/subscribers, respectively
KA Encryption/decryption of the ticket in the corre-
sponding access brokers
KS Verification of the ticket in the secret brokers
SecretKeyi Input to PRF to derivate KO
KG Signing/verifying the subscription packet in secret
broker/subscriber, respectively
the case even when 30% of the access broker are under the DDoS attack. Furthermore,
this mechanism does not introduce any additional overhead when there is no attack un-
like replicated data delivery or FEC, and it provides much lower latency compared to
classical acknowledge mechanisms e.g., TCP’s cumulative ACK mechanism.
How does SeReCP Overcome the Shortcomings of [SK05]: To address the limitation
of [SK05] of full trust in brokers, we develop a novel solution as: (1) SeReCP employs S
tickets encrypted by S different KA rather than a ticket encrypted by a shared key. (2)
The authentication in SeReCP is fulfilled in two separate brokers having different keys to
check the ticket’s diverse parts.
In SeReCP, an adversary whose aim is to launch a DDoS attack against the subscribers
needs to compromise either all of S tickets maintained by publishers (this attack takes
until ticket expire i.e., 500 packets and its result is relatively limited) or both allofKA and
KS that are kept by the corresponding access brokers and secret brokers, respectively.
Where an attacker compromises only some of S, KA and KS can suspect the packets to be
fabricated by using compromised keys since their publication IDs are quite different from
others. Thus, SeReCP renders a DDoS attack against the subscriber to be much harder to
launch.
We employ a multihoming based fast "recovery" mechanism to meet high availabil-
ity requirements without requiring replicated data delivery, as in [SK05]. Our experi-
ments demonstrate that transmitting a replicated packet only to applications with a high
availability requirement among the others, SeReCP meets the applications’ availability
requirements, even when 50% of access broker are under attack.
To provide secure communication between the brokers we consider a symmetric key
pad similar to [Bak+11]. However, new pads can be regularly issued by AdServ using the
secure channel, unlike [Bak+11]. This produces limited overhead, since we employ this
method only between brokers but not across all nodes as in [Bak+11].
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5.3.2 E2E Security and Group Key Management
Group Key Management System: SeReCP provides efficient DDoS protection by em-
ploying the above methods. However, to protect the E2E integrity and confidentiality
between publisher and their subscribers, SeReCP requires a key management system.
Hence, we introduce a group key management system (done by AdServ), which first
identifies the advertisements of each publisher e.g., advertisements 1 and 2 for publisher
1, according to the application running on the device and the utility policy, and then
issues the corresponding secret keys for the publishers, e.g., secret keys 1 and 2 for pub-
lisher 1. Additionally, AdServ clusters subscribers according to the advertisements they
subscribe, e.g., subscribers 1 and 2 subscribe for advertisement 1 (a subscriber can also
subscribe to multiple advertisements), and then issues the secret keys to the correspond-
ing subscription group members e.g., secret key 1 for subscription group 1 (subscribers 1
and 2). This process is illustrated in Fig. 5.3.
E2E Security: Malicious intruders (during the transmission over the underlay net-
work) can alter the data to launch a replay or repudiation attack against the subscribers.
To cope with this, the publishers encrypt and sign each packet with KO:
KO = f(SecretKeyi, SequenceNumber)
where f indicates PRF, SecretKeyi is a symmetric key issued by AdServ for adver-
tisementi, and SequenceNumber is the current sequence number of the packet of the
advertisementi. The subscribers use the pair of publisher ID and advertisement ID as
an index to maintain the last seen sequence number in a list. Upon reception of a packet,
using the publisher and advertisement IDs as index in the list, the last seen sequence
number is obtained and then SequenceNumber is calculated by adding 1 to it. The sub-
scriber makes use of SequenceNumber and SecretKeyi to PRF in the process of derivation
of the KO.
The subscribers can authenticate the original packet performing a UMAC validation
using KO. In case of the packet is forwarded by an intruder to a subscriber not in the
correct group, the packet cannot be decrypted by the subscriber without K0. In addi-
tion, since KO is derived using the current SequenceNumber, launching a replay attack is
impossible for intruders if they have no the SecretKeyi and no SequenceNumber.
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Upon receiving a packet from an access broker, the secret broker extracts the ticket
and publication ID, but adds the publisher ID into the subscription packet. To pro-
tect from repudiation attack, secret brokers sign the subscription packet using KG and
a nonce (subscribers’ respective ID) to UMAC as illustrated in Fig 2(C). KG is issued by
AdServ to secret brokers and the corresponding subscription group (it does not need to
happen frequently e.g., daily). Thus, even if intruders compromise a subscriber’s secrets
(SecretKeyi, SequenceNumber, andKG), they cannot fabricate a packet for the subscribers
by spoofing the IP addresses (as if it is coming from the publisher over the secret bro-
kers), since the intruder must know subscriber IDs (a random 32 bit value) of the target
subscribers in order to embody the UMAC signature.
To alter a packet, an intruder would need to compromise (a) all secrets of the secret
brokers, (b) members of that subscription group, and (c) obtain detailed knowledge of the
network/nodes structure and data flow relationships. This is often unrealistic.
5.4 Security Analysis
We now present the security analysis for SeReCP.
5.4.1 DDoS Attack
Rendering a publisher inaccessible is possible by launching a DDoS against either access
brokers maintaining the communication between publisher and subscriber or the corre-
sponding subscribers by gaining elevated privilege on the intermediate brokers6. To cope
with direct attacks on the brokers, SeReCP employs packet diffusion in addition to re-
dundant packet transmission or FEC, thus providing a significant mitigation in case d%
of brokers are under DDoS attack. Moreover, taking into account the stringent latency
and availability requirements, we propose a multihoming based fast "recovery" mecha-
nism, proving rapid re-transmission of dropped packets. In the second case of attacks,
SeReCP employs S different tickets and two-step authentication to make a DDoS attack
against the subscribers much harder, keeping in mind this is the type of attacks launched
by attackers who are able to compromise some secrets of the nodes. Thus, to mount a
attack on the subscriber, an adversary must compromise both KA and KS belonging to
access brokers and secret brokers, respectively. This is a difficult task for an attacker.
5.4.2 Replay Attack
Replay attacks pose risks for both brokers and subscribers. If the system is vulnerable
to replay attack, an attacker can re-send the same packet in order to mislead brokers
and subscriber. However, SeReCP uses two dedicated countermeasures to protect the
system from replay attacks. (1) Access brokers keep the last seen publication ID along
with the publisher ID. Upon reception of a packet, they check if the publication ID in the
6The publishers and subscribers IP addresses are not public and they permit only some predefined IP
addresses to communicate. Hence we assume a direct DDoS attack on the publishers and subscribers is not
possible.
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receiving packet is larger than the last seen one. (2) Publishers sign the original packet
KO derived by using SecretKeyi and SequenceNumber to PRF. Upon receipt of a packet,
the subscribers derives KO by using SecretKeyi and SequenceNumber to PRF. Then, the
signature is checked using KO whether the packet is altered/fresh, or not.
5.4.3 Repudiation Attack
Repudiation attacks are a severe concern over group communication since an adversary
who compromised the secrets of a member of a subscription group can fabricate packets
by spoofing a publisher’s and secret broker’s IP addresses. SeReCP employs aKG for each
subscription group. AdServ issues these keys to the secret brokers and the corresponding
subscribers. They also sign the packets using the subscriber ID (as nonce) and KG to
UMAC. This provides a capability for subscribers to check whether the packet originates
from the secret brokers and, implicitly, the publisher.
5.4.4 Drop and Delay Attack
An attacker can drop some of the packet to lead to failure of the authentication mecha-
nism. Particularly, the dependence on the monotonically increasing message ID in the
system might cause the failures if such an attack occurs. To simply mitigate this issue, the
subscribers keep a reasonable number of missing sequence numbers.
5.5 Evaluation
The main goal of SeReCP is to provide high communication availability between pub-
lishers and subscribers, even during the high-volume DDoS attacks in order to avoid
inaccessibility to some critical devices, which can pose severe safety risks on power grids.
In this section, we present an evaluation as to how well SeReCP meets these goals and its
additional overhead levels in terms of latency and traffic.
We consider that the wide area network used by the utility to manage the SG covers
a territory or a country. To obtain realistic results we employed NorNet Testbed [Dre15]
that contains multihomed7 nodes spread over all of Norway. We deployed daemons at 30
nodes with 2-3 network connections.
To measure the round-trip time latency between publishers and subscribers (when the
brokers interpose), we deploy publisher and subscriber daemons at two different nodes
and broker daemon at the all other nodes. In each experiment we change the tasks of
all nodes till the results stabilize. By doing so, we obtain the results across deployments.
Correspondingly, for availability measurements, we deploy the publisher and subscriber
daemons on the same node in order to enable the implementation of diverse attack sce-
narios.
7A multihomed node has connections to multiple Internet service providers (ISP) via different network
interfaces.
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FIGURE 5.5: The normalized throughput results of SeReCP and Angelos
[SK05]. In the case of transmitting replicated (R) packets, both SeReCP(R)
and Angelos’(R) achieve higher network resilience.
Each SeReCP’s publication packet (see Fig. 5.2(B)) contains 48 bytes of additional data
(36 bytes ticket, 4 bytes publication ID, 4 bytes Advertisement ID, and the 4 bytes signa-
ture) over the original packet; the subscription packets include only 12 bytes additional
data (Advertisement ID, publisher ID, and the signature are 4 bytes). Taking into ac-
count SG applications high availability requirements, this additional traffic constitutes a
reasonable overhead.
Fig.5.4 shows the round-trip time latency between publishers and subscribers by com-
paring direct communication using UDP with the communication over the brokers using
SeReCP. As we investigate whether our approach can be implemented for SG applications
using the public networks, we present the actual latency results for both direct communi-
cation and SeReCP. In addition, although we obtain the results for each deployment case,
since we see that the results mainly differ according to the ISPs (e.g., Uninet, PowerTech)
between two ends, we illustrate the three representative combinations. The latency re-
sults show that SeReCP adds around 40ms latency in comparison to the direct connec-
tion. The ISPs’ underlay infrastructures have significant effect on the latency. Although
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TABLE 5.2: Performance evaluation parameters
Application Availability Latency Priority
Wide Area Situational
Awareness (WASA)
100% 200 ms high
Real Time Pricing 99.33% 1150 ms middle
Customer Information 98.50% 2000 ms low
SeReCP introduces an additional 40ms latency, the obtained latency values, between 60-
80 ms, are reasonable for most of the SG applications which range at 200-2000 ms, as in
Table 5.2 [US 10].
We first compare our approach with Angelos et al. [SK05] regarding throughput, in
the normalized form, in the presence of DDoS attack. Throughput refers to the rate of
successful message delivery. Fig. 5.5 denotes the successful delivery rates of SeReCP
and [SK05] without/with duplicate packets in the case of different rates of failures in
access brokers. Without duplicate packets, we see that while the connection performs
well up to 30% failure of pub-sub brokers using SeReCP (recall that real time applications
can perform well up to 10% packet drop by using UDP or TCP [Nah+01]), the perfor-
mance drops after 5% failures for [SK05]. Utilizing our multihoming-based fast "recov-
ery" mechanism, SeReCP delivers the dropped packets in time (i.e., the re-transmission
time of the acknowledge mechanism of subscribers). On the other hand, in the case of
sending duplicate packets, whereas SeReCP can maintain the connection without stalling
up to 50% failure, the connection can perform well up to 20% failure for [SK05]. These
results demonstrate that sending redundant replicated packets significantly enhances the
throughput in the presence of DDoS attack. However, even by sending duplicate packets,
[SK05] cannot introduce effectiveness as simple as SeReCP.
To assess the effectiveness of the approach, another important factor is latency in the
presence of a DoS/DDoS attack. Fig. 5.6 shows the corresponding latency results for
the experiments. By sending duplicate packets SeReCP provides reasonable latencies for
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the real-time applications8 for up to 50% failures. [SK05] with duplicate packets, and
similarly simple SeReCP, introduce similar curves and latencies up to 30% failures for the
real-time applications.
We next evaluate the communication system to provide the required availability for
SG applications. Availability refers to the rate of delivered packets that do not violate
the application latency requirements. Therefore, a packet should arrive to the destination
not only before the re-transmission time of the acknowledge mechanism, as is common
practice, but also within the acceptable latency for SG applications. In light of the above
results, we employ the duplicate packet method depending on the availability require-
ments of the applications. To do so, we categorize SG applications into three priorities
with respect to availability and latency requirements (Table 5.2). We select three real
SG applications [US 10] which represent general SG applications. The duplicate packet
method is not used for Customer Information application. Note that while all packets are
duplicated for WASA application, only 50% of packets (randomly chosen) are transmitted
as duplicated for the Real Time Pricing application.
Using these three duplication methods (100%, 50%, and 0% duplication) for the cor-
responding applications, we obtain results regarding the network availability for each
application in diverse failure rates of access brokers by employing SeReCP and [SK05].
Fig. 5.7 denotes that by employing 100% duplication, ([SK05] provides the required avail-
ability for WASA application for only up to 20% failure) SeReCP introduces the same
availability up to 50% failure for WASA despite its strict latency requirement i.e., 200 ms.
Fig. 5.8 depicts that although Real Time Pricing relatively has lower latency requirement
(1150 ms), by duplicating only 50% of packets, the required availability can be provided
up to around 30% and 20% failure by SeReCP and [SK05], respectively. Finally, without
duplication of packets, SeReCP can still provide the required availability up to 30% fail-
ure due to the much lower latency requirement i.e., 2000 ms, [SK05] represents a sharp
decline after 5% failure, as illustrated in Fig. 5.9. Overall, by employing the duplication
of packets depending on the application requirements rather than duplication of all pack-
ets as in [SK05], SeReCP can introduce high resilience against DDoS attack and provide
the required availability for each application at least up to 30% failure of access brokers.
8Real-time apps typically have 150-200ms latency [RGZ06].
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In addition, if the first priority applications are safety-critical applications, then SeReCP
sustains the required availability for up to 50% failures for these applications despite the
second and the third priority cases shutting down after 30% failures.
Discussion: In our evaluation, we assess our approach for its ability to provide the re-
quired availability for real-time SG applications during the DDoS attack on the pub-sub
brokers. We compare our approach with [SK05], which is also proposed to protect the
E2E connection of real-time application from DDoS attacks. Firstly, we evaluate our ap-
proach in terms of its additional latency and overhead. The results denote that SeReCP’s
additional overhead and latency is reasonable for most SG applications. It is worth high-
lighting that, although the latency results, obtained the actual Internet infrastructure, are
reasonable for most SG application, the ISP connections of the end hosts significantly af-
fect the latency. Secondly, we evaluate the normalized throughput of SeReCP and [SK05]
for real time applications. Without duplicate packets, whereas SeReCP can protect the
E2E communication up to 30% failure, the connection stalls after 5% failure in [SK05]. This
shows that SeReCP preserves the E2E communication even without duplicate packets up
to 30% failures. With duplicate packets, SeReCP can maintain the same performance up
to 50% failures. In the third evaluation, by employing different duplicate packet rates
depending on SG applications’ "priority", while SeReCP can provide the required avail-
ability for middle and low "priority" SG applications up to 30% failures, it provides the
64 Chapter 5. A Secure and Reliable Communication Platform
required availability for high "priority" appications up to 50% failure. If we consider
pub-sub brokers size comparable to a typical Akamai setting (ca. 2500 nodes) [SK05], an
attacker coordinating around 1,300,000 zombies can bring down 30% of access brokers.
However, this volume of attacks are a small percentage of the DDoS attacks experienced
in the past. Even in this situation, SeReCP can provide the required availability for high
priority (safety critical) applications despite the failure of the low and middle priority
ones. This substantiates SeReCP to be a promising approach to make the public network
usable for SG applications in a secure and reliable manner.
5.6 Conclusion
The proposed SeReCP approach provides a proactive DDoS attack defense by using a
pub-sub infrastructure in addition to providing secure E2E data delivery in a light-weight
manner, considering SG applications requirements. To maintain the availability in case
of a targeted or sweeping attack on an access broker maintaining the communication
between a given publisher and its subscribers, we employ a packet diffusion mecha-
nism, spreading the packets over access brokers in a pseudo-random manner due to its
token-based authentication mechanism. Moreover, we propose a multihoming-based fast
"recovery" mechanism, enhancing the packet diffusion mechanism by detecting and re-
questing the dropped packets in still access brokers rather than in the subscribers, thus
enabling the system to meet the stringent latency requirements of SG applications. Fi-
nally, to preserve E2E confidentiality and integrity of the data, we propose a group key
management system, which provides role-based access rights for both publisher and sub-
scriber in addition to guard from replay attacks.
To assess the effectiveness of our approach against DDoS attacks, an actual SG test-bed
was used. The experiments show that SeReCP introduces a small 40ms overhead accept-
able for most SG applications. Furthermore, we conducted an DDoS attack by randomly
bringing down access brokers, and compared the availability across SeReCP and state of
the art [SK05]. The results showed that by assigning the rate of duplicate packets de-
pending on the applications availability and latency requirements, SeReCP provides the
required availability, up to 30% failure and 50% failure, of pub-sub brokers for the appli-
cation with relatively lower requirements and for the application with stringent require-
ments, respectively. This showed that SeReCP, with its lightweight mechanism, can resist
attacks much larger than we have seen to date. Overall, these results validate SeReCP to
provide the required security for SG applications in instances where the SG uses public
networks.
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Securing the Cloud-Assisted Smart Grid
To manage millions of SG devices and to handle large amounts of data in a reliable, scal-
able, and cost-effective way, the SG utilities increasingly extend their communication-
based management system to the advocated cloud computing platform. These cloud
platforms enable reliable and on-demand access to varied computing resources [BI14;
BMR15]. Despite the advantages of the cloud, its usage of the public network and shared
resources can expose the SG to security risks considering both the cyber and physical sys-
tems, e.g., power grid/appliances. In particular, DDoS attacks represent a major threat to
the SG applications running in the cloud, considering SG applications’ stringent latency
requirements (in the range of 100 ms to 5 s) and reliability requirements (99.00 %–99.99%)
[BI14].
As availability constitutes a safety property for SG applications (especially for con-
trol functions), deploying proactive defense mechanisms becomes indispensable for SG
communication. Proactive defense mechanisms, e.g., moving/hiding the target [Sta+05;
FPT12; Jia+14; DS17b], are introduced as countermeasures increasing the cost placed on
the attacker to overwhelm the victim’s resources. However, since these proactive defense
mechanisms are mainly designed to mitigate DDoS attacks in typical web applications,
they are not suitable for the SG applications’ context due to the SG specific requirements
of high availability and responsiveness [SK05].
To fill this gap, we propose a hybrid hierarchical cloud-extension concept (HHCEC),
which is a SG-relevant cloud-assisted architecture. HHCEC provides ultra-high respon-
siveness and security with its (a) hybrid and geographically dispersed structure, and (b)
specialized broker-based publish-subscribe communication system. Second, we propose
a novel approach termed Port Hopping Spread Spectrum (PHSS), which acts as a strong
defense against transport and application layers DDoS attacks, as well as the volume-
based DoS/DDoS attacks, against the broker servers. PHSS is equipped with two distinc-
tive features: (1) port hopping, changing the open port of the broker server as a function of
the time and a secret shared between the broker server and the publishers1, and (2) packet
spreading, diffusing consecutive data packets over a number of broker servers versus a
single broker server. This approach enables PHSS to instantiate replica broker servers to
take over the attacked broker servers without blocking all traffic by taking advantage of
the rapid-elasticity characteristic of the cloud.
1The terms client/publisher and server/broker are interchangeably used in the rest of the chapter. In
addition, while every SG device/application server can be a publisher and/or subscriber, the brokers are
dedicated servers for their respective roles.
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The existing port hopping approaches assume that the secret (a cryptographic seed), if
compromised, can be renewed by an Authorization Server using a public key-based re-
keying approach, which requires high unaffordable computation complexities for differ-
ent SG entities (cf. [LT04; FPT12]). Moreover, when using public key-based approaches,
if the secret is compromised, the adversary can mount an attack on the broker to render
inaccessible them. In such cases, the broker servers become unavailable for all publishers
during the re-keying process, which in turn severely impacts the SG applications’ service
provision. Accordingly, an efficient reactive mechanism is highly necessary in order to
minimize the impact of DDoS attacks against the open ports of broker servers, as a result
of compromising the secret.
To address this issue, we introduce (1) a token-based authentication mechanism that al-
lows for a light-weight periodic transmission of the secret to each client (publisher), and
(2) a shuffling-based containment mechanism that quarantines malicious clients, without ren-
dering the attacked broker server inaccessible. To do this, the containment mechanism
repositions/shuffles the clients over the ports of the broker server with a negligible over-
head.
To assess the efficiency of the proposed approach, we construct a proof-of-concept
prototype using EC2-micro instance [Ama16] and the PlanetLab (http://planet-lab.org)
test-bed. We evaluate PHSS’s effectiveness in providing network availability by using
the shuffling-based containment mechanism against DDoS attacks using the compromised
secret. We also compare our approach with the public key-based re-keying method used
by the existing port hopping mechanisms. Our results show that by containing the impact
of the DDoS attack using the compromised secret in a notably shorter time period, PHSS
provides high network availability of over 98% during the attack versus the typical 6˜0%
availability achieved by using the public key-based re-keying method. Furthermore, af-
ter assessing the overhead (in terms of broker server throughput and response latency),
the experimental results show that our proposed mechanism causes neither significant
throughput degradation (i.e. <0.01% throughput degradation) nor additional latency. To
summarize, our contributions are:
• A SG-relevant cloud extension, termed HHCEC, which utilizes a hybrid and geo-
graphically dispersed structure to meet the responsiveness and reliability require-
ments of SG applications.
• A strong proactive DDoS attack defense mechanism, called PHSS, which dynam-
ically changes the open ports of the broker servers to efficiently drop the invalid
packets in the firewall. Furthermore, PHSS diffuses consecutive data packets over
a number of servers versus a single server in order to rapidly recover the attacked
system in the cloud.
• A token-based authentication mechanism to prevent secrets from being compro-
mised, as well as a shuffling-based containment mechanism to contain the damage of
the DDoS attack utilizing the compromised secret in a shorter time.
• A proof-of-concept platform using Amazon’s EC2 [Ama16] and PlanetLab nodes to
evaluate our approach in terms of the availability of service provision for the SG
applications over DDoS attacks and the overhead imposed by our approach.
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FIGURE 6.1: Hybrid Hierarchical Cloud Concept (HHCEC)
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.1 details the security
and attack models. Section 6.2 introduces the HHCEC, followed by the PHSS approach
in Section 6.3 and their evaluation in Section 6.4.
6.1 Models, Goals and Assumptions
We now describe the system and attack models in addition to the security goals and as-
sumptions driving our approach.
6.1.1 System Model
We consider the established SG model where the utility relies on a heterogeneous network
(i.e., public and private) and a hybrid cloud infrastructure, as illustrated in Fig. 6.1. We
posit that the utility takes into account the availability requirements of SG applications
and the cost-effectiveness while buiding the network and the cloud infrastructure. As
pub-sub systems inherently provide scalability and proactive DDoS attack defense for
the constrained SG devices, we employ a broker-based pub-sub system on HHCEC.
Our system is designed for a message passing paradigm where publishers transmit
their data to brokers, and the brokers subsequently deliver the data to the subscribers,
e.g., the SG applications and devices.
A system administrator that considers the geographical distance and the latency be-
tween the brokers and publishers, assigns each publisher to a broker bundle. Further-
more, the system administrator monitors/maintains the latency between the broker bun-
dles and the publishers to re-assign the publishers to a new broker bundles in case of
detecting intolerable latency.
Our approach distinguishes between authorized and unauthorized traffic before it
reaches the resource-constrained SG devices by countering the DDoS attacks in the well-
provisioned broker servers in terms of computation capacity and bandwidth. Thus, the
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proposed approach adopts the functionality of a distributed firewall to avoid any over-
whelmed link to the SG nodes.
6.1.2 Security Goals
Our security objective is to guarantee delivery of the publisher data to the corresponding
subscribers within the time window specified in the application requirements. To meet
the high availability requirements of the critical devices, any DDoS attacks using privilege
of the compromised secret must be eliminated or at least mitigated by containing the
impact of the DDoS attack in a reasonable time period.
6.1.3 Attack Model
The broker servers, which maintain the communication between the publishers and the
subscribers, can be targeted by an attacker with the intent to render critical devices inac-
cessible.
We consider a robust threat model where the attacker:
• Controls a minority of publishers/clients that behave maliciously, referred to as ma-
licious clients.
• Can eavesdrop, capture, drop, resend, and alter some of the traffic between the
publisher and the brokers to launch DDoS attacks against brokers.
• Can disclose the secret of the malicious clients. Accordingly, the attacker can launch
a DDoS attack against the open port of the broker server.
6.1.4 Assumptions
As in contemporary attack models, we assume that (a) publishers obtain only the IP ad-
dresses of the broker servers and (b) valid certificates are issued by a Certification Au-
thority to all brokers/publishers/subscribers2 and to Authorization Servers in a secure
way. Since we focus on the broker defense against DDoS attacks, the protection of the
Authorization Server is beyond the scope of the paper.
6.1.5 Limitations
It is worth mentioning that the pathological case of attackers that can fully saturate the
Internet backbone links for HHCEC is beyond the scope of this approach.
2We suppose that our approach is deployed on the SG devices that possess enough resources for
asymmetric-key cryptography.
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6.2 Cloud Computing for Smart Grid
In this section, we review the utility of the cloud for SG applications. Afterwards, we
highlight the existing limitations behind the direct usage of the cloud structure in the SG
context. Finally, we describe the technical details behind our proposed cloud-assisted
architecture that addresses such limitations. We also present existing approaches related
to the adoption of cloud computing for the SG in Section 2.3.
Typically, the realization of smart grids causes a very large increase in data volume due
to the implementation of real time metering, monitoring and pricing applications. This
massive data also needs to be collected and processed in real time. As control decisions
are solely based on such data, it significantly affects the stability and reliability of the SG.
Thus, data parallelism and high computational capabilities play key roles in analyzing
and processing this large amount of data [BI14].
However, the variable resource needs of the SG applications, as matching the varying
SG operational behavior, is a challenge for the SG utilities. These applications operates in
idle mode on dedicated hardware until a particular situation occurs, e.g., detected abnor-
mality in the grid voltage. This results in inefficient resource usage. Consequently, using
a cloud computing platform becomes a viable solution to address these issues due to its
featured rapid elasticity [BI14]. In fact, as SG applications have strict availability, response
time and security requirements, the direct usage of the cloud for the SG encounters the
following limitations [BI14].
1. Guaranteed Service Availability: while availability, real-time responsiveness, guaran-
teed consistency, and fault tolerance are the properties indirectly affecting the safety
of the SG, they are typically liveness properties for cloud service providers. Avoid-
ing single point of failure scenarios and potential communication bottlenecks is a
must to achieve high availability in the use of the typical cloud for the SG.
2. High Responsiveness: for data efficiency in the Cloud, an outer layer of the Cloud can
be built to provide data aggregation, multiplexing towards the main applications.
This would eliminate the potential data transfer bottleneck and contribute to the
responsiveness of the applications.
3. Data Confidentiality: some SG applications require high confidentiality to prevent
data sharing or information leakage, which the cloud service providers typically do
not provide. On the other hand, some SG applications need relatively less security
protection. This security diversity forces the SG utility to employ diverse resources
with different security assurances in the cloud adoption.
In the next section, we introduce an SG related cloud-extension concept that over-
comes the above-mentioned limitations resulting from the direct usage of the cloud in the
SG context.
6.2.1 Hybrid Hierarchical Cloud Concept (HHCEC) for the SG
Providing the specific SG requirements is the driver behind proposing a 3-layer HHCEC
cloud-assisted architecture, as depicted in Fig. 6.1. The first layer is composed of Broker
70 Chapter 6. Securing the Cloud-Assisted Smart Grid
Bundles, which are dispersed based on the grid topology throughout the utility territory.
Each Broker Bundle can consists of several broker servers. The goal of the Broker Bundles
is to handle the time-sensitive data in a location surrounding the source rather than in a
remote center. This layer provides an interface to support data concentration, data pre-
processing, short-term redundant data storage (using replica shards), proactive defense
against DoS/DDoS attacks and multiplexing for applications running in the other layers.
Since this layer is composed of public cloud infrastructures, data requiring high confiden-
tiality is saved/forwarded in an encrypted form so that it can be decrypted solely by the
destination [DS17b].
The second layer is an in-house private cloud infrastructure comprised of application
servers that process data requiring high availability and/or confidentiality. This layer
controls and monitors the Broker Bundles of the first layer and assigns the SG devices to the
corresponding Broker Bundles. Furthermore, the second layer accommodates applications
performing analysis, batch processing, permanent archiving, and visualization functions.
Applications/data requiring less security are delegated to the third layer, which con-
sists of public cloud infrastructure(s). This layer communicates and shares corresponding
data with third parties.
While the public clouds in the first layer are built using the infrastructure as a service
(IaaS) model, the public clouds in the third layer can be constructed using IaaS, platform
as a service (PaaS), and/or software as a service (SaaS) models depending on the appli-
cations’ requirements. On the flip side, the private cloud in the second layer is located
in-house to strictly ensure no physical data access by third-party.
We utilize a pub-sub system as a communication platform on HHCEC for SG applica-
tions. The brokers of this pub-sub system reside in the Broker Bundles. The communication
between the SG devices and the layers 2 and 3 is not direct, but goes through the Broker
Bundles, as shown in Fig. 6.1. The application servers and the SG devices can be either
publishers or subscribers. We assume that their roles are assigned by a system adminis-
trator residing in the in-house cloud architecture provided by the second layer.
As a summary, the proposed cloud-assisted architecture HHCEC accommodates the
pub-sub based SG communication platform while taking into account the SG security
requirements. Next, we describe the proposed DDoS attack defense mechanism, PHSS,
that guards the broker servers residing in the Broker Bundles.
6.3 Port Hopping Spread Spectrum (PHSS)
In this section we detail the technical concepts behind our proposed defensive mecha-
nism, required for securing the aforementioned cloud-assisted SG structure. The pro-
posed PHSS consists of two main mechanisms: (1) port hopping and (2) packet spreading,
which provide for a robust DDoS protection for the pub-sub broker servers.
6.3.1 Port Hopping
The port hopping system of PHSS periodically changes the open port of the broker server
over time, as illustrated in Fig. 6.2, according to a pseudo-random sequence known by
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FIGURE 6.2: Port Hopping Approach
both the clients and broker server. This sequence is produced by the broker and the clients
using a shared secret, the time and a pseudo random function (PRF). In addition, to avoid
clients sending packets to the previous or the next port due to time sync error or com-
munication latency, the broker server leaves those ports open for a certain time period,
corresponding to the maximum latency between the broker and the clients [FPT12]. (see
Fig. 6.2). In this context, two challenges must be considered: (1) time synchronization
attacks or clock drift [FPT12] and (2) compromising of the shared secret by the attacker.
Time synchronization attacks/clock drift
To address the first challenge, PHSS takes advantage of a secure synchronization ap-
proach between the brokers and clients. To perform the secure synchronization, each
client first obtains a respective session key (128 bits symmetric key) and an authentica-
tion ticket (which also includes the session key) from an Authorization Server via a se-
cure channel during the process of joining the network (see messages # 1 and # 2 in Fig.
6.3). The authentication tickets (akin to Kerberos ticket [NT94]) are encrypted and signed
using a shared key3 known by the broker servers. The session key of a given client is
derived by decrypting the authentication ticket (inside the sync-request message of the
client) by using the shared key in the broker servers. Thus, the sync-request message’s
integrity is checked using the session key by the broker servers.
To synchronize the secret and time, each client sends a sync-request message to the
broker including the respective authentication ticket and time-stamp. As a response, a
sync-reply message, including the current secret, the life-time of the secret and a time-
stamp, is issued by the broker server. The sync-reply messages are issued to each client
by encrypting and signing with the respective session key, derived by decrypting the
authentication ticket inside the sync-request message. This synchronization process is
illustrated in Fig. 6.3 (3. and 4. messages).
A client receiving the sync-reply message can synchronize the time with the broker
server, as reported in [FPT12]. The life-time of the secret is randomly generated to avoid
3A symmetric key.
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FIGURE 6.3: Authentication and synchronization protocol
synchronization attacks. Before the end of the lifetime of the current secret, each client
issues a new sync-request message to the broker server to derive a new secret and time-
sync info4. The regular re-synchronization employed by our approach provides protec-
tion against clock drift and time synchronization attacks, which are main concerns in the
existing port hopping approaches [LT04; FPT12].
Shared Secret Compromise by the Attacker
Another concern associated with the second challenge is the compromise of the secret
shared among all clients, which poses a high security threat for the system. The existing
port hopping approaches use a PRF and a long-term clients secret, which increases the risk
of attacks [LT04; FPT12]. As a consequence of compromising the secret, SG applications
would experience an unacceptable degradation of availability until new secrets are issued
to all clients via the secure channel (using a public key). To address this issue, in PHSS,
each client regularly requests the current secret from the broker server, as mentioned
above.
The regular renewal of the secret by using the token-based authentication provides
a limited mitigation since the attacker can continuously compromise the clients’ secrets
and thus, launch a direct DDoS attack against the open port. In this case, the containment
of the damage of the attack on the broker server is only possible by retaining malicious
clients in quarantine.
4The synchronization is fulfilled a few times in a day by each client. The overhead of this process is
negligible in comparison to the daily traffic of client/broker server.
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Shuffling-based Containment Mechanism. We develop a shuffling-based (repositioning)
containment mechanism, which contains the impact of malicious clients by localizing /quar-
antining them and then renewing their keys via Authorization Server, as illustrated in
Fig. 6.4. The shuffling idea is roughly inspired by [Jia+14], but our mechanism does not
require moving target servers and additional servers. In the shuffling-based containment
mechanism, when the broker server detects the DDoS attack on the open port5, it ran-
domly shuffles and splits all clients N into p clusters by considering that all clients are
suspicious clients Ns, (Ns = N ). New secrets6 are then transmitted to each of the p clus-
ters. This process is simply called a shuffling iteration. An overview of the variables and
constants used in the shuffling-based process is given in Table 6.1. After the clients start
using their new secrets, the port(s) under attack indicate that the corresponding secret(s)
are compromised. The clients who do not use these compromised secrets are removed
from Ns7. Then, the clients of Ns are shuffled and re-clustered by issuing new secrets for
each new cluster. This technique progressively quarantines the malicious clients, which
provides a quick localization of the malicious clients c without disturbing all traffic. The
number of shuffling iterations is denoted as x. To investigate the effects of p and c on the
number of shuffling iteration x (indicating also the containment duration), we perform a
mathematical analysis as follows:
|N |/(p/c)x ≤ 1 (6.1)
Lemma. For a fixed N , if |N |/(p/c)x ≤ 1, then the compromised clients c are localized in x
shuffling iterations by splitting the Ns into p clusters in each shuffling iteration.
5To detect the attack we simply probe the port periodically, but more complicated methods can be used
for the detection like [GP01].
6For each secret, the broker server concurrently opens the corresponding ports. A client using a given
secret communicates over the port opened for that secret
7The benign clients can continue the transmission over the last issued secrets/ports without disturbing
their traffic.
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TABLE 6.1: Variables and Constants Definition.
Symbol Definition
N The set of clients
Ns The set of suspicious clients
p The number of clusters/secrets/open ports
x The number of shuffling iterations
c The number of malicious clients
Sa The set of secrets used by attacked ports
Proof. To localize a malicious client in x shuffling iterations, first, Ns is set equal to N
(Ns = N ) and then it is split into p clusters (p is equal to |N | 1x ). The broker server issues a
different secret for each cluster. After the first shuffling iteration, the clients of the cluster(s)
whose secret(s) are not used to launch an attack on the corresponding port(s) are removed
from Ns. This iteration continues until |Ns| ≤ p, and a different port is assigned to each
suspicious client, which enables to localize the malicious client. In addition, if c ≥ 1, Ns
is further split into p clusters in each clustering/shuffling iteration, and p is assigned to
(p = |N | 1x ∗ c).
A speedy localization of the malicious client(s) minimizes the loss of network availabil-
ity. To this end, in the extreme case, we can assign each client to a different cluster, namely
issuing a different secret per client (p = |N |), and thus finding the malicious one after a
shuffling iteration (x = 1) based on the above lemma. However, opening a large number
of ports poses a high risk of vulnerability to attacks that target the entire port range. In
addition, building larger clusters in each shuffling iteration, e.g., splitting into two clusters
(p = 2) in each shuffling iteration, increases the duration of the containment, thus affecting
the network availability. Thus, we need to localize the malicious clients c in a minimum
number of shuffling iterations x, and open a minimum number of ports p (equal to the
number of the clusters and the issued secrets) in each shuffling iteration. To minimize the
two parameters (p and x) for N clients, we create a corresponding optimization problem:
minimize A(p, x) = p ∗ x (6.2)
subject to |N |/(p/c)x ≤ 1 (6.3)
To find the minimum values of x and p, inequality (6.3) is expressed as
|N |/(p/c)x ≤ 1 =⇒ |N | ≤ (p/c)x =⇒ p ≥ c ∗ |N |1/x (6.4)
and the result is substituted into equation (6.2) in order to express A(p, x) as a function of
one variable:
A(x) = (c ∗ |N |1/x) ∗ x, x 6= 0 (6.5)
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To compute the minimum value of (6.5), the Closed Interval Method [HW03] is used. We
have to solve A′(x) = 0. Thus,
c ∗ (|N | 1x − |N |
1
x ln (|N |)
x
) = 0, x 6= 0 (6.6)
Solving the above equation gives
x = ln (|N |) (6.7)
Substituting the solution (6.7) into (6.3) results in p = ln(|N|)
√|N | ∗ c.
Algorithm 1 Containment Algorithm
Input: A set N = {n1, n2, . . . , ni} of clients, c = 1 as the first estimation
Output: Suspicious clients Ns = {ns1, ns2, . . . , nsj} equal to compromised clients
Ns ← N
(p, x)← OPTIMUM(Ns, c)
CLUSTER(Ns, p)
while |Ns| ≥ p do . if |Ns| ≤ p, the compromised ones are contained
Check the ports to find the attacked ones.
Remove the clients not using the attacked ports/the secrets Sa = {sa1, sa2, . . . , sak}
from Ns
if c ≥ |Sa| then CLUSTER(Ns, p)
else
c← |Sa|
OPTIMUM(Ns, c)
procedure OPTIMUM(Ns, c) . finds min p and x
x = ln(|Ns|)
1 > |Ns|/(p/c)x =⇒ p = ln(|Ns|)
√|Ns| ∗ c
return p, x
procedure CLUSTER(Ns, p)
Randomly split Ns into p-clusters and then issue p-secrets to the corresponding
clients
Adaptive Algorithm
We embody an adaptive optimization algorithm, which sets c = 1 and then computes the
optimum p and x by solving the optimization problem above. After the execution of each
shuffling iteration, if the number of compromised secrets is higher than c, the algorithm
increases the number of issued secrets (clusters) p based on the number of compromised
secrets c8. The pseudo-code of the optimization-based containment algorithm is shown
in Algorithm 1.
To summarize, in order to address the clock drift and compromising the secret key in
the port hopping mechanism of PHSS, we develop a token-based authentication mechanism
8An intelligent attacker who can pause his/her attack over time and/or cooperate with the others cannot
evade this containment algorithm but might delay it.
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FIGURE 6.5: Packet Spreading
and a shuffling-based containment mechanism. The idea behind the token-based authentica-
tion is to complicate the compromise of secrets. The shuffling-based containment mechanism
is further introduced to localize the compromised secrets without rendering the broker
server inaccessible for all the clients, unlike typical port hopping [LT04; FPT12] or moving
target mechanisms [Jia+14].
6.3.2 Packet Spreading
An attacker who controls a larger Botnet can bring down targeted brokers by flooding
their entire ports and thus overcoming the port hopping mechanism. In such a case, the
time period for re-establishing the connection could violate the availability requirements.
To address this issue, we employ the data spreading mechanism [SK05; DS17b], which
transmits by spreading consecutive data packets to broker servers within a Broker Bundle
in a pseudo-random manner, as illustrated in Fig. 6.5. As shown in the figure, a Broker
Bundle might consist of normal brokers, concentrator brokers and replica brokers. The
role of the concentrator broker is to reassemble the packets received from the normal
brokers. When some of the broker servers are brought down by the DDoS attack, we em-
ploy transmitting duplicate packets methods to "recover" the dropped data and meet the
availability requirements. In that way, the dropped packets do not affect the reassembling
process, as the concentrator broker uses the duplicate packets for reassembling.
Moreover, utilizing the rapid-elasticity characteristic of the cloud computing, new/ready
replica broker server(s) are instantiated to take over the attacked broker server(s). This
provides an efficient attack mitigation also in cases of persistent threat. The IP addresses
of the new replicas can be delivered to the publishers in an encrypted form by performing
a process similar to the sync-process.
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6.4 Evaluation
In order to validate and provide realistic results on the efficiency of the proposed ap-
proach, we build a proof-of-concept prototype which consists of two EC2 micro instances
(EC2) [Ama16] and 21 PlanetLab nodes. To represent the SG applications with their strict
requirements, we deploy a pseudo-state estimation application, which requires a latency
of less than one second (< 1s) and a minimum of 30 samples per second [WYB15] for a
power grid that spans continental Europe.
Hence, we employ all the properly functioning PlanetLab nodes (21 nodes) in Europe
as publisher clients of the SG and two EC2 instances in EU-Central-1 (Frankfurt). The first
EC2 instance represents a broker server in a Broker Bundle, while the second EC2 instance
is a subscriber running the SG application in the third layer of HHCEC.
6.4.1 Evaluation Metrics
The evaluation metrics used to assess our approach are availability, and throughput and
latency overheads.
1. Availability: As responsiveness is a dominant concern for SG applications, we focus
on network availability that refers to the success rate of timely delivery of the mes-
sages from SG publishers to subscribers over the broker server. This metric is used
to measure the level of network availability between the beginning of the attack ex-
ploiting the compromised secret and the containment of the impact of the attack. For
the containment of the impact of the attacks we use PHSS’s shuffling-based contain-
ment mechanism and the traditional approach, which launches a re-keying process
for all the clients using public key. Then, we compare their efficiency in providing
availability during the same attack period.
2. Throughput and latency overhead: Throughput is defined as the successful re-
sponse rate of the broker server for the pseudo-state estimation application. The
throughput overhead refers to the throughput decrease caused by PHSS on the bro-
ker server by comparing it with the simple transmission overhead. Furthermore,
the additional latency imposed by PHSS is used as metric in the evaluation of our
approach.
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6.4.2 Proof-of-concept Prototype-based Evaluation
Our proposed software architecture is a middleware between the network stack and the
pub-sub layer in the broker servers and publishers. The middleware in the broker server
(i.e., the server stack) conducts the following tasks: (1) switching the open port depend-
ing on PRF and the current secret, (2) answering the clients’ synchronisation messages
and (3) executing Algorithm 1 to contain the impact of the DDoS attack utilizing the com-
promised secret.
The client side middleware (i.e., client stack) is responsible for: (1) producing the cor-
responding open port number of the broker servers using current secret to PRF, and (2)
synchronising/updating the time/secret by sending a sync-request message to the bro-
ker servers. Moreover, to obtain a new secret while an attack is ongoing, each client stack
sends a sync message each time when the server stack transmits a message requesting for
a sync-request message.
The number of open ports p for the clusters in each shuffling iteration and the number
of the malicious clients c are the two key factors for the efficiency of PHSS, as pointed out in
Section 6.3.1. Therefore, we evaluate the efficiency of PHSS for these factors by comparing
with the public key-based re-keying process.
In the public key-based approach the Authorization Server issues different secrets to
each client to localize the malicious clients and countermeasure the impact caused by the
DDoS attack. However, this also increases the risk of attacks targeting the entire port
range, since the broker server opens a different port each client.
Benchmark attack duration for our experiments is the period for containing the DDoS
attack’s impact through a public key-based approach. During this period, the successful
message delivery rate of the pseudo-state estimation application refers to the network
availability provided by the containment mechanisms. As the state estimation is one
of the critical SG applications, we employ 4096 bits public key in our evaluation when
comparing PHSS with the public key-based containment mechanism.
To the best of our knowledge, our proof-of-concept implementation-based experiment
is the first real-world experiment of the port hopping approach in the literature. The related
existing approaches focus only on the local network performance in case of a DoS attack
or clock accuracy of port hopping mechanism [LT04; BHK07a; FPT12].
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Results Discussion
Fig. 6.6 demonstrates that the number of open ports p significantly affects the availability,
especially with the increase in the number of malicious clients. However, instead of open-
ing the maximum number of ports (21 ports in this experiment, i.e., a port for each client),
opening an optimum number of ports computed using Algorithm 1 provides availabil-
ity close to the maximum availability provided by 21 clients even when the number of
malicious clients increases.
The straight line in Fig. 6.6 shows the successful delivery rate in the time period
between the beginning of a DDoS attack that exploits the compromised secret and the
containment of the impact of the DDoS attack by using the public key-based approach.
PHSS, using Algorithm 1, provides an availability over 98% in each case, whereas the
public key-based approach caters an availability under 60% . The only case where PHSS
provides lower availability than the public key-based containment approach is when us-
ing the minimum ports (2 ports) in each shuffling iteration despite the existence of more
than a single malicious client.
Another aspect of the evaluation of our approach is the overhead in terms of service
degradation of the broker server and the additional latency induced when PHSS is oper-
ating. To do this, we run the pseudo-state estimation application on the proof-of-concept
prototype using both static port and port hopping mechanisms with variant numbers of
the open ports.
Fig. 6.7 shows that with up to 150 hopping ports, neither the switching ports nor the
opening ports results in a significant impact. The throughput degradation of the broker
server is<0.01% for 30 ports, which implies a successful response rate of the broker server
for the pseudo-state estimation application. Opening more than 150 ports causes abnor-
mal behavior of the broker server, but thanks to our optimization used by Algorithm 1,
PHSS does not need such a high number of open ports, p. Moreover, we did not observe
any significant additional latency when using our approach.
6.4.3 Emulation-based Evaluation
To assess the effectiveness of our approach in large networks, we emulate the proof-of-
concept in EC2’s local network by creating 100 clients9. We employ Algorithm 1 to find
9More than 100 clients are not supported by the EC2-micro instance.
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the optimum number of open ports p in each run. In addition, the network includes
different number of malicious clients in each run.
Fig. 6.8 shows that with the increase in the number of clients from 21 to 100 (see Fig.
6.6), the public key-based containment method is able to contain, in a relatively longer
time period, the impact of the DDoS attack that uses compromised secrets to discover
server’s open port. Accordingly, a notably higher loss of availability occurs.
Considering the case where PHSS is deployed, PHSS maintains an availability per-
formance of up to 98% even where the malicious clients are up to 10%. Beyond 10%, the
performance linearly degrades, as depicted in Fig. 6.8. The reason for the degradation
is the increase in the number of the quarantined malicious clients that need to obtain new
keys using the public key. Hence, if all clients are malicious, our approach loses its effi-
ciency. However, PHSS takes advantage of the different session key for each client, which
eliminates a high fraction of potential key breaches.
Finally, we demonstrate the duration of the key distribution ranging from 21 to 10K
nodes for different sizes of the public key (i.e., 2048 bits and 4096 bits) in the case of us-
age of public key-based re-keying employed by the existing approaches. Fig. 6.9 shows
that the increase in the number of clients strongly impacts the duration of containment
of the damage of the DDoS attack as well as the network availability indirectly. As PHSS
does not need the public key to sanitize all clients except the malicious clients, it signifi-
cantly outperforms the public-key based re-keying approach when the number of clients
increases. In addition, the key size is also an important factor: as shown in Fig 6.9, the
re-keying process using 4096 bits key takes ten times longer than in the case of 2048 bits.
6.4.4 Synopsis
The evaluation of our approach focuses on the availability of the network and the in-
duced overhead (i.e., throughput and latency). The experimental results denote that dur-
ing DDoS attacks using the compromised secret, PHSS can provide network availability
which is higher than 98% compared to the public key-based re-keying mechanism that
provides availability below 60%. An increase in the number of the clients does not have a
significant effect on the performance of PHSS, whereas it considerably affects the public
key-based re-keying mechanism.
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Unless all clients are malicious, PHSS significantly outperforms the public-key based
re-keying approach. In addition, PHSS introduces negligible throughput and latency
overheads, as depicted in the results.
6.5 Conclusion
We have proposed a cloud-assisted DDoS attack resilient communication platform. Our
first contribution was a hierarchical hybrid cloud-assisted architecture (HHCEC), aimed
at meeting scalability and security requirements of the SG applications in the cloud. We
employed a publish-subscribe system on the HHCEC, as the pub-sub message-passing
paradigm that matches with the SG’s data acquisition paradigm. However, DDoS attacks
against the brokers pose availability risk for time-sensitive critical SG applications. To
cope with this, we proposed the port hopping spread spectrum (PHSS). The port hopping
mechanism of PHSS basically prevents the brokers from transport and application layer
DDoS attacks by switching the open port over time in a pseudo-random manner.
This enables the broker to drop the invalid packets in the firewall to avoid the applicat
ion-based filtering. In addition, to overcome the relatively high-volume flooding attack,
PHSS spreads the consecutive packets over the brokers in a Broker Bundle.
Furthermore, the existing port hopping mechanisms use a secret shared between all
parties to produce the same open port number in the same time, which pose a high se-
curity risk in the case of the compromise of the secret. The containment of the impact of
the DDoS attack utilizing the compromised secret is fulfilled by an Authorization Server
using a secure channel (a public key-based re-keying process) in the existing works. How-
ever, the brokers become unavailable until the public key-based re-keying process is done,
which leads to the loss of availability that violates the requirements of the SG applications.
To address this issue of the existing approaches, we employ a token-based authentication
mechanism, enabling the brokers to regularly issue the secret in encrypted form by using
the session key of each publisher. Moreover, to contain the damage of the DDoS attack
employing the compromised secret, we introduce a shuffling-based containment mechanism,
which delivers new secrets to each cluster after shuffling and clustering the publishers.
By repeating this process on the clients in the cluster(s) whose secrets are still used for the
attack, the port shuffling mechanism progressively isolates the malicious clients.
Using a proof-of-concept platform consisting of Amazon EC2 micro instances and
PlanetLab nodes, we evaluated the effectiveness of our approach in providing availability
in the case of DDoS attacks using the compromised secret. We did so by comparing PHSS
with the public key-based rekeying mechanism. The results show that our approach sig-
nificantly increases availability in comparison to the public key-based re-keying mecha-
nism, since it contains the impact of the DDoS attack utilizing the compromised secret in
a notably shorter time period.
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Chapter 7
Towards DDoS Attack Resilient Wide
Area Monitoring Systems
The effectiveness of cyber-control systems is determined by achieving real-time and accu-
rate state information as obtained from an efficient and reliable communication schema.
Thus, runtime state estimation constitutes a critical element to maintain the SG perfor-
mance and resilience over any network failures transpiring as either operational fail-
ures or as deliberate attacks. In practice, this state assessment is achieved using Wide
Area Monitoring Systems (WAMS) that use Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs, and also
known as Synchrophasors) for data acquisition to monitor real-time power transmission
and to detect grid instabilities [Mar+14]. The PMUs periodically sample the voltage and
current parameters of the power system, and subsequently forward the sampled data to
the Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC) for processing [KAR13].
As WAMS form the core of SG operations, this criticality also makes the WAMS sus-
ceptible to attacks that can exploit communication level vulnerabilities to compromise the
critical WAMS requirements on low-latency and high-availability. The transport layer is
particularly vulnerable to cyber-security attacks - Denial-of-Service (DoS) and Distributed
DoS (DDoS) attacks can be conducted towards the PMUs or PDCs to cause transmission
delays or loss of measurements. Consequently, this can result in a severe degradation in
SG performance in terms of inaccurate predictions of transmission status, network me-
tering failures or delays in the mitigation of power network failures [Kar14; WL13].
In this chapter, we extend upon the advocated Multipath-TCP (MPTCP) approach to
provide a resilient and efficient communication scheme for the WAMS phasor measure-
ment processes. The basic MPTCP provides long-duration communication connections
[Rai+11] and provides reactive mitigation against attacks with its diverse multi-path func-
tionality. However, in order to achieve proactive and robust protection of the transport
and application layer from DoS/DDoS attacks, we introduce a novel stream hopping
mechanism termed as MPTCP-H that is directly integrated into MPTCP. The proposed
hopping mechanism hides open port numbers by timely refreshing of the sub-flows, with
new port numbers, without causing data traffic interruptions. This approach of hiding
port numbers is shown to provide high coverage against transport and application layer
DoS/DDoS attacks. The results from MPTCP-H demonstrate that the proposed approach
indeed secures the system with minimal additional latency and message overhead.
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Contributions in this chapter:
• A practical threat model where the DoS/DDoS attacks can occur in the WAN via
compromised devices, and accordingly saturate the WAMS devices.
• A novel defense mechanism that mitigates DoS/DDoS attacks by periodically switch-
ing the MPTCP connection subflows.
• Empirical validation of the MPTCP-H’s overhead which shows that MPTCP-H per-
forms equal to or better than the standard transportation protocols in terms of la-
tency and congestion attributes.
7.1 Background
This section outlines the technical characteristics of WAMS in a SG. We also provide a
background on MPTCP operations that are used in our proposed MPTCP-H extension.
7.1.1 Wide Area Measurement Systems (WAMS)
Accurate estimation and monitoring of the state of the power network is critical for SG
operations. The traditional Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems
are employed for periodically monitoring the sampling measurements at predefined time
intervals, e.g., per second [AJZ05]. In order to manage the SG in a reliable and efficient
manner, WAMS offer low-latency, high-precision and time-synchronized measurements
by taking advantage of phasor measurements (both magnitude and phase angle) ob-
tained from the deployed Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) [AJZ05]. Whereas SCADA
systems are unable to handle the dynamic snapshots of a power system, the advanced
WAMS support real-time behavior of the power system to mitigate unexpected power
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blackouts. While the WAMS technology supports the SG control functions with real-time
state monitoring, any inaccuracies in the state information arising from communication
perturbations or assessment errors, can also detrimentally affect the SG stability.
In this chapter, we focus on a multi-tier WAMS architecture that interfaces, in turn,
with the high voltage (HV) substation PMUs followed by substations PDCs, regions PDCs
and control center PDC (cf. Fig. 7.1 [KAR13]), where the HV substation PDCs also con-
nected with PMUs in the neighboring substations (ca. 20-40 PMUs) [KAR13].
In the hierarchical architecture, the measurements of PMUs are forwarded to the sub-
station PDCs that sort the received data by timestamps and examine any missing data for
requisite analysis. The substation PDCs then transmit the prepared measurements to the
regional PDCs for subsequent forwarding to the national monitoring centers, as shown
in Figure 7.1. The characteristics of WAMS are as follows [KAR13].
A HV substation of the Power Grid (Substation PDC):
• ∼ 20-40 PMUs connected to the PDC.
• PMU data rates (60-120 fps for 60Hz systems).
• Tolerable internal latency (∼3-10 ms).
• Applications requiring fast response as well as local visualization and archiving.
Regional centers of WAMS (Regional PDC):
• Responsible for a large number of PMUs (∼50-500).
• Data rates between 30-60 fps.
• Tolerable internal latency (∼10-100 ms).
• Applications for regional operation, e.g. state estimation.
Main control center (Super PDC):
• Accommodation of a very large number of PMUs (a few thousand PMUs).
• Low data rates (∼1-30 fps).
• Tolerable internal latency (∼100 ms-1s).
• Applications that perform visualization combining SCADA and Synchrophasor data.
7.1.2 Multipath TCP (MPTCP)
Multipath TCP is a recent TCP extension [For+13] and an Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) standard, which is still in its experimental phase. MPTCP allows a single TCP con-
nection to make simultaneous use of multiple paths by opening several subflows, each
using a different interface and routed through a different path in the network. In prac-
tice, MPTCP is a TCP connection that uses TCP options to enable multipath functionality
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without requiring any changes at the application level. Hence, for a given application, an
MPTCP connection behaves exactly like a regular TCP connection.
In MPTCP, the initial 3-way handshake consists of a SYN, a SYN/ACK and an ACK,
as in the regular TCP. The difference with MPTCP is that each party asks the other party
through an MP_CAPABLE TCP option whether it supports MPTCP. At this stage, they also
share their keys in cleartext in order to identify and authenticate future subflows for the
connection. This handshake and the subflows are depicted in Fig. 7.2.
Each subflow is identified with a 4-tuple of <source address/port, destination ad-
dress/ port>, which is created after the initial MPTCP handshake and exchange of keys.
To add new subflows into an existing connection, a token derived from the initial key and
MP_JOIN in the TCP options are used in the handshake process of the new subflow, as
illustrated in Fig. 7.2 [For+13].
Note that each subflow has its respective sequence numbers similar to a regular TCP
connection. In addition, the specification of MPTCP identifies a different sequence num-
ber that interrelate packets delivered over multiple subflows within a single MPTCP con-
nection [For+13].
The Advantages of Utilizing MPTCP in the Phasor Measurement Communication of
WAMS
High communication latency, resultant from a connection re-establishment of TCP
due to a broken or stalled connection, can violate the latency requirements of phasor
measurements [Paa+14]. In contrast for MPTCP, when the first subflow is initialized to
transmit phasor measurements, the other subflows are created concurrently. Since one of
the MPTCP subflows used to transmit the measurements is likely functioning normally
(with high likelihood), thus the overall phasor measurement traffic is not disturbed or
delayed.
Moreover, using MPTCP, a higher network utilization and a fairer allocation of re-
sources to subflows is provided by efficiently addressing the congestion response of the
corresponding subflows. The detailed advantages of MPTCP-based networks appear in
[Rai+11].
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7.2 System and Security Models
In this section, we first present the SG system and threat models. Subsequently, we outline
the potential compromise of SG devices and the resultant security vulnerabilities in the
SG networks. We also discuss the deficiencies of current intrusion detection systems to
detect these threats.
7.2.1 System Model
Similar to contemporary SG models, we consider that the power utility employs a het-
erogeneous network (i.e., composite public and private networks) to construct a SG wide
area network (WAN) for cost-effectiveness and applications availability. For WAN, the
utilities could use the links leased from the carriers and also dedicated network links.
WAN is typically used not only for various kinds of WAMS devices but also for different
types of SG devices such as Smart Meters.
In addition, we assume that gateway-to-gateway (versus host-to-host) virtual private
networks (VPNs) exist in the WAN to provide secure channels. Thus, every node at a
given local area network can access the other local area networks only through the pro-
scribed gateway-to-gateway tunnels [Lav+10].
In the geographically demarcated SG operational area where the WAMS acquire the
state measurement data, some SG devices might be compromised by exploiting the vul-
nerabilities. The compromised devices could grant the attackers elevated privileges for
overwhelming the devices resources, as illustrated in Fig. 7.3.
Although the IEEE standards C37.118.1/2 [Mar+14] specify Synchrophasor measure-
ments and data transmissions, respectively, IEC 61850 [AAH16] is the de-facto standard
for specifying the substation and utility automation [AAH16]. In addition, we also as-
sume that both the PMUs and the PDCs support the IEC 61850-90-5 standard to pro-
vide MPTCP connection authentication through the standardized key distribution center
(KDC). IEC 61850-90-5 recommends UDP for data transmission of WAMS as a transport
layer protocol due to its a lightweight mechanism [AAH16]. However, in this work, we
employ MPTCP for the data transmission and show that it introduces near similar per-
formance characteristics to UDP for phasor measurement traffic.
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7.2.2 Attack and Threat Model
Our threat model covers two types of Denial-of-Service attacks, namely: (1) transport
layer attacks, where the adversary consumes the device’s processing and networking re-
sources by exploiting the information obtained from the port scanning or sweeps, and (2)
application layer attacks, which exploit the vulnerability of the application to saturate the
device resources.
In our threat model, the attackers are malicious entities which are compromised de-
vices able to access the WAN (Intranet) where the phasor measurement devices are lo-
cated. Furthermore, the malicious devices are assumed to have the ability to launch
DoS/DDoS attacks to saturate the resources of PDCs and PMUs. However, to mount
more sophisticated attacks inside the WAN, the attackers have to guess the open port
numbers or obtain elevated privileges (e.g., scanning the open ports). In addition, we do
not trust the devices inside the WAN. We preclude the case of an insider attacker physi-
cally accessing the phasor measurement devices.
The level of effort needed to mount DoS/DDoS attacks naturally also depends on the
type of the topology. As an example, a mesh topology connecting the the SG devices
within a WAN is highly vulnerable to DoS attacks. This occurs as any compromised
device in the mesh can be exploited to carry out an internal DoS attack which overwhelms
the service of multiple nodes at the same time.
7.2.3 Compromise of SG Devices
The deployment of devices in a wide geographical area makes it difficult to protect them
from being physically compromised. This is often observed in devices used for monitor-
ing the grid where an attacker can accesses the physical devices and compromise them.
On the other hand, a house owner can have full physical access to many deployed devices
e.g., smart meter [AP17].
The device can be compromised either by using login credentials or by exploiting a
vulnerability. 1) Login credentials can be obtained using: social engineering, side channel
attacks, eavesdropping (unprotected communication), and passwords guessing, and 2)
Identifying a vulnerability is possible for an attacker either by buying zero-day exploits
or by scanning the device. The attacker also needs to develop a exploit code using the
vulnerability to plant malware on the device to exploit it. In addition, to compromise the
devices, the attacker can also directly connect to the local network behind the firewall that
the devices are connected to [PSZ17].
As the compromised nodes act similar to the normal nodes, such "internal" attacks
pose a higher threat potentially leading to significant damages to the SG communica-
tion network and even to the control system of power network. As a result, the com-
promised nodes can be exploited by different malware or viruses attacking critical SG
devices [AP17].
In particular, the SG can be significantly affected by DoS/DDoS attacks since it heavily
depends on the availability of the communication network. In this paper, we mainly focus
on internal DoS/DDoS attacks in WAN networks where the attackers use the malicious
devices inside a WAN to launch DoS/DDoS attacks on critical SG devices (i.e., PDCs or
PMUs) to induce data transmission delays or block data delivery [AP17].
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7.2.4 Security Vulnerabilities of WAMS
We outline a study conducted on a testbed using real WAMS devices [Mor+11] to high-
light their security vulnerabilities.
Morris et al. [Mor+11] conducted tests to evaluate the vulnerability of PMUs and
PDCs in terms of the attacks originating from inside a WAN by building a testbed con-
sisting of PMUs, PDCs, a router and a Network Analyzer [Mor+11]. They launched TCP
flooding (SYN and FIN) and UDP garbage flooding attacks on the devices for both specific
and also random ports. The test results showed that all devices under flooding attacks
are eventually overwhelmed and start to deny service when the traffic volume increases
beyond the data processing ability of the device [Mor+11].
Based on the collected results, the authors suggestion to mitigate these issues is that
utilities should be enabled to monitor the volume of the network traffic in order to detect
and/or limit transmission of the traffic to the devices. Moreover, the fuzzing tests con-
ducted in [Mor+11] show that even individual packets can result in device failures i.e.,
resetting the devices.
These test results indicated that DoS/DDoS attacks can be a serious threat to the safety
and reliability of the power network. Such DoS/DDoS attacks can lead to partial loss of
availability, and thus leading to the incorrect state estimation of the power network, or,
impediments to the mitigation on power system failures [Mor+11]. For this reason, a
proactive defense mechanism needs to be employed to mitigate the DoS/DDoS attacks
for WAMS.
7.2.5 Deficiencies in Intrusion Detection Systems
For providing security protection to IT infrastructures, the traditional security solutions,
e.g, firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS), or Virtual Private Networks (VPN), are
both common and efficient. However, as SG devices are typically resource constrained
(computational, bandwidth, memory), the direct adoption of these IT-level security solu-
tions is largely not possible [BHK07a].
Typical IT servers need stronger security protection than the edges/clients. How-
ever, in SG communication networks, the control center servers and edge nodes (e.g.,
relays, circuit breakers) require the same level of security, since the edge nodes can also
pose safety similar to that of the servers. Moreover, given that SG devices have con-
strained resources, directly utilizing the IT-based DDoS defense/authentication mecha-
nisms might not provide the expected security protection for the SG applications. There-
fore, lightweight and proactive DDoS protection mechanisms are desired for securing SG
communication networks [BHK07a].
Moreover, the classical Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) or Intrusion Prevention Sys-
tems (IPS) are not adequate for guaranteeing SG communication security. SG communica-
tion systems have also inherited many new challenges and security threats from its own
machine to machine communication structures and other issues of computer network-
ing technologies. For this reason, the IDS systems utilized for SG communication have
to consider the issue of handling resource-frugal devices over both traditional computer
networks and M2M networks [AP17].
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FIGURE 7.4: Stream hopping of MPTCP-H
Based on this background, we now present our proposed approach that provides effi-
cient defense against transport and application layer DoS attacks on WAMS.
7.3 MPTCP-H Architecture
The MPTCP-extension (MPTCP-H) aims to provide proactive protection against transport
and application layer DoS attacks. The main idea behind MPTCP-H is to employ a stream
hopping mechanism alongside the MPTCP multipath functionality. In order to achieve
that, MPTCP-H develops two innovations:
1. Stream Hopping, where subflows are switched over random ports which increases
the attack cost, unlike in the typical fixed MPTCP flow.
2. Authentication, which handles the authentication between the PMU and the PDC
whenever a new connection is created.
7.3.1 The Stream Hopping Technique
The traditional security systems such as firewalls, IDS and IPS are unsatisfactory to de-
fend phasor measurement traffic against DoS/DDoS attacks due to their passive and un-
accomplished structure. In existing IT systems, the continuous change of network attack
type gives an advantage to the attackers over the protection systems. The malicious at-
tacker is in the dark side, while the protector is in the bright side. Therefore, the adversary
solely requires discovery of a few vulnerabilities whereas the protector must guarantee
that the system does not have any exploitable vulnerabilities [LWC14].
To address the advantage the attackers have over the protectors, moving target de-
fense (MTD) methods have been proposed [Afz17]. This mechanism is a new proactive
defense method in which the protector constantly changes the attack surface of the sys-
tem to boost the cost of an successful attack for the attacker. Port hopping [LT04; FPT12] is
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a specific MTD method that periodically switches a port of a service in a pseudorandom
manner, confusing potential intruders. The port hopping mechanism facilitates both the
detection and filtering of unauthenticated packets and does not need require changes in
the existing systems and protocols [LWC14].
However, this port hopping scheme requires all clients to know a secret key used by
the server to calculate the port number for the current time slot. In the case of disclosure
of the secret key, the open port of the devices can be direct target of DoS/DDoS attacks,
which exposes high security risks for WAMS. Furthermore, the implementation of the
port hopping technique is not practically feasible for TCP connections.
On the other hand, MPTCP allows simultaneous use of s subflows over different
paths1 to distribute data across these subflows, while maintaining a standard TCP in-
terface for the applications. This characteristic of the MPTCP connection enables the im-
plementation of a port hopping-like technique, called stream hopping, by periodically
switching the subflows over different IP-addresses/interfaces2.
Subflow Switch
To realize the stream hopping technique of MPTCP-H, we extend the functionality of
MPTCP by periodically opening new subflows that use different paths, each of which
is used for an allocated time period t. In MPTCP-H, only PDC is allowed to initiate s
new subflows using TCP-like handshake, as illustrated in Fig. 7.2. After establishing
an MPTCP connection with a PMU, the PDC opens new subflows by selecting new ran-
dom port numbers on its side. To establish a new subflow, the PDC periodically sends
a SYN packet containing an MP_JOIN option to the PMU. After checking the authentica-
tion of the new subflow, the PMU acknowledges the SYN with the same type of message
(MP_JOIN) and binds the new subflow to the MPTCP connection. The three-way hand-
shake ends with the acknowledgement message of the PDC.
MPTCP-H also allows a given PMU to randomly select new port numbers on their
side to announce to PDC the new subflows in the MPTCP connection. In order to do
this, each PMU periodically hands over the selected port numbers to the PDC, such that
the PDC can use them to connect to the PMU. To this end, PMUs transmit a ADD_ADDR/
REMOVE_ADDR message through an existing subflow, which informs the receiver of the
PMU’s alternative existing addresses/no longer existing addresses, respectively. The
PDC initiates new subflows over the delivered port numbers of each PMU by perform-
ing a three-way handshake carrying MP_JOIN command as illustrated in Fig. 7.2. Sub-
sequently, the expired subflows are closed by sending FIN. This periodic switching of
1In this work, a path between a sender and a receiver is defined by a 4-tuple of source and destination
address/port pairs. Changing one of the tuples creates a new path. We interchangeably use the subflow
and path terms.
2Moreover, in MPTCP, the single-homed nodes can create subflows over different port numbers of IP-
addresses pair using MPTCP "ndiffport" path manager [Paa17]. Since PMUs are single-homed devices, for
each new subflow we use different port numbers but the same pair of IP-addresses. Furthermore, MPTCP
provides higher performance and robustness than normal TCP when the number of subflows per pair of
IP addresses gets increased [ZSP16]. The reason for the performance improvement is the utilization of
available network paths in an efficient manner.
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subflows is the basis for the subflow hopping technique which makes reconnaissance of
the victim’s address difficult for attacker.
Phase Shift
To keep the renewing period of subflows shorter than the attacker’s subflow port number
reconnaissance time, MPTCP-H creates multiple subflows with t/s phase shifts versus
multiple subflows activated for the same time period t. In Fig. 7.4, stream hopping in
conjunction with the phase shift is depicted where each shaded bar represents a subflow
of the active connection (s = 3) at a particular point in time. Each subflow is active for
the allocated time t and is substituted with a new subflow with a new port number when
the allocated time expires. The renovation of the subflows do not overlap each other, but
take place with a t/s phase shift. By doing so, we assure the MPTCP-H connection of
having a subflow initialized within a period of time not exceeding t/s at each instance.
In addition, by finely calibrating the number of the subflows s on t/s, depending on the
attacker’s the reconnaissance time, we can assure that the MPTCP-H connections have
a functional subflow throughout the attack duration. The reason is that, throughout the
attack, there is a subflow whose lifetime is shorter than the t/s which is the time for the
reconnaissance of a subflow by attacker.
Attack-resistance
The shuffling of the active port numbers (and the subflows) increases the difficulty for
an attacker who discovers the port number of subflows through port scanning to launch
connection-flooding attacks. As the subflows expire after the allocated time, the possible
maximum damage caused by an attacker who discovers the port numbers of the subflows
is limited to that specific time duration. As new subflows get activated, the attacker must
guess or once again scan the port numbers for the new subflows to maintain the attack.
This limits the attacker to mount persistent attacks on the active ports or forces them
to blindly guess or aggressively scan the active ports. The consequence of either is the
limited damage potential from an attack.
Furthermore, as PMU and PDC randomly and separately choose their next ports,
MPTCP-H does not need a shared secret key to determine the port number while opening
a new subflow, unlike existing pseudorandom port hopping mechanisms. This protects
the system from the effects of a probable shared key disclosure.
In MPTCP, allowing only one side to initiate new subflows is possible and we delegate
this responsibility to PDCs. Since the PDCs typically have higher importance than a single
PMU, MPTCP-H configures PDCs to initiate new subflows. Therefore, even if an attacker
uncovers the varying open port numbers to some extent, he is unable to saturate the PDC
resources by sending forged messages to initiate new subflows.
The proposed stream hopping mechanism of MPTCP-H is akin to Frequency Hopping
Spread Spectrum (FHSS) [Dix94] technique which enables secure radio communication.
If an attacker plans to jam or decipher the radio signal in FHSS, he needs to discover the
hopping sequence or monitor the entire wide frequency band to capture the signal. Like-
wise, the subflow hopping of MPTCP-H has the same impact - increasing the difficulty
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for the attacker by changing port number over time. In addition, when DoS/DDoS at-
tacks take place, the data traffic can be distributed or duplicated over several subflows
for redundancy/resiliency.
Performance Consideration
Since MPTCP-H requires frequent opening and closing of subflows (TCP connections), a
probable degradation in the performance and throughput of the system should be consid-
ered. Firstly, we introduce an equation that calculates the additional data traffic overhead
(per second) of MPTCP-H:
s ∗ 1/t ∗ (4 ∗ handshake message (MP_JOIN) + 4 ∗ FIN message)+
ADD_ADDRmessage+REMOV E_ADDRmessage ∗ 1/t = Message Overhead (7.1)
As seen in the equation (7.1), t and s are key factors in the calculation of the overhead.
We present two scenarios to show their effects on the overhead. Then, we assess the
scenarios’ results to see how to properly calibrate the factors’ values.
The first scenario: If t is equal to 1 second, s is 10 subflows, and the packet length is
equal or greater than 40 bytes in the equation (7.1), then the overhead is 3280 bps (between
a PDC and a PMU).
The second scenario: If t is equal to 5 seconds, s is 5 subflows, and the packet length is
equal or greater than 40 bytes in the equation (7.1), then the overhead is 326 bps (between
a PDC and a PMU).
Considering the second scenario, if there are 40 PMUs that connect to a PDC, 40 ∗
326/2kbps = 6.48kbps inbound traffic and 40 ∗ 326/2 kbps = 6.48 kbps outbound traffic
(overhead) are created by MPTCP-H.
To compare the overhead with the measurement traffic, we need to calculate the max
PMUs traffic for a PDC: 40 PMUs ∗ 70 < bytes (packet size) ∗ 120fps = 336 kbps
When we compare the overhead of the second scenario (4.32 kbps) with the inbound
traffic of PDC (336 kbps), we see that MPTCP-H introduces a DDoS mitigation mechanism
at the expense of a reasonable overhead (14.5%). In addition, it is worth noting that the
difference between the first scenario and the second scenario indicates that decreasing t
and rising s sharply boost the total overhead, meaning the calibration of those values has
high importance for obtaining the minimal overhead with the required security.
Furthermore, as detailed in the evaluation section, we did not observe any perturba-
tion in the system performance while frequently switching the subflows (TCP connec-
tions).
7.3.2 Authentication for Initiating New Subflows
A MPTCP connection between a PMU and PDC is initiated by exchanging initial keys that
are used to authenticate new subflows for the connection. However, no secure mechanism
is declared by the MPTCP specification for the exchange of the initial keys. IEC 61850-90-
5 specifies the key distribution center (KDC) [AAH16] which introduces a symmetric key
coordination between the publishers and subscribers (i.e., PMU-PDC).
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To provide secure authentication, we use keys provided by KDC instead of the ini-
tial keys. The idea is akin to the one reported in [PB12], where an application-layer key
(SSL/TSL) is proposed to be used for the authentication.
By using an application-layer key, i.e., the KDC keys, instead of the initial keys ex-
changing in the clear-text, we address the existing MPTCP’s security issue related to key
disclosure. By doing so, PMUs and PDCs become more robust against JOIN-flooding
attacks.
Moreover, MPTCP-H secures the handshake process of establishing new subflows as
follows: When initiating a new subflow, the PDC transmits the initial synchronization
message including a 32-bit token which is a cryptographic hash of the receiver’s initial
(KDC) key, produced by the SHA-1 algorithm, and truncated to the most significant 32
bits. This token is used to associate the subflows to the MPTCP connection and also
provide the security mechanism to block unauthenticated new subflows initiated by at-
tackers [For+13].
Upon receiving a SYN that contains an MP_JOIN option, a valid token, and a random
number, the PDC responds by sending a SYN/ACK including an MP_JOIN option, a
random number, and a truncated (leftmost 64 bits) Hash-based Message Authentication
Code (HMAC). Finally, following the PDC’s transmission of an ACK with a HMAC, the
PMU sends an ACK to the PDC, which makes the connection ready for data transfer.
The random numbers (nonces) averts replay attacks on the authentication method. The
HMAC exchange along with the random number secures the establishment process, since
if the HMAC is incorrect, the connection is refused [For+13].
7.4 Security Analysis of MPTCP-H
We now present the threat scenarios and the related security analysis for the proposed
MPTCP-H technique.
Computer network attacks can be categorized as: (i) active attacks, and (ii) passive
attacks. An active attack involves the exploitation of compromised data or devices to
mount attacks on the network, such as data injection, data modification or packet drop
attacks. In a passive attack, the attacker needs to collect critical information on the net-
work and to learn network properties or transmitted data by using attack types such as
sniffing or eavesdropping. Passive attacks are widely employed to collect information
paving the way for an active attack [PSZ17].
The SG can be targeted to induce a power outage which can be performed by por-
tioning the power grid. The power grid portioning can be carried out in cyber means,
by intentionally transmitting a trip command to a circuit breaker (CB). Triggering trip
commands can be accomplished by launching the following active attacks: 1) directly
compromising the CB; 2) prompting a wrong control decision at the central controller
which sends a trip message to the CB; or 3) changing the controller commands while they
are on the path between CB and the central controller [PSZ17].
As we focus on the security of phasor measurement traffic between PMU and PDC in
this work, the second method is the most probable to be used by an attacker to conduct
an attack on the grid after gathering critical information using passive attack methods.
The attacker can cause an incorrect control decision by the controller by perturbing the
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phasor measurement traffic, providing information about the state of the grid. To accom-
plish this, the attacker mounts a DoS/DDoS attack against the open ports of either the
PMU generating the measurements or the PDC processing those measurements. How-
ever, since MPTCP-H reshuffles the open ports, the attacker must guess or discover the
open ports to launch a DoS/DDoS attack. A blind attacker is very unlikely to realize
a successful attack by randomly selecting a port number and flooding garbage data to
affect the phasor’s operation. Even if the attacker successfully guesses or discovers the
open port, the available time for attacking is limited, and after some allocated time t, the
ports get shuffled. In the case of a DOS/DDoS attack against all the discovered open
ports, the attacker has to continually scan the ports of the devices and continually adapt
its attack according to the periodically varying port numbers of the subflows. This makes
conducting an efficient attack a difficult task for the attacker, making MPTCP-H a suc-
cessful mitigation technique against such attacks.
Another threat includes the compromising of the KDC keys for both PMUs and PDCs
for the exchange of an initial key. These devices have scarce resources and can be sat-
urated using a relatively small number of malicious authenticated connection requests
by the attacker. For this attack, exposing the open port numbers for a short time would
be enough to overwhelm the service of the devices. To protect the PDCs, carrying more
importance than PMUs from the above mentioned attack, MPTCP-H grants the right of
opening new subflows to the PDCs. Thus, the PDCs are able to refuse any requests to
open new subflows and protect their resources from being depleted by the attacker. A
complementary scheme that adds protection on the keys can also be included in MPTCP-
H.
Configuring PMUs to accept traffic only from the PDCs (and vice versa) also repre-
sents a suitable defense approach for the PMUs. This can be achieved through a white-
listing approach that provides the PMUs (or PDCs) with a list of the authorized PDCs (or
PMUs). For an attacker spoofing the IP addresses, MPTCP-H renders such a DoS attack
to become unlikely by periodically varying the MPTCP subflows using new port num-
bers. To do so, each subflow is continuously recreated after some lifetime t using new
port numbers. This introduces a defense against threats related to attacker spoofing the
IP address to consume the target’s resources by transmitting forged packets to its open
ports.
MPTCP inherently introduces new challenges for the traditional security approaches,
making them no longer sufficient for MPTCP. For instance, since an IDS monitors and cat-
egorizes the traffic of a connection based on the 5-tuple, it sees the subflows of an MPTCP
connection as an independent TCP connection, and thus cannot discover the correlation
to reassemble MPTCP traffic correctly. Moreover, MPTCP enabling a sender to employ all
available routes at the same time causes the fragmentation of data among the routes. For
this reason, an IDS cannot have adequate knowledge on any of the streams to detect the
malicious data, which leads to an exploitable vulnerability for cross-path data fragmenta-
tion attacks. Z. Afzal [Afz17] investigates possible attacks using these vulnerabilities and
introduces solutions to address them.
Overall, MPTCP-H constitutes a proactive defense mechanism for time-critical com-
munications. We opted for a proactive mechanism vs. a reactive mechanism, as deploying
a reactive approach e.g., Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) would consume more time
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for mitigation. Reactive mechanisms have to detect the attacker at first and then report
the attack to the systems or administrators for prevention. Moreover, a careful placement
of IDSs in the network is required to detect internal attacks. Still, MPTCP-H can be used
complementary to an IDS.
7.5 MPTCP-H Implementation
For the implementation of our mechanism we use the Linux Kernel implementation of
Multipath-TCP (mptcp_v0.91) [Paa17] which is the reference and most common imple-
mentation of IETF [For+13]. We implement our MPTCP-H mechanism using the En-
hanced Socket API of B. Hesmans et al.[Hes17], which enables us to have control over
individual subflows. This API allows us to open new subflows with custom IP addresses
and port numbers and closing them whenever needed. G. Demaude and P. Ortegat
[DO17] develop a Java Native Interface (JNI) tool that enables us to use Java language
to manage the Native C socket API. In the implementation of MPTCP-H on a Virtual Ma-
chine (the Linux Kernel with mptcp_v0.91), we manage the native C socket API with the
above mentioned tool.
In our implementation, while PMU runs on the host (physical computer), PDC runs on
a Virtual Machine. In WAMS, the phasor measurement traffic between a PMU and PDC is
similar to a server-client model. The PMU acts as a server by sending measurement mes-
sages each time the PDC (the client) transmits a request message for the measurement.
To implement this scenario, we develop a middleware between the application layer and
MPTCP in the client side for MPTCP-H and provide two applications acting as PMU-
PDC in client and server sides. After establishing a MPTCP connection, the PDC (client)
additionally opens a fixed number of Multipath-TCP subflows s for the connection. The
subflows are periodically switched by the PDC (client). In other words, the subflows are
closed over time and replaced with new subflows. Each of the new subflows is created
with a random port number as explained in Section 7.3.1. The implementation of the idea
and threat model are fulfilled by Ferdaus Nayyer during his master thesis as a joint work.
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7.6 MPTCP-H Evaluation
As the proposed defense mechanism is targeted at time-sensitive critical WAMS applica-
tions, we need to particularly assess the system availability and the overhead, in terms
of additional latency and message. Thus, we employ three metrics in the evaluation of
the approach: (1) the system availability, (2) the latency, and (3) the overhead messages
caused by MPTCP-H. Firstly, in Section 7.6.1, we evaluate our approach regarding the
second and the third metrics, i.e., latency and message overhead, in attack-free condi-
tions in order to test our approach in the case of different network topologies and data
rates. Secondly, in Section 7.6.2, we test MPTCP-H under both DoS attack and attack-free
conditions in terms of the system availability (the first metric) and additional latency (the
second metric) by comparing TCP.
7.6.1 Attack-free conditions
In the following sections we evaluate our approaches under DoS attack conditions.
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Latency Assessment for MPTCP-H
To assess the impact on latency, the NorNet testbed is used for evaluating latency, which
provides realistic results [Dre15]. The testbed consists of a collection of multihomed
nodes distributed throughout Norway. Two nodes with 2-3 network connections are
driven by daemons (i.e., a PMU and PDC). In our experiments evaluating impact on la-
tency, three representative types of PMU-PDC topologies are implemented: 1) 4 network
interfaces and 16 subflows (full-mesh), 2) a single network interface and a single subflow,
and 3) a single network interface but multiple subflows.
We utilize two different data rates (60 fps and 120 fps) in each experiment to simulate
realistic phasor measurement traffic of WAMS. As the measurement traffic of WAMS typ-
ically has proscribed data rates, we evaluate the proposed approach regarding induced
latency or congestion rather than throughput of the system.
According to IEEE C37.118.2-2011, Synchrophasor measurement traffic can be trans-
mitted over TCP/IP or UDP/IP. UDP provides faster data delivery given its lightweight
characteristics [Mar+14]. We compare the proposed approach with TCP and UDP in the
transmission of Synchrophasor measurements to assess its performance.
Fig.7.5 presents the normalized average latency versus data rates for varied protocols.
The latency values are normalized utilizing the latency of UDP as a base - as suggested
for Synchrophasor data transfer by the IEEE Standard for Power Systems C37.118.2-2011
[Mar+14]. Fig 7.5. shows that MPTCP-H introduces less latency than TCP (and even
UDP) in transmitting 60 frames per second (fps). On the other hand, for the 120 fps
data rate, while TCP provides the worst latency, UDP outperforms MPTCP-H in terms of
latency. We see from Fig.7.5 that TCP’s latency is relatively low for the data rates of 60
fps due to its congestion handling mechanisms. However, when the data rates are high
(120fps), UDP’s connectionless approach provides better latency than TCP. That being
said, MPTCP-H with multiple subflows provides latency results close to UDP even in the
case of high data rates (120 fps).
We also conducted experiments on single-homed PMU and PDC to analyse if MPTCP-
H has any shortcomings in these scenarios. Fig.7.6 shows that while the latency results for
TCP are similar to the results of the previous experiment, MPTCP-H’s latency degrades
slightly. However, the overall latency of MPTCP-H is still relatively close to the latency
of the UDP for both data rates of 60 fps and 120 fps.
Finally, to demonstrate the effect of the port-based multiple subflows structure of the
MPTCP-H on the latency, we conducted experiments that compare UDP and TCP with
MPTCP-H that uses 10 subflows over single-homed nodes (with 1 network interface).
Fig. 7.7 highlights that MPTCP-H does not introduce any additional latency, and, instead,
decreases latency even when the data rate increases to 120 fps. TCP’s latency increases
with the data rate.
Message Overhead of MPTCP-H
To measure the additional overhead, we deploy a PMU and a PDC on a host and on
Virtual Machines, respectively. In this work, while the message overhead refers to the
protocol-specific message transmission, all traffic implies the message overhead plus the
application layer message transmission. To calculate the message overhead, we run each
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FIGURE 7.8: TCP, MPTCP vs MPTCP-H for message overhead
FIGURE 7.9: The effect of the number of subflows on the overhead
experiment for 5 minutes with different hopping rates, number of the subflows, and ap-
plication layer message rates, i.e, 4ms (250 fps), 8ms (120 fps), 16s (60 fps). Subsequently,
we find the ratio of the overhead messages to the whole traffic for each run. We con-
duct our experiments in the fix time period (5 min) since phasor measurement traffic acts
as a continuous data stream unlike typical web applications. By doing so, we find the
additional message overhead in the case of phasor measurement traffic.
We first compare TCP, plain MPTCP, and MPTCP-H in terms of the additional mes-
sage overhead, since TCP is recommended by IEEE standard C37.118.2 for phasor mea-
surement traffic and is a reliable transportation protocol like MPTCP and MPTCP-H. Fig.
7.8 demonstrates that increasing the message rate causes a slight decrease in the message
overhead ratio. The reason is that since the increase of application layer message rate
does not lead to a linear raise in the message overhead of any protocols, the ratio of the
overhead messages to all traffic decreases. In addition, we see that utilizing MPTCP (1
subflow) instead of TCP introduces around 2% of additional message overhead due to
MPTCP’s additional protocol messages. When we consider high capacity of contempo-
rary network devices, this additional message overhead is reasonable for WAMS. Fur-
thermore, we compare MPTCP (10 subflows) with MPTCP-H (10 subflows) to assess the
message overhead caused by our mechanism. As seen in the Fig. 7.8, MPTCP-H does not
introduce significant message overhead in comparison to the plain MPTCP. Moreover, it
causes an additional 2% of message overhead compared to TCP, similar to plain MPTCP.
Fig. 7.9 shows that when the number of the subflows s increases from 5 to 20, the mes-
sage overhead also goes up to near 1%. The reason is that the increasing of the number
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FIGURE 7.10: The effect of hopping rates on the overhead
FIGURE 7.11: The effect of hopping rates and packet rates on the overhead
of the subflows (sub-TCP connections) causes additional protocol-based message over-
head. The results denote that the number of the subflows s should be minimized due to
the high overhead in a network with numerous PMUs. On the other hand, involving a
smaller number of subflows eases the discovery of the open ports as explained in Section
7.3.1. Therefore, s should be adapted for different network topologies considering a prob-
able adversary’s attack coordination speediness and the trade-off between the s-related
message overhead and the security consideration.
To show the effect of various hopping rates t on the message overhead, we conduct
experiments using 5 subflows in different hopping rates (time periods) t. The results in-
dicate that reducing the time period of switching subflows slightly increases the message
overhead, as illustrated in Fig. 7.10. However, the increase in message overhead is not
as high as s. Therefore, we can select the shortest time period/hopping rate t without
considering the message overhead.
Lastly, we assess the effect of both different hopping rates and packet rates on the
message overhead. The results demonstrate that when the message rate is high (4ms),
the ratio of the overhead messages is much lower than the one in the low message rate
(16ms), as shown in the Fig. 7.11. This implies that a higher message rate does not lead
to a significant message overhead in MPTCP-H. Moreover, the effect of different hopping
rates is clearly seen at the low message rate due to existence of less application layer
messages in the whole traffic at a low message rate. However, even in the worst case (t =
5s), the increase of the ratio of the message overhead is less than 1%.
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FIGURE 7.12: The system availability provided by MPTCP-H and TCP under
DoS attack
7.6.2 Under DoS attack conditions
In the following sections we assess our approach under DoS attack conditions.
Assessment of the System Availability
We test the availability provided by MPTCP-H and TCP under the DoS attack. The avail-
ability refers to the successful delivery rate of the phasor measurements. The attack sce-
nario in our evaluation is setup as follows: The attacker scans the all ports of the target
(i.e., PDC or PMU) and then launches a SYN flooding attack against the ports for 5 min-
utes. We employ different phasor measurement rates, i.e., 250, 120 and 60 fps, while
testing the availability of MPTCP-H and TCP under DoS attack.
Fig. 7.12 shows that under the DoS attack, MPTCP-H at a low data rate (60 fps) pro-
vides 100% availability. However, the provided availability degree decreases down to
92% with the increase of the data rates from 60 to 250 fps. The reason for this is that until
the MPTCP-H switches subflows/ports under attack, mass amounts of data are transmit-
ted in the high data rate scenarios, which can not be handled by the acknowledge mecha-
nism of MPTCP-H. Alternatively, in Fig. 7.12 we see that TCP cannot provide more than
53% availability for any data rate when the PMU/PDC is under attack. Furthermore,
with data rate increase, the provided availability degree sharply decreases around 10%
like in the case of MPTCP-H.
Evaluation the Additional Latency
As we target time-sensitive WAMS applications, we also assess our approach in terms of
latency in both DoS attack and attack-free conditions. We run each experiment for the
three phasor measurement rates.
Fig. 7.13 demonstrates that the DoS attack causes around 2 ms of additional latency
for each data rate when the system uses MPTCP-H. However, as seen in Fig. 7.14 the DoS
attack leads to more than 20 ms additional latency for TCP, which is not acceptable by
most WAMS applications. Moreover, when we look at Fig. 7.14 and Fig. 7.13, it is clear
that MPTCP-H does not cause any additional latency in attack-free cases in comparison
to TCP.
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FIGURE 7.13: Latency of MPTCP-H under DoS attack
FIGURE 7.14: Latency of MPTCP-H under DoS attack
Summary
The experiments for latency showed that MPTCP-H, with different network topologies,
does not induce any additional latency for the phasor measurement traffic in WAMS in
comparison to UDP, as recommended by the IEEE standard C37.118.2 and IEC 61850.
Furthermore, using MPTCP instead of TCP introduces reasonable additional message
overhead for the contemporary network devices. On the other hand, we test our approach
under DoS attack conditions in terms of the system availability and latency. The results
show that when the PMU/PDC is under DoS attack, whereas MPTCP-H provides over
92% availability for each data rate, the availability provided by TCP is under 53%. In
addition, while the DoS attack causes around 2 ms of additional latency for MPTCP-H,
it leads to more than 20 ms of additional latency for TCP. Overall, we can see from the
experiments that MPTCP-H provides a significant mitigation of the DoS/DDoS attack
with a reasonable overhead.
7.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we first surveyed the possible DoS attack threats against the WAMS (i.e.,
PMUs and PDCs). As a countermeasure against possible DoS attacks, we have proposed
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an MPTCP-extension, termed MPTCP-H, which basically switches the subflows, remov-
ing each subflow after a proscribed t period and adding a new one with a new port, thus
hiding the session information from an attacker who is capable of scanning the ports.
As real-time delivery is a crucial requirement for the phasor measurement traffic, we
evaluated our approach regarding the additional latency and message with the stan-
dard UDP and TCP. The results show that our approach demonstrates a latency perfor-
mance competitive with even the most lightweight transport protocol of UDP. In addition,
MPTCP-H does not introduce any significant additional message overhead in comparison
to plain MPTCP and TCP. Further, the experiment results obtained under DoS attack con-
dition indicate that while MPTCP-H provides over 92% availability, TCP cannot provide
an availability above 53%.
In this paper, we showed that MPTCP-H, with its lightweight mechanism, can mit-
igate the attacks originating from inside the WAN. Overall, these results validate that
MPTCP does not introduce significant additional overhead that can disturb the phasor
measurement traffic while at the same time providing protection against DoS attacks.
Moreover, we plan to test our approach under more sophisticated attacks where the
attacker can continuously scan using powerful computers.
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Summary and Conclusion
The Smart Grid (SG), differing from the classical power grid with fixed generation sources,
dynamically coordinates multiple heterogeneous power sources, distribution and load
balancing activities to provide reliable and cost efficient energy services. This is achieved
by tightly interlinking the power producers and consumers (the physical resources) us-
ing advanced computing/communication technologies (the cyber resources) to form an
adaptive cyber-control system, i.e., a state machine. The effectiveness of such cyber-
control systems is determined by achieving real-time and accurate state information as
obtained from an efficient and reliable communication schema [KK13].
To support the communication requirements of the SG, utilities typically prefer dedi-
cated private E2E communication networks. However, this may not always be achievable
due to cost and technical restrictions. Therefore, the SG communication network could
become a heterogeneous network consisting of multiple private networks and public net-
work i.e., the Internet [Bud+10; KK13].
However, where the Internet infrastructure is employed for SG communication, the
reliability and security issues of the Internet can pose risk for SG operations. Two main
problems regarding these issues have been explored in this thesis. The first problem is
that the current Internet infrastructure does not inherently provide the necessary QoS
guarantees for the safety-critical applications, requiring both low latency and high relia-
bility, due to the Internet’s best-effort versus guaranteed delivery service performance. To
address this problem, the contribution (C1) proposes an overlay network based approach,
which provides a disjoint multipath in the Internet and smart resource allocation for crit-
ical applications. Thus SG applications obtain high QoS-assurance in the Internet infras-
tructure. The second problem is due to the Internet’s security vulnerabilities that can
be exploited by hackers, causing security and safety risks for not only the cyber-system
but also for physical-systems, e.g., electrical grid/appliances. In particular, DDoS attacks
can be considered as a major threat to the SG applications using over public network.
In this regard, we consider three type of DoS/DDoS attacks: 1) volume-based DDoS at-
tacks, 2) transport and application layer DoS/DDoS attacks, and 3) internal DoS/DDoS
attacks launched by compromised SG devices. Contributions (C2), (C3), and (C4) address
these three type of attacks respectively. Contribution (C2) uses P2P broker-based pub-sub
system with a data diffusion mechanism, which provides protection from volume-based
DDoS attacks. Contribution (C3) uses a port hopping mechanism whose key disclosure
risk is addressed. This mechanism provides a strong mitigation for transport and applica-
tion layer DoS/DDoS attacks. Finally, contribution (C4) focuses on internal attackers that
mount application and transport layer attacks exploiting common secrets. To do this, we
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propose an extension to multipath-TCP which hides the open ports from attacker without
using common secrets with other SG devices.
8.1 Thesis Contributions
In this section, we briefly summarize the contributions made by this thesis.
• Contribution 1: Reliable Communication for the SG over Public Networks
We propose an overlay network, HetGrid, that addresses the following require-
ments of SG applications running on public networks: (1) reliable real-time per-
formance, (2) fault-tolerant communication, and (3) E2E QoS-managed delivery.
HetGrid selects the overlay nodes with the most adequate resource provisioning
to manage inter-Autonomous System (AS) communication rather than place a ded-
icated server into each domain. In addition, HetGrid needs only local underlay
knowledge to enable reliable communication across the network.
HetGrid’s main contributions for SG communication can be summarized as fol-
lows: 1) High reliability over the public networks: HetGrid strives to build a
physically-disjoint multipath, and meets the strict QoS requirements of SG appli-
cations via a light-weight, low-overhead communication architecture. To achieve
high reliability, it employs Source Routing-based QoS Routing (SRQR) and Com-
pensative Multi-Routing (CMR) mechanisms, and 2) Application-adaptive and crit-
icality aware resource allocation: SG applications not only need flow-based (peri-
odic) data acquisition, but also aperiodic data accusation (e.g., alert messages) with
diverse QoS requirements. This necessitates a smart resource allocation on the over-
lay network. Thus, HetGrid employs Altruistic Flow Allocation (AFA) in order to
reserve/allocate the ”best” paths (in terms of QoS metrics) for high priority (critical)
applications in a distributed manner.
• Contribution 2: A Secure and Reliable Communication Platform for the SG
Taking into consideration the security requirements and threats for the SG, we pro-
pose a novel pub-sub approach, SeReCP, which provides secure/reliable commu-
nication in the case of a volume-based DDoS attack and for link/node failures. In
addition, considering the high availability requirements of the SG traffic, we pro-
pose a multihoming-based fast ”recovery” mechanism in addition to the data dif-
fusion approach, which provide minimum drop/ack/re-transmission over attacks
on the intermediate pub-sub brokers. Moreover, given the constraints of SG de-
vices and for their group communication requirements, we introduce a novel group
key management mechanism, which provides replay and repudiation attack protec-
tion in addition to confidentiality and integrity assurance. Lastly, the evaluation of
SeReCP is performed on a real test-bed NorNet, which validates the effectiveness of
SeReCP in terms of availability under the attack and, also, its low overhead. SeReCP
shows stable communication performance for up to 30% of pub-sub brokers being
attacked.
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• Contribution 3: Securing the Cloud-Assisted SG
Application and transport layer DDoS attacks represent a serious threat to SG appli-
cations, like volume-based DDoS attacks addressed by SeReCP (C2). To mitigate the
risk related to DDoS threats, we propose an SG-relevant Hierarchical Hybrid Cloud-
Extension Concept (HHCEC) along with a DDoS attack defense mechanism, termed
as Port Hopping Spread Spectrum (PHSS). HHCEC is a cloud-assisted architecture
designed to meet scalability and security requirements of the SG applications in the
cloud. To prevent transport or application-layer DDoS attacks on HHCEC, PHSS
switches the open port of server as a function of time and a secret shared between
authorized clients and server, thus efficiently dropping packets with invalid port
numbers. In addition, PHSS spreads the data packets over all the servers versus a
single server to provide a robust protection against DDoS attacks that would affect
some of the servers. This approach enables PHSS to instantiate replica servers to
take over the attacked servers without blocking all traffic by utilizing the rapid-
elasticity characteristic of the cloud. Moreover, PHSS leverages a port shuffling
mechanism in order to quarantine malicious clients in a notably short time. Ac-
cordingly, the effect of launching a DDoS attack based on the compromised secret
is minimized. We evaluate our approach by building a proof-of-concept prototype
using Amazon’s EC2 and the PlanetLab test-bed. In a DDoS attack scenario, the
proposed approach obtains a significant availability improvement of >38%, high-
lighting its efficiency in comparison to existing approaches. The results also indicate
a negligible overhead of less than 0.01% throughput degradation for the proposed
approach.
• Contribution 4: Towards DDoS Attack Resilient Wide Area Monitoring Systems
We first surveyed the possible DoS attack threats against the WAMS devices (i.e.,
PMUs and PDCs) in both the substation network and WAN of the SG. Based on
this survey, we introduce a practical threat model where the DoS/DDoS attacks can
occur in the substation network or WAN via compromised SG devices, and accord-
ingly saturate the WAMS devices. To counter these threats, we propose a novel de-
fense mechanism, MPTCP-H, which mitigates DoS/DDoS attacks by periodically
switching subflows of the MPTCP connection over new port numbers. Further-
more, MHPTCP-H does not need a shared secret between communicating parties,
thus avoiding the DoS/DDoS attack from the compromised SG devices. Empirical
validation of the MPTCP-H’s overhead shows that MPTCP-H performs equal to or
better than the standard transportation protocols in terms of latency and congestion
attributes.
8.2 Limitations and Future Works
When utilities employ the Internet infrastructure for the critical application, they face
many security and reliability problems. In this thesis we mainly focus on availability-
related problems, as loss of availability posses safety risks for the grid and, perhaps more
importantly, for human beings. However data integrity and confidentiality violations
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are also serious issues in the SG. In particular, data integrity violations can cause criti-
cal safety problems in the power grid, when considering the dispersed SG devices in a
large geographical area where the SG devices are vulnerable to being physically com-
promised. Moreover, data integrity violations can also affect communication availability.
For example, by sending mass amount of fabricated messages triggering a heavy-duty
computation, the compromised SG devices can cause saturation of some control center
servers, which can pose significant safety risks for the SG. This problem will be addressed
in future research.
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A.1 Path Selection and Cost Function Definition
In SRQR, we employ the shortest path (least-cost) routing algorithm for path selection
between the ingress and the egress SN. We aim to find the least cost (weight) path which
meets the QoS requirements in addition to balancing the link load. Hence, we need to
define the weight of the links and the function which computes the weight of paths for
the shortest path algorithm.
Let the overlay path pass through n SNs (from SNs to SNd). Proportional Bandwidth
Shortest Path (PBSP) [LM04] defines the path weight function by including the influence
of all the concave metrics (e.g., bandwidth, etc.) as:
∑n−1
i (
Bi,i+1
Bi,i+1−RB ∗
Ci,i+1
Ci,i+1−RC ), where
Ci,i+1 and RC are residual and required any other concave metric, respectively. The aim
of the definition is to maximize the residual bandwidth and other metrics at any link for
any path (cf. [LM04]). However this path weight function does not include the influence
of additive metrics (e.g., latency). We include the additive metrics’ influence over the
weight of the path as:
PathWeight = ∂conc/n ∗ ∂add, (A.1)
where the influence of the concave (∂conc) and the additive (∂add) metrics. We define the
influence of the additive metrics (∂add) (latency and reliability) over the weight of the path
as;
∂add = (` ∗ <), (A.2)
where ` and < are the influence of latency and reliability over the weight of the path
respectively.
Firstly, the latency’s influence (`) is defined based on following criteria. Let Pn and Pm
be the probability of choosing the paths which pass through n and m intermediate nodes
from SNs to SNd respectively:
if
∑n−1
i Li,i+1 >
∑m−1
j Lj,j+1 than Pn < Pm.
In the definition of the latency’s influence (`) , our aim is to minimize the current
latency at any link for any path, selecting the minimum latency path, as in PBSP, thus: if∑n−1
i Li,i+1< RL,
∑m−1
j Lj,j+1 < RL and
RL
RL−
∑n−1
i Li,i+1
> RL
RL−
∑m−1
j Lj,j+1
then
(Pn =
RL−
∑n−1
i Li,i+1
RL
< Pm =
RL−
∑m−1
j Lj,j+1
RL
). The weight of the paths can be specified as 1 /
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P . The latency (`) is defined as:
` =
RL
RL −
∑n−1
i Li,i+1
. (A.3)
Although the reliability is probabilistic metric, it can be converted additive ones by taking
logarithm their product [IP11]. Base on this concept, by using a similar approach of the
latency, the influence of the reliability over the weight of the path can be defined as:
< =
∑n−1
i logRi,i+1∑n−1
i logRi,i+1 − logRR
. (A.4)
Let put ` and <, defined above, into the equation (A.2):
∂add =
RL
RL−∑n−1i Li,i+1 ∗
∑n−1
i logRi,i+1∑n−1
i logRi,i+1 − logRR
. (A.5)
Finally, ∂add and ∂conc can be put into the equation (A.1) to get the path weight equation
as:
PathWeight =
n−1∑
i
(
Bi,i+1
Bi,i+1 −RB )/n ∗
∗
∑n−1
i logRi,i+1∑n−1
i logRi,i+1 − logRR
∗ RL
RL −
∑n−1
i Li,i+1
. (A.6)
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